Opinion
NO. 4-12-0225
03-08-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JARROD R. RILEY, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from
Circuit Court of
Clark County
No. 10CF62
Honorable
Tracy W. Resch,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE APPLETON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: (1) By sentencing defendant to 50 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, 3 years' imprisonment for robbery, and 3 years' imprisonment for unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle, the trial court did not abuse its discretion, under the circumstances of this case.
(2) Defendant is entitled to additional presentence credit for the time he spent in presentence custody in Tennessee, before he was extradited to Illinois, because his custody in Tennessee was a result of the offenses for which he was sentenced in Illinois. ¶ 2 The trial court sentenced defendant, Jarrod R. Riley, to 50 years' imprisonment for first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010)), 3 years' imprisonment for robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 2010)), and 3 years' imprisonment for unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2010)), ordering that the latter two sentences run concurrently to one another but consecutively to the sentence for murder. For two reasons, defendant appeals from these sentences. First, he argues the sentences are too severe, especially considering that he must serve 100% of the 50-year prison term for murder. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20 (West 2010). Second, he argues that the trial court failed to give him the full amount of presentence credit to which he was entitled. We agree with the second argument, but because we find no abuse of discretion in the sentences, we are unable to agree with the first. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified so as to give defendant the full amount of presentence credit to which he is entitled. Otherwise, we decline to alter the sentences.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. The Guilty-Plea Hearing (December 2010)
¶ 5 Defendant entered an open plea of guilty to one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010)), one count of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 2010)), and one count of unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2010)). ¶ 6 The prosecutor recited the following factual basis, and defense counsel agreed that the State had evidence that would substantially prove this factual basis. Defendant went to the city of Marshall, Illinois, on July 12, 2010, and waited a few blocks away from the residence of Maria Pacheco until she sent him a text message that all her family members had left the house. Defendant then walked to her house and sent her a text message that he had arrived and was waiting outside. She let him inside the house, and he hid. Maria saw her uncle, Arnulfo Pacheco, getting ready to climb into his truck to go to work, and she lured him into the house by telling him there was a problem in the bathroom. ¶ 7 Arnulfo entered the house, checked the bathroom, and found nothing wrong. He then exited the bathroom, whereupon defendant grabbed him from behind and, using a bleach-soaked towel provided by Maria, tried to suffocate him or render him unconsciousness. ¶ 8 When the bleach-soaked towel failed to render Arnulfo unconscious, defendant struck him repeatedly in the head with a hammer and then stabbed him twice in the neck with a shard of glass. Defendant then taped the bleach-soaked towel over Arnulfo's face, using duct tape provided by Maria. Arnulfo died from the hammer blows to his head. ¶ 9 After killing Arnulfo, defendant stole his wallet, containing $500. Then he and Maria stole his pickup truck.
¶ 10 B. The Sentencing Hearing (March 2011)
¶ 11 1. The Presentence Investigation Report
¶ 12 a. Defendant's Age, Height, and Weight
¶ 13 Defendant was born on March 29, 1990, making him 20 years old at the time of the presentence investigation report. He was 6 feet 2 1/2 inches tall and weighed 300 pounds.
¶ 14 b. His Family Background and His Alleged Victimization
By Sexual Abusers and Schoolyard Bullies
¶ 15 Defendant was adopted when he was 3 1/2 years old. His adoptive mother told him that, when he was between the ages of four months and one year, his biological mother and his maternal grandfather sexually abused him. Defendant suggested to the probation officer that he also might have suffered sexual abuse by the foster parents who had custody of him before he moved in with his adoptive parents, the Rileys. ¶ 16 Defendant told the probation officer that he had "opened up" to Maria Pacheco regarding the sexual abuse he reputedly suffered as a child and that she in turn had told him about some unwelcome touching she had endured at the hands of her uncle, Arnulfo Pacheco. According to defendant, this disclosure by Maria is what "set him off." ¶ 17 Defendant had an intense hatred of sexual abusers, and he felt the same way about bullies, given that he himself had been bullied as a child at school because of his large size.
