Opinion
2011-09-22
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant,v.Cesar RIOS, Defendant,234 East 178th St., LLC., Defendant–Respondent.
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Peter D. Coddington of counsel), for appellant.Neal S. Comer, White Plains, for respondent.
Robert T. Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx (Peter D. Coddington of counsel), for appellant.Neal S. Comer, White Plains, for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Margaret L. Clancy, J.), entered on or about February 23, 2010, which granted defendants' CPL 330.30 (1) motion to set aside a jury verdict convicting defendants of criminally negligent homicide and reckless endangerment in the second degree, unanimously affirmed.
This case arises out of a fire in a building owned by the corporate defendant and managed by defendant Rios, who previously owned the building. The fire, which caused the deaths of two firefighters and serious injuries to four more, started in apartment 3–I and spread to apartment 4–L.
Although the fire was caused by illegal and unsafe electrical installations made by the tenant in 3–I, the People's theory at trial was that the deaths and injuries were caused by an illegal and unsafe partition created by a different tenant in 4–L. Therefore, regardless of Rios's knowledge or lack of knowledge of the electrical conditions in apartment 3–I, under the circumstances of the case the People were required to prove that Rios (and, through him, the corporate defendant) knew about
the partition in 4–L and failed to remove it. The People proceeded under a theory of actual knowledge of the unsafe conditions, rather than failure to ascertain them.
In setting aside the verdict, the court correctly concluded (26 Misc.3d 1225[A], 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 50256[U], *11–15, 2010 WL 625221 [2010] ) that there was no evidence that Rios knew of the partition in 4–L. The inferences upon which the People rely are impermissibly speculative. Furthermore, the People called the building's superintendent, who testified that he knew about the partition in 4–L but never told Rios about it. Even if the jury discredited that testimony, such disbelief would not supply affirmative proof of the contrary proposition. Although “[j]ury verdicts are not to be set aside lightly, ... they are not sacrosanct,” and “we cannot ... permit a jury verdict to stand based upon speculation and conjecture” ( People v. Marin, 102 A.D.2d 14, 33, 478 N.Y.S.2d 650 [1984], affd. 65 N.Y.2d 741, 492 N.Y.S.2d 16, 481 N.E.2d 556 [1985] ).