People v. Rivera

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Biggs

    208 A.D.3d 1340 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 15 times
    Determining that an officer's testimony that "he could not see into the defendant's vehicle" meets the test set by the New York Court of Appeals—"whether the police officer reasonably believes the windows to be over-tinted"—for stopping a motor vehicle for excessively tinted windows

    The Supreme Court, in its written decision, made a fleeting reference to the impoundment as part of the facts of the case, but engaged in no actual analysis about the legality of the impoundment. Since the issue of the lawfulness of the impoundment was neither raised by the omnibus motion nor at the suppression hearing itself, the People were not required to proffer a written police department impoundment policy (see generallyPeople v. Walker, 20 N.Y.3d 122, 125, 957 N.Y.S.2d 272, 980 N.E.2d 937 ) or establish a relevant police caretaker or public safety function (see generallyPeople v. Rivera, 192 A.D.3d 920, 921, 143 N.Y.S.3d 667 ; People v. Weeks, 182 A.D.3d 539, 541, 122 N.Y.S.3d 347 ). We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to controvert the search warrant.

  2. People v. Biggs

    2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 5328 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)

    The Supreme Court, in its written decision, made a fleeting reference to the impoundment as part of the facts of the case, but engaged in no actual analysis about the legality of the impoundment. Since the issue of the lawfulness of the impoundment was neither raised by the omnibus motion nor at the suppression hearing itself, the People were not required to proffer a written police department impoundment policy (see generally People v Walker, 20 N.Y.3d 122, 125) or establish a relevant police caretaker or public safety function (see generally People v Rivera, 192 A.D.3d 920, 921; People v Weeks, 182 A.D.3d 539, 541). We agree with the Supreme Court's denial of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to controvert the search warrant.

  3. People v. Gray

    2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 2025)

    Initially, to the extent that Maggs testified that the Schenectady Police Department impounds vehicles when the driver is arrested for aggravated unlicensed operation in the second degree, the People failed to reconcile that alleged lack of discretion with the written policy stipulated into evidence, which directs that a secured and lawfully parked vehicle be left at the scene unless it would be inappropriate to do so, such as where the vehicle would be a hazard or in danger of theft or damage. Maggs' ambiguous testimony - essentially asserting that any vehicle parked on the street would be unsafe if unattended - falls short of demonstrating that the subject vehicle was not reasonably secure and safe in this residential area, among the many other vehicles parked curbside (see People v Rivera, 192 A.D.3d 920, 921 [2d Dept 2021]; People v King, 188 A.D.3d 721, 722 [2d Dept 2020]; People v Weeks, 182 A.D.3d 539, 541 [2d Dept 2020]; compare People v Tardi, 28 N.Y.3d at 1078). Further, although departmental policy did not require Maggs to investigate whether defendant's father, who was not present at the scene, was in fact willing and able to take control of the vehicle, "facts were brought to [Maggs'] attention to show that impounding would be unnecessary" (People v Walker, 20 N.Y.3d at 125) - i.e., that the "reasonable alternative[ ]" to towing contemplated by the subject policy existed (compare People v David, 41 N.Y.3d 90, 100-101 [2023]).

  4. People v. Wilson

    222 A.D.3d 1006 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 9 times

    v. Douglas, 40 N.Y.3d 385, 386–90, 200 N.Y.S.3d 300, 310–13, 223 N.E.3d 757, 758–61 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People established that "the inventory search was conducted pursuant to a police procedure which was rationally designed to meet the objectives justifying such a search and which effectively limited the searching officer's discretion so as to assure that the police were not merely rummaging for incriminating evidence" ( People v. Meyers, 80 A.D.3d 715, 716, 914 N.Y.S.2d 315 ; seePeople v. Banton, 28 A.D.3d 571, 572, 813 N.Y.S.2d 509 ; cf. People v. Russell, 13 A.D.3d 655, 657, 788 N.Y.S.2d 139 ). The evidence demonstrated that the officer properly conducted the search pursuant to established police procedures, including by preparing a meaningful inventory list recording the property contained in the vehicle (seePeople v. Hill, 219 A.D.3d at 955, 196 N.Y.S.3d 94 ; People v. Noble, 211 A.D.3d at 972, 180 N.Y.S.3d 262 ; cf. People v. Rivera, 192 A.D.3d 920, 921, 143 N.Y.S.3d 667 ). Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the Sandoval compromise adopted by the Supreme Court was not improper (seePeople v. Ragland, 136 A.D.3d 845, 845, 24 N.Y.S.3d 529 ; People v. Townsend, 70 A.D.3d 982, 982, 897 N.Y.S.2d 448 ; People v. Jamison, 303 A.D.2d 603, 603, 756 N.Y.S.2d 495 ).

  5. People v. Hernandez

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 51518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

    While the Court acknowledges that the vehicle can be seen partially in the road, near a fire hydrant, and possibly impeding traffic, there was absolutely no other testimony as to the status of the vehicle (see, e.g., People v. Rivera, 192 A.D.3d 920 [2d Dept. 2021]). In addition, there was no evidence presented that the car could not have been legally parked.

  6. People v. Essic

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 51517 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

    At the hearing, Officer Lawson testified that the defendant's vehicle was legally parked, and there was no testimony regarding posted time limits pertaining to the parking space (see, e.g., People v. Rivera, 192 A.D.3d 920 [2d Dept. 2021]). Nor was there any testimony that the vehicle would impede traffic in any way.