¶ 18 c. His Paternity
¶ 19 Although defendant never had married, he was the father of two children by two different women. Both children were under the age of one year. He never had paid any child support.
¶ 20 d. His Educational and Vocational Background
¶ 21 Defendant graduated from high school. He entered Indiana University in the fall of 2008 and left the university in May 2009 with a grade point average of 0.347 and an educational debt of $6,000. "I didn't even try," he explained. He spent too much time partying. ¶ 22 He got in a knife fight in college, in which he received a cut on his forearm. He stitched the wound himself. ¶ 23 He has held three jobs. None of these jobs lasted more than two months. His last employer, Indiana Veneers Corporation, described him as a "dependable" employee and said his job performance was good. ¶ 24 At the time of his murder of Arnulfo Pacheco, defendant was living in a homeless shelter in Terre Haute, Indiana. Before living in the homeless shelter, he "mooched off of others," in his words.
¶ 25 e. Lack of Criminal History
¶ 26 Defendant has no criminal history, not even any traffic violations.
¶ 27 f. Mental Health
¶ 28 Possibly, defendant had some mental-health problems, although he was taking no medication and never had undergone formal counseling. He told the probation officer he suffered from mood swings and that he especially was angered by "bullies and rapists." He became infuriated whenever anyone "messe[d] with" his family and friends. Ever since he was 16 years old, his adoptive parents urged him to undergo anger-management counseling, but he always refused to do so.
¶ 29 g. His Attitude Toward His Crimes
¶ 30 Defendant expressed remorse and guilt, though seemingly without emotion.
¶ 31 2. The Testimony of Dr. Jerry L. Boyd
¶ 32 The defense retained a clinical psychologist, Jerry L. Boyd, to assess defendant's fitness to stand trial. Boyd found him to be fit. Nevertheless, in the sentencing hearing, the defense called Boyd for purposes of mitigation. ¶ 33 According to Boyd, defendant was a person of normal intelligence, but his emotional and social maturities lagged behind his intelligence. He was easily angered, easily frustrated. He was emotionally reactive and impulsive, and his judgment was poor. He was troubled, chronically depressed, and lonely, and he felt unloved and unlovable. ¶ 34 Because of his emotionality, his sense of isolation, and his passivity in relationships, defendant was vulnerable to being influenced by anyone whom he perceived as caring about him. The influencer could exploit the issue of sexual abuse, and defendant's perceived history as a sexually abused child could move him to react. Boyd said he had no independent verification that defendant was in fact sexually abused as a child, and Boyd was careful to dispel any notion that he was better qualified than anyone else to discern whether a person was telling the truth. Even so, Boyd perceived defendant as sincerely believing he had been sexually abused as a child, and this claimed victimization seemed to be an important feature of defendant's self-concept. ¶ 35 Boyd testified that the majority of people who had been abused did not injure others. In fact, he said the tendency of such people was to suffer further victimization in other ways rather than to victimize others. ¶ 36 Defendant could be victimized by being influenced. Boyd could not say that defendant actually was influenced in the circumstances of this case. All he could say was that, given defendant's personal history (perceived or real) and his impulsive, emotional nature, he was at risk of being influenced. ¶ 37 Boyd believed, however, that defendant was amenable to treatment. He was not a sociopath. He could distinguish right from wrong. He was responsible for his conduct. He knew how to weigh the pros against the cons when deciding on a course of action. If defendant underwent professional treatment, Boyd would give him a favorable prognosis. ¶ 38 According to Boyd's report, which was admitted in evidence, defendant told him on January 18, 2011:
"Bullies have a big impact with me. I feel like a bully now. Her uncle was smaller than me. And now he's dead because of me. That's taken a big toll. I want to tell the family I'm sorry. I don't know how to say it. I've been sorry since the day it happened. (Q—did you believe that [Maria's] uncle had touched her?) Yeah, I did. (Q—Do you still believe that?) Seeing her in the courtroom—she didn't look like she even cared. (She would) tap her pen, pull her hair, and look
smug—everything was okay. I'm glad we got caught. What we did was horrible. The family knows we didn't get away (with the crime)—we killed him and what happened. I'm glad we're caught for the family's sake. (Q-Do you fell you were used?) I don't know. Whenever I needed money she would give me money. I gave her money. I think she kind of did play me. I don't even know why. (Q—How did she play you?) I don't know. The texts and stuff, we talked about it (that I should harm him) and I shook my head (no). She gave me that look like I was worthless. If she hadn't given me that look, I would have let him walk. I almost did you know. He was almost out of the door and she shoved me back into him and in that thirty seconds is when it all . . . (happened)."
