Opinion
06-14-2024
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Cruz RIVERA, Defendant-Appellant.
SARAH S. HOLT, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KATHLEEN P. REARDON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Victoria M. Argento, J.), dated August 22, 2022. The order determined that defendant is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act.
SARAH S. HOLT, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KATHLEEN P. REARDON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (NANCY GILLIGAN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CURRAN, GREENWOOD, NOWAK, AND KEANE, JJ. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
[1] Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order determining that he is a level three risk pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law § 168 et seq.) after a conviction of sexual abuse in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.65 [3]). Correction Law §§ 168-d (3) and 168-n (3) both require "the court fixing a sex offender’s risk level determination to ‘render an order setting forth … the findings of fact and conclusions of law on which the determinations are based’ " (People v. Leopold, 13 N.Y.3d 923, 924, 895 N.Y.S.2d 302, 922 N.E.2d 890 [2010], quoting Correction Law § 168-n [3]; see People v. Smith, 11 N.Y.3d 797, 798, 868 N.Y.S.2d 569, 897 N.E.2d 1050 [2008]). We agree with defendant that Supreme Court failed to comply with the statutes inasmuch as it made only general and conclusory findings of fact and conclusions of law (see People v. Mahar, 191 A.D.3d 1237, 1237, 137 N.Y.S.3d 758 [4th Dept. 2021]; People v. Flax, 71 A.D.3d 1451, 1451-1452, 896 N.Y.S.2d 560 [4th Dept. 2010]). Nevertheless, we conclude that the record is sufficient to allow us to render our own findings of fact and conclusions of law (see People v. Palmer, 20 N.Y.3d 373, 380, 960 N.Y.S.2d 719, 984 N.E.2d 917 [2013]; People v. Gilbert, 78 A.D.3d 1584, 1584, 910 N.Y.S.2d 808 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 16 N.Y.3d 704, 2011 WL 446506 [2011]; People v. Urbanski, 74 A.D.3d 1882, 1883, 903 N.Y.S.2d 648 [4th Dept. 2010], lv denied 15 N.Y.3d 707, 2010 WL 3583295 [2010]).
[2–4] We reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in assessing 15 points under risk factor 11 for alcohol or drug abuse. Risk factor 11 applies "where the offender had a history of alcohol or drug abuse or where the offender consumed sufficient quantities of these substances such that the offender can be shown to have abused alcohol or drugs" (Palmer, 20 N.Y.3d at 378, 960 N.Y.S.2d 719, 984 N.E.2d 917). "A history of substance abuse within the meaning of risk factor 11 exists only when there is a pattern of drug or alcohol use in [the] defendant’s history" (People v. Jackson, 203 A.D.3d 1680, 1681, 164 N.Y.S.3d 352 [4th Dept. 2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The case summary prepared by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders states that, at a substance abuse evaluation conducted in April 2021, defendant indicated that he began drinking alcohol at age 12 and would consume "approximately 25 bottles on weekends" when he was drinking. Defendant reported that he last used alcohol in 2014, but he admitted to being under the influence of alcohol when he was arrested in September 2015. In any event, defendant’s abuse of alcohol prior to 2014 occurred during the time period of some of the underlying offenses. Defendant was given diagnostic impressions of alcohol use disorder—severe. The People therefore established by clear and convincing evidence that defendant had the requisite pattern of alcohol abuse to support the assessment of 15 points under risk factor 11 (see People v. Heffernan, 217 A.D.3d 1593, 1594, 190 N.Y.S.3d 561 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 909, 2023 WL 8720731 [2023]; Jackson, 203 A.D.3d at 1681, 164 N.Y.S.3d 352; People v. Stewart, 199 A.D.3d 1479, 1479-1480, 154 N.Y.S.3d 896 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 908, 2022 WL 1634317 [2022]).
[5] We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in assessing 15 points under risk factor 12 for acceptance of responsibility. The assessment of 15 points is appropriate where, as here, the offender has refused or been expelled from treatment (see People v. Ford, 25 N.Y.3d 939, 941, 6 N.Y.S.3d 541, 29 N.E.3d 888 [2015]). The case summary states that defendant was removed from the sex offender counseling and treatment program in May 2021 and has thereafter refused to participate in the program. Although defendant is correct that removal from a sex offender treatment program for disciplinary violations is not tantamount to refusal to participate in treatment (see id.), defendant’s reliance on Ford is misplaced inasmuch as there is no indication in the record that defendant was expelled from the program based on disciplinary violations (cf. id.; People v. Loughlin, 145 A.D.3d 1426, 1427, 44 N.Y.S.3d 821 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 906, 2017 WL 1719017 [2017]). The assessment of 15 points under risk factor 12 was therefore proper (see People v. Richardson, 197 A.D.3d 878, 880, 153 N.Y.S.3d 277 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 918, 2022 WL 403247 [2022]; People v. Thousand, 109 A.D.3d 1149, 1149-1150, 971 N.Y.S.2d 604 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 857, 2013 WL 6500631 [2013]).
Finally, we note that, even without the assessment of 15 points for risk factor 11 and 15 points for risk factor 12, defendant remains a level 3 risk (see People v. Valentine, 187 A.D.3d 1681, 1681-1682, 132 N.Y.S.3d 505 [4th Dept. 2020], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 907, 2021 WL 629331 [2021]; People v. Robinson, 160 A.D.3d 1441, 1442, 72 N.Y.S.3d 886 [4th Dept. 2018]; People v. Riddick, 139 A.D.3d 1121, 1122, 30 N.Y.S.3d 764 [3d Dept. 2016]).