Opinion
12-23-2016
D.J. & J.A. Cirando, ESQS., Syracuse (Bradley E. Keem of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. Kristyna S. Mills, District Attorney, Watertown (Nicole L. Kyle of Counsel), for Respondent.
D.J. & J.A. Cirando, ESQS., Syracuse (Bradley E. Keem of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
Kristyna S. Mills, District Attorney, Watertown (Nicole L. Kyle of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., LINDLEY, DeJOSEPH, NEMOYER, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted aggravated criminal contempt (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 215.52[1] ), unlawful fleeing a police officer in a motor vehicle in the third degree (§ 270.25), and resisting arrest (§ 205.30). We note at the outset that, as conceded by the People, the uniform sentence and commitment form incorrectly reflects that a post-incarceration period of conditional discharge was imposed, and it therefore must be amended to correct that clerical error (see generally People v. Pitcher, 126 A.D.3d 1471, 1473–1474, 6 N.Y.S.3d 352, lv. denied 25 N.Y.3d 1169, 15 N.Y.S.3d 301, 36 N.E.3d 104 ).
Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions that his conventional plea of guilty to a lesser charge under the first count of the indictment and his Alford pleas to crimes charged in the sixth and seventh counts of the indictment were not knowingly and voluntarily entered, inasmuch as defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction (see generally People v. Conceicao, 26 N.Y.3d 375, 381, 23 N.Y.S.3d 124, 44 N.E.3d 199 ; People v. Jones, 114 A.D.3d 1239, 1242, 980 N.Y.S.2d 670, lv. denied 23 N.Y.3d 1038, 993 N.Y.S.2d 252, 17 N.E.3d 507, 25 N.Y.3d 1166, 15 N.Y.S.3d 298, 36 N.E.3d 101). This case does not fall within the narrow exception to the preservation requirement (see People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5 ; Jones, 114 A.D.3d at 1242, 980 N.Y.S.2d 670 ).
In any event, defendant's challenges to County Court's acceptance of his pleas are without merit. With respect to defendant's conviction under the first count of the indictment, we conclude that the record affirmatively demonstrates that defendant understood the nature and consequences of his plea (see Conceicao, 26 N.Y.3d at 382–384, 23 N.Y.S.3d 124, 44 N.E.3d 199 ). We further note that "no factual colloquy was required inasmuch as defendant pleaded guilty to a crime lesser than that charged" (People v. Richards, 93 A.D.3d 1240, 1240, 940 N.Y.S.2d 431, lv. denied 20 N.Y.3d 1014, 960 N.Y.S.2d 357, 984 N.E.2d 332 ; see People v. Harris, 125 A.D.3d 1506, 1507, 2 N.Y.S.3d 309, lv. denied 26 N.Y.3d 929, 17 N.Y.S.3d 92, 38 N.E.3d 838 ).
Similarly, "the record establishes that defendant's Alford plea was ‘the product of a voluntary and rational choice, and the record before the court contains strong evidence of actual guilt’ " ( People v. Smith, 26 A.D.3d 746, 747, 807 N.Y.S.2d 897, lv. denied 7 N.Y.3d 763, 819 N.Y.S.2d 888, 853 N.E.2d 259 ). Beyond that, the record "shows that defendant was advised of his rights and that his Alford plea ... was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered with a full understanding of its consequences" (People v. Alfieri, 201 A.D.2d 935, 935, 610 N.Y.S.2d 904, lv. denied 83 N.Y.2d 908, 614 N.Y.S.2d 390, 637 N.E.2d 281 ; see People v. Clacks, 298 A.D.2d 846, 847, 747 N.Y.S.2d 817, lv. denied 99 N.Y.2d 534, 752 N.Y.S.2d 594, 782 N.E.2d 572 ). We note that the court specifically advised defendant of the existence of a possible defense of intoxication and elicited defendant's knowing waiver of that defense (see People v. Petix, 234 A.D.2d 994, 995, 652 N.Y.S.2d 189, lv. denied 89 N.Y.2d 1098, 660 N.Y.S.2d 392, 682 N.E.2d 993 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.