¶ 39 3. The Autopsy Report
¶ 40 According to the autopsy report, Arnulfo Pacheco, age 37, was 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighed 130 pounds. He died of a chop wound to the head and of lacerations to the neck, which perforated the carotid arteries and the jugular veins.
¶ 41 4. The Two Interviews of Defendant
¶ 42 The Illinois State Police interviewed defendant twice: on July 17, 2010, in Camden, Tennessee (to which he and Maria had fled in Arnulfo's truck), and on January 5, 2011, in Marshall, Illinois (to which defendant had been extradited). Both interviews were videotaped and downloaded onto compact discs (CDs), People's exhibit Nos. 2 and 2A. In the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor played the CDs for the trial court, after authenticating them through the testimony of Holly Finney, a special agent of the Illinois State Police. Both CDs are in the record.
¶ 43 a. The Interview of July 17, 2010
¶ 44 In the interview of July 17, 2010, defendant explained that his objective had been to get Maria Pacheco out of her parents' house because, according to what she had told him, her parents had been mistreating her: they had been yelling at her and hitting her in the face. (It does not appear that any evidence adduced in the sentencing hearing reveals precisely what Maria Pacheco's age was, but one might infer, from Boyd's report, that she was a minor. According to what defendant told Boyd, he was worried about being "labeled as a sexual predator," evidently because of his erotic relationship with Maria. He also told Boyd he had suggested to Maria that she "tell [her] teachers" about the abuse she was suffering at the hands of her uncle. In the sentencing hearing, the judge, who had presided at Maria's trial, remarked that she was "a 15-year-old girl." In its brief, the State likewise refers to Maria as defendant's "then 15-year-old girlfriend." In his reply brief, defendant does not disagree with that description.) Also, Maria had told defendant that her uncle, Arnulfo Pacheco, had been touching her in excessively familiar ways, though "not sexually": he had touched her on the thigh and on the back, and he had kissed her on the cheek. Defendant did not like this because he was "a very jealous guy." ¶ 45 So, defendant and Maria decided to kill her uncle. Their plan was to knock him out first so as to "make a clean kill." Arnulfo typically parked his pickup truck in the driveway of her parents' house. When he was getting into his truck to drive to work, she called out to him that there was something wrong with the bathroom. Arnulfo came inside the house and checked the bathroom. He told her he saw nothing wrong. She told him to check again. When he emerged from the bathroom a second time, defendant grabbed him from behind, pressed a rag over his face, and dragged him to the dining room. Maria went upstairs because defendant did not want her to "see this side of [him]." ¶ 46 The two men fell down, and Arnulfo grabbed a hammer from the floor and tried to hit defendant with it. Enraged at this attempt at self-defense, defendant took the hammer from Arnulfo and hit him on the head with the claw of the hammer. They rolled around on the floor, and defendant punched him in the face. Then defendant took a videocassette recorder off a nightstand and broke it over Arnulfo's head. Then defendant picked up a glass tabletop and broke it over his head. Then, straddling Arnulfo, defendant tried to choke him. ¶ 47 Arnulfo was yelling for "Sondra" (Maria's middle name) and crying out, "Please!" Defendant called out for Maria to remain upstairs. Arnulfo asked defendant, "Why?" Defendant answered, "You're never going to touch my girlfriend again." Arnulfo then smiled, causing defendant to become even angrier. Defendant picked up a shard of glass from the broken tabletop and thrust it first into one side of Arnulfo's neck and then into the other side. Arnulfo began shaking. Then defendant taped a cloth over Arnulfo's mouth, using duct tape from the kitchen. ¶ 48 Then defendant removed the gloves from his hands and washed his hands. ¶ 49 In the interview, one of the police officers asks defendant how he feels about this situation. "It sucks," he answers.
