Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
Super. Ct. No. 1178131, Superior Court County of Santa Barbara, James F. Rigali, Judge
Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Kenneth J. Kao, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COFFEE, J.
Maurice Van Roberson appeals from an order recommitting him to the Department of Mental Health as a sexually violent predator (SVP) within the meaning of California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP law). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600 et seq.) He challenges the constitutionality of the SVP law.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was convicted of forcibly raping a 17-year-old girl and committing lewd acts with an 8-year-old girl in 1983. He had a history of committing other sexual offenses against young children and violated parole in 1996 after sneaking into a female dorm at 3:30 a.m. He returned to state prison and was committed to the Department of Mental Health as an SVP following a jury trial in 1998. Recommitment petitions filed in 1999, 2001 and 2003 were consolidated for a jury trial. (People v. Roberson (Apr. 10, 2007, B181107) [nonpub. opn.].) Appellant was recommitted for three terms which ended on July 31, 2005. (Ibid.) This appeal involves appellant's fourth recommitment petition. After probable cause proceedings and a trial, a jury found that appellant was an SVP and he was recommitted to the Department of Mental Health for an additional two-year period, beginning on July 31, 2005, and expiring on July 31, 2007.
DISCUSSION
Ex Post Facto
In Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, the United States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Kansas's SVP Act, a civil commitment statute similar to the SVP law. In Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1175, the California Supreme Court concluded that the SVP law is not punitive in nature and upheld the law against an ex post facto challenge: "Under these circumstances, the SVP[] [law] does not impose liability or punishment for criminal conduct, and does not implicate ex post facto concerns insofar as pre-[law] crimes are used as evidence in the SVP determination." We are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) The determination that the SVP law is not punitive "removes an essential prerequisite for ex post facto claims." (Hendricks, at p. 369.) We reject appellant's ex post facto claim.
Equal Protection
Appellant claims the SVP law violates the equal protection clauses of the federal and state Constitutions because it treats SVP inmates differently from other similarly situated persons. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) We disagree. Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Hubbart v. Superior Court supra, 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1171-1178, and we are bound by that decision. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.
We concur:
GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.