In each of these cases, the subsequent sentences were held to violate section 5-8-1(c) of the Code. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d at 436; Jones, 168 Ill. 2d at 371-72; Walker, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 920-21. Also, in People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App. 3d 519, 571 N.E.2d 202 (1991), the defendant was originally sentenced to four 4-year terms for four convictions, to run consecutively and, upon reconsideration, he was sentenced to two 6-year terms on two groupings of two convictions, each to run consecutively. Rivera, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 523.

The citation to Muellner served only to illustrate the conflict among the districts of the appellate court on the issue addressed in Kilpatrick. Of more significance is Kilpatrick's citation with approval of the appellate court's decision in People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App.3d 519 (1991). There, on resentencing after defendant violated his probation, the circuit court divided defendant's six burglary convictions into three groups and imposed concurrent terms of four years' imprisonment on each conviction in each group.

However, this court also relied on existing precedent to answer this issue raised in Kilpatrick. We followed the analysis of the appellate court in People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App.3d 519 (1991), which held that the trial court was barred from increasing a defendant's sentence upon reconsideration, despite the fact that the defendant's total number of years' incarceration remained unchanged. In Rivera, defendant was convicted of multiple counts of burglary and was sentenced to four consecutive sentences of four years each for a total of 16 years' imprisonment.

We noted that this section is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 89 S.Ct. 2072, in which the Court stated that due process may prohibit a judge from imposing a more severe sentence when the defendant has been convicted following a retrial because a greater sentence may penalize the defendant's right to challenge his conviction and sentence. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill.2d at 443. Bearing in mind the purpose of section 5-81(c), we agreed with the appellate court's reasoning in People v. Rivera (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 519, that consecutive sentences are not treated as a single sentence under section 5-8-1(c). Accordingly, a trial court's modification of sentences so that they are to be served concurrently rather than consecutively does not justify the trial court's increase in the terms of imprisonment for each sentence. ( Rivera, 212 Ill. App.3d at 525.)

Todd, 263 Ill. App.3d at 438. We disagree with the court's reasoning in Todd and find the analysis of the appellate court in People v. Rivera (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 519, more compelling. In Rivera, the appellate court ruled that section 5-8-1(c) barred a trial court from increasing a defendant's sentence notwithstanding the circumstance that the defendant's total number of years' incarceration remained unchanged.

In order to sustain the imposition of a consecutive sentence, the record must establish that the trial court is of the opinion that a consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public. People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App.3d 519, 526 (1991). Like the defendant in this case, the defendant in Rivera was charged with numerous burglaries over a short span of time, was young, and had no significant criminal record.

This court's decision in Todd found that the language of section 5-5-4 of the Code did not prohibit increasing individual sentences, as long as the combined total of the sentences did not exceed the prior vacated sentence. On the other hand, the second district, in People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App.3d 519, 571 N.E.2d 202 (1991), came to a contrary conclusion in a case involving section 5-8-1(c) of the Code. There, the defendant had received a combination of consecutive and concurrent prison sentences totaling 16 years.

Thus, the court found that it was immaterial that "the total number of years' imprisonment remained the same," because the fact remained that the "defendant's sentence was increased, from either six or nine years' incarceration to 15 years." Id. In reaching its holding, the court was expressly persuaded by People v. Rivera, 212 Ill.App.3d 519, where we held that a trial court could not increase a defendant's sentence on review, even if the defendant's total number of years' incarceration remained the same. Kilpatrick, 167 Ill.2d at 445-46.

In addition, when the trial court determines that a more severe sentence is warranted, defendant's age has little import. People v. Rivera, 212 Ill.App.3d 519, 526 (1991). ¶ 41 Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in sentencing defendant to an extended term of 10 years' imprisonment, which falls in the middle of the statutory range.

Moreover, when the court determines that a severe sentence is warranted, defendant's age has little import. People v. Rivera, 212 Ill. App. 3d 519, 526 (1991). ¶ 40 Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in sentencing defendant to concurrent terms of nine years' imprisonment, which fall within the statutory ranges.