¶ 50 b. The Interview of January 5, 2011
¶ 51 At defendant's request, Finney interviewed him a second time, on January 5, 2011. At the beginning of the interview, defendant explained to Finney that, in the previous interview, he left out some information and minimized Maria's role in an effort to protect her, because he still was in love with her at that time. Now, because he was feeling so much remorse and because he wanted the Pacheco family to know the whole truth and because he did not want to come across as "some bad guy who was planning this," he proposed to set the record straight. ¶ 52 Defendant now told Finney that, once he was inside the house of Maria's parents, he was "at the point where [he] didn't want to do it," but Maria physically pushed her uncle into him, and, on impulse, defendant grabbed him. Then, while defendant had him in a chokehold, she spurred defendant on by telling him, "Remember what he did to me." The part about her being upstairs was false. ¶ 53 Later, after she and defendant fled in Arnulfo's pickup truck, she told him, smiling, that she wanted to live a life of crime, like Bonnie and Clyde. But that was not the kind of life that defendant wanted to lead.
¶ 54 5. The Text Messages
¶ 55 In the sentencing hearing, Finney testified that, by making inquiries of friends and family members of Maria Pacheco, the Illinois State Police obtained the numbers to her and defendant's cell phones. Both of them had accounts at Verizon. By a subpoena, the State acquired the text messages that defendant and Maria had sent one another. ¶ 56 These text messages ran into the thousands of pages, so Finney prepared a condensed version, People's exhibit No. 14, containing only messages relevant to this case (taking care not to exclude any messages that could reasonably be taken as mitigating). Without objection, the trial court admitted People's exhibit No. 14 in evidence. The exhibit covers the period of July 5 to 12, 2010.
¶ 57 a. Monday, July 5, 2010
¶ 58 Defendant sends Maria a text message that on Wednesday they should take her uncle's car. Wednesday sounds good, Maria replies. She wants to know if she still has to "wait and see" what defendant's "brilliant plan" is. She remarks that he hitherto has refused to tell her what the bleach is for. To "help knock him out so i wont have to hurt him," defendant explains. He asks her if she has rope and duct tape. She answers no but that she will buy duct tape and that she will keep looking for rope. He concludes by telling her: "My friend and his girl want us to live with them in texas if you want to."
¶ 59 b. Tuesday, July 6, 2010
¶ 60 Maria asks defendant if they are "waiting till next week to leave." She remarks that her father "just got new checks the other day and they're at the house so we could just take those."
¶ 61 c. Wednesday, July 7, 2010
¶ 62 Defendant tells Maria: "I hate my life and cant wait to leave." She replies that she "feels the same way" because she has "put up with there shit for to long" and she cannot "deal with them" any longer. When defendant first asked her to run away with him, she was "beyond happy." The days seem to creep by, and she "can't wait to get out of this place."
¶ 63 d. Thursday, July 8, 2010
¶ 64 Maria asks defendant how he will get to her house on Wednesday. He answers that he has it "all figured out." When she asks him what exactly is the plan, he answers that the plan is "[g]etting you then starting a new life together after we get money but my buddy says we wont need it."
