People v. Rios

9 Citing cases

  1. People v. Knapp

    487 P.3d 1243 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 9 times

    In doing so, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to giving the instruction. Id. at ¶¶ 52 -53 ; People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 42, 338 P.3d 495.

  2. People v. Stone

    471 P.3d 1148 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    ¶55 We also review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a requested jury instruction. People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 42, 338 P.3d 495. "We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the instruction."

  3. People v. Rios

    463 P.3d 322 (Colo. App. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    This, defense counsel submitted, was at odds with the general rule that "[t]he guilty plea of a codefendant may not be used as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt." People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 24, 338 P.3d 495 ; see also People v. Craig , 179 Colo. 115, 498 P.2d 942 (1972). ¶13 In Colorado, this rule can be traced back to at least 1914, when the supreme court held that while "admissions of guilt made by one of several persons jointly indicted and tried for the same offense are admissible against the person making them, they are not admissible against his codefendants, unless made in their presence and assented to by them."

  4. People v. Mosely

    487 P.3d 1157 (Colo. App. 2019)   Cited 4 times

    2009) (detailing the prosecution's burden to prove mutual combat as an exception to self-defense). Similarly, in People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 51, 338 P.3d 495, 504, a division of this court held, in considering the combat-by-agreement exception to self-defense, that In some instances, the prosecution must prove the existence of an exception to self-defense to carry its burden to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

  5. People v. S.K. (In re M.H-K.)

    433 P.3d 627 (Colo. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times

    And no evidence, other than paternal grandfather’s speculation, supported the allegation that father was under the influence of methamphetamine while caring for the child or that mother knew of this conduct and disregarded the associated risks. See People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 23, 338 P.3d 495 (there was no reason for the court to instruct the jury on information that was never introduced into evidence); see also Barnhisel v. People , 141 Colo. 243, 246, 347 P.2d 915, 917 (1959) ("[A]n instruction ... is erroneous if it implies or assumes the existence of evidence not in the record."). ¶ 42

  6. People v. Lindsey

    461 P.3d 553 (Colo. App. 2018)   Cited 4 times

    ¶ 25 We address Lindsey’s other contentions to the extent that similar issues may arise in the event of retrial. People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 39, 338 P.3d 495. Because we remand on the competency issue, we need not address Lindsey’s arguments on the prosecutor’s cross-examination or merger because the issues were not raised at trial and they are unlikely to arise on remand—particularly the merger issue, on which the parties agree.

  7. People v. Robinson

    459 P.3d 605 (Colo. App. 2017)   Cited 4 times

    ¶ 28 We agree with the Attorney General that several circumstances may have mitigated the impact of the prosecutor's statements. First, "[a] passing reference in opening statements ... may not be prejudicial in the context of a lengthy trial," People v. Rios , 2014 COA 90, ¶ 35, 338 P.3d 495, and here the prosecutor's statements were brief and not repeated (although, as noted above, the prosecutor's direct examination of E.G. also addressed race). But Robinson's trial was not lengthy: excluding voir dire of the prospective jurors and deliberations, it lasted less than two days.

  8. People v. Theus-Roberts

    378 P.3d 750 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 8 times
    Upholding the rejection of instructions on eyewitness credibility where a general credibility instruction was given

    ¶ 33 Whether sufficient evidence supports a requested jury instruction is a question of law that we review de novo. People v. Rios, 2014 COA 90, ¶ 42, 338 P.3d 495. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the giving of the instruction.

  9. People v. Quenga

    2015 Guam 39 (Guam 2015)   Cited 5 times
    In Quenga, 2015 Guam 39, we considered whether the evidence established that Quenga and Manila had engaged in a single conspiratorial relationship or had formed several agreements.

    As such, courts have found error where a co-defendant testifies to having pleaded guilty and no limiting instruction is given. People v. Rios, 338 P.3d 495, 501, 2014 COA 90 (Colo. App. 2014) ("[A] defendant is entitled to have the question of his guilt determined upon the evidence against him, not on whether a codefendant . . . has been convicted of the same charge."); United States v. Prawl, 168 F.3d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1999) ("When a [co-defendant's guilty] plea is introduced for any proper reason . . . the district court . . . should instruct the jury that the co-defendant's plea may not be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt. Such [a]n instruction is necessary because admission of a co-defendant's guilty plea can be extremely prejudicial to the defendant, given the natural human tendency to assume that if an aider and abettor is guilty, the principal must also be guilty."); United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 992 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[P]utting evidence of codefendants' convictions before the jury . . . without a cautionary instruction limiting the jury's consideration to a permissible purpose, constituted plain error affecting substantial rights . . . .").