¶ 65 e. Saturday, July 10, 2010
¶ 66 Defendant informs Maria that a complication has arisen: "I guess my friend and his girl got into fight and she kicked him out." Nevertheless, defendant still wants to leave on Monday. His plan is to wait for the uncle, "knock him out," "tie him [u]p," and "take his car," and "by the time he wakes up [they] will be gone." Maria asks him where they will go. California, he replies, and they can "make a pit stop in colorado" because he has a friend there. ¶ 67 Defendant tells her she "need[s] to soak a rag in bleach for Monday." He proposes that, on Monday, before they attack the uncle and take his vehicle, they have sex. She likes that idea. She replies: "[M]y uncle leaves at like ten or eleven to work so you would have to get there early to have enough time to fuck me and take care of him." She explains that her uncle leaves his car in her parents' driveway and that "he usually comes by before work [to] see if we're there." ¶ 68 Defendant asks her "[h]ow much money [is] at the diner." She answers that the money is in the bank but that "his checkbooks are here." She says she "could just take whatever cash is here and [the] checkbook tomorrow." He assents to that idea. ¶ 69 Defendant exhorts Maria that they "cant stop now." He urges her, "[W]hatever i do to your uncle don't stop me please." She agrees she will not stop him. They can hardly wait until two more days pass, when, as defendant says, he will "fuck [her] like crazy."
¶ 70 f. Sunday, July 11, 2010
¶ 71 Maria tells defendant that her parents leave the house at 7:30 a.m. at the latest. He is gratified by this information because he and she will have "plenty of time of time to fuck." ¶ 72 She confirms to defendant that she has her father's checkbook. He asks her how much is in the account. She replies "more than 800 for sure." He tells her to take the money out of the "box" too. ¶ 73 She keeps insisting she loves him. He replies:
"JR: i know you do i think after i do what im doing to your
uncle we are stealing his shit[.] Do you have any knives in your house that are sharp
MP: Love wat are you going to do. Sorry just got texts
JR: Knock him out and fuck him up but if he fights back well you understand righ[t]
MP: Wat do you mean by fuck him up. And yes i do but i don't think we need be killing anyone yet
JR: Just in case if anything ill make it look like a kidnapping but i have gloves so i wont leave any finger prints
MP: Lol you think of everything. But does't have to be at my house why wouldn't you just do it at his
JR: Cuz he would have to come in and i know your house i know where i would hide til he got there and plus it would look like a kidnapping i got this ok baby do[ll.] Trust me
MP: Yes i trust you. I'm just a bit worried but i shall be ok[.] Idk wat would happen if something went wrong. [Y]ou know the consequences of being cought but i knew we wont
JR: No when he gets to your house tell him something wrong with the toilet when he goes to check lock the door behind him he touched you and kissed your cheek thats[.] What time would he be at your house
MP: Around ten before he leaves for work
JR: Then lets do this and be free and do unto ppl that has been done unto us
MP: :) yes lets
JR: I love you more than anything you might see a side of me tomorrow very few ppl see dont be scared cuz i would never hurt you
* * *
JR: I am already know what i am doing dont stop me soon you will have to be cold
MP: Huh
JR: Dont stop me no matter how it turns out[.] Not give a fuck about anything and we are going to new york ok
MP: Thats find with me as long as I'm with you I'm happy :)
* * *
JR: Claudia didn't want you to know but she asked me what i would do about your uncle i guess touching and hitting on her and i told her to tell but she sent me one[.] Before you guys left saying you guys wouldnt believe her your uncle is trying to molest your sisters is what she is telling me and i know he has tried touchin You
* * *
MP: When did she send you that messarge.. When did we leave the Resturant
JR: Idk the time on my facebook is messed up but you
already know what i want to do
MP: What is that
JR: Think about what i went through you should know me better than anyone should you not
MP: Yes i should
JR: Then you know the answer
MP: I pretty sure of it. But i thought you were going to do it anyways
JR: Was just going to knock him out but he is touching little girls and tried to touch my fiance it ends tomorrow
MP: Yea thats wat i thought you were planing to do
JR: Would you want him doing it again
MP: Of course not. He's just going to do it again maybe not with my sisters but with other children so he must be eliminated
JR: Lol i love you you are starting to sound and act like me thats good
MP: Lol really. I can be evil bad cruel sometimes lol
JR: Be it more often just not to me ok baby it will help us in the future a lot[.] Tomorrow we kill a bad man then we start our lives over just you and me
MP: Yes just you and me :)
JR: Not if i can help it do you have a baseball bat
MP: No i don't[.] Have a bunch of metal rods in garage tho JR: So bleach will have to do[.] OK how big well i guess we will check
MP: Different sizes. We can break tomorrow
JR: I dont want them to break i want them to be strong im thinking just cutting his throat
MP: They wont break. Do wat you need to do all i ask is that i see none of it possible i LOVE jarrod
JR: OK i but if i was you i would you would need to get used to it
* * *
JR: Does your uncle live alone
MP: Yes he does
JR: Does he carry alot of money
MP: Not really sometimes
JR: Well we will see wont we
MP: yes we will :)
JR: You getting excited yet
MP: Oh I'm very excited
* * *
JR: So we are making love really quick right baby :) and don't forget when uncle comes in lock door
MP: Yes we are :) and yes i will remember to do so
* * *
JR: Baby quick questions well questions
MP: Yes love
JR: There is a girl in colorado that says she will give m[e] thousand dollars to fuck her and i told her that it would be up to you if you wanted to do a three way
MP: why would u even ask that :(no i'm sorry love
JR: Its fine ***."
¶ 74 g. Monday, July 12, 2010
¶ 75 Defendant tells Maria, at 6:48 a.m. Indiana time, that he has called a cab and that he is on his way to her parents' house in Marshall, Illinois. She keeps him apprised of when her family members are getting up and leaving the house. He tells her he is six miles from Marshall and then one mile away. She tells him, "you should stay off archer ma migt recognise you She's watering her plants or doing something outside." ¶ 76 At 8:05 a.m. Illinois time, Maria tells defendant, "They left. I'm here don't worry love just wait a few minutes to make sure they are all gone." About 10 minutes later, defendant tells her, "Open the front door." She replies, "OK."
¶ 77 6. Defendant's Statement in Allocution
¶ 78 In the sentencing hearing, defendant made a statement in allocution. He told the trial court:
"My name is Jarrod Riley. You all know who I am. I would
like to apologize to the victim's family. Since the day it happened, I wish I could take it back. That's not because I was caught, but because of how I sincerely feel. I want you to know that I know you hate me. I do not blame you. I will live with the pain I have caused the family the rest of my life.
Once again, I want to say how sorry I truly am. I'm glad we got caught. I'm glad we are getting punished. I'm glad because it gives the victim's family closure not only that we got caught, but justice is being served."
¶ 79 7. The Trial Court's Discussion of the Mitigating and Aggravating Factors,
Followed By Its Imposition of the Sentences
¶ 80 On the positive side of the ledger, the trial court noted that defendant, age 20, had no prior criminal history and that he did not appear to be a sociopath. He did not have a substance addiction or a serious psychological malady. Nor did he have a "history of violence or persistent aggressive conduct." Also, after his arrest, he "gave a full confession," pleaded guilty, and "cooperated with the State by testifying at the trial of Maria Pacheco," thereby helping the State to obtain a conviction of her. The court stated it had considered those circumstances. ¶ 81 On the negative side of the ledger, the trial court noted defendant's aimlessness and idleness. Seemingly, his murder of Arnulfo Pacheco was his antidote for ennui. The court said:
"The most notable impression conveyed by the [presentence investigation report] is Mr. Riley's almost total lack of purpose, motivation or sense of responsibility. He has enjoyed good health¶ 82 Apropos of "hooking up with girls," the trial court noted that defendant had fathered two children but had contributed nothing toward their support. Now these children would grow up with the knowledge that their father was in prison for murder. ¶ 83 In the trial court's view, this murder was especially reprehensible not only because defendant coldly planned it out but also because at no point, not even in the midst of the grisly act, did he ever seem to have any qualms or second thoughts. He showed a total lack of empathy for a victim who was, physically, so much smaller than he. Defendant was 6 feet 2 1/2 inches tall and weighed 290 pounds (the presentence investigation reports says 300 pounds). Arnulfo Pacheco, by contrast, was only 5 feet 2 inches tall and weighed only 130 pounds. ¶ 84 "By all accounts," the trial court said, "Arnulfo Pacheco was a decent, hard-working young man trying to responsibly make his way in life, working as a cook in his brother's restaurant." "Mr. Riley," by contrast, "leaves unpaid debts for an educational opportunity that he made no effort to take advantage of. Society will feed, house, provide medical care and generally bear the economic cost of Mr. Riley's future imprisonment day by day, year by year for decades to come. These are Jarrod Riley's accomplishments, all before age 21." ¶ 85 The trial court sentenced defendant to 50 years' imprisonment for first degree murder, 3 years' imprisonment for robbery, and 3 years' imprisonment for unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle, ordering that the latter two sentences run consecutively to the first sentence. Thus, the cumulative punishment was imprisonment for 53 years. ¶ 86 Defendant filed a motion to reduce the sentence, and the trial court denied the motion. ¶ 87 This appeal followed.
and normal advantages in life. He graduated in the middle of his high school class. Seems to have been well liked and he participated in a variety of extracurricular activities.
Yet after his graduation from high school, he did not make any serious effort to either obtain an education or earn a living by working. He parties as opportunity presented, did drugs, hooked up with girls, made a little music, played with his cell phone, occasionally worked, but mostly, as he said, was content to mooch off others. *** It is as if Mr. Riley, having nothing else to do, filled the vacuum of his life by murdering another human being."
¶ 88 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 89 A. The Severity of the Prison Sentences
¶ 90 1. The Economic Burden of Defendant's Future Imprisonment
¶ 91 Before announcing the sentences, the trial court remarked that "[s]ociety will feed, house, provide medical care, and generally bear the economic cost of Mr. Riley's future imprisonment day by day, year by year for decades to come." Defendant argues that the cost of his future imprisonment was not a legitimate factor in aggravation. See 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West 2010). ¶ 92 "An isolated remark made in passing, even though improper, does not necessarily require that [the] defendant be resentenced. [Citation.] Rather, [the] defendant must show that the trial court relied on the improper fact when imposing sentence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Reed, 376 Ill. App. 3d 121, 128 (2007). It is unclear that the trial court regarded the cost of defendant's future imprisonment as a factor in aggravation that should increase his prison sentence. The court did not say it was a factor in aggravation, and we do not see how, conceptually, it would have been possible for the court to regard it as a factor in aggravation. If the cost of imprisonment were a concern, it would be a reason to impose a short prison term, not a long one.
¶ 93 2. His Poor Performance in College and His Unpaid Educational Debt
¶ 94 Defendant argues that "whether [he] was successful in college or [left] behind an educational debt is remote and completely unrelated to the length of the sentence the trial court should impose." Granted, poor academic performance and unpaid educational debts are not among the aggravating factors listed in section 5-5-3.2(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a) (West 2010)). All section 5-5-3.2(a) says, however, is that the factors listed therein "may be considered by the court as reasons to impose a more severe sentence"; it does not say the factors listed therein are exclusive. Id. In fact, case law says that, in determining a sentence, the court should consider the defendant's general moral character, habits, and occupation. (People v. Adkins, 41 Ill. 2d 297, 301 (1968); People v. Zemke, 159 Ill. App. 3d 624, 629-30 (1987))—factors not listed in the Unified Code. Industriousness is considered to be a moral virtue, and indolence is considered to be a vice. Arguably, making little or no effort in college, spending all one's time partying and goofing off, is indicative of a defect in moral character. The same could be said when, after dropping out of college, one makes little or no effort to acquire and maintain employment, despite having two children to support and an educational loan to repay.
¶ 95 3. His Youth and Immaturity
¶ 96 Defendant argues that youth is a mitigating factor and that his "lack of maturity *** suggests that [he] is less culpable than a mature adult." In support of this argument, he cites People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ________, ____________, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012); and Chief Justice Roberts's concurring opinion in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. ________, ________, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2040 (2010 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). ¶ 97 In Miller and Graham, however, the defendants were minors (Miller, 567 U.S. at _____, 132 S. Ct. at 2460; Graham, 560 U.S. at _______, 130 S. Ct. at 2018), whereas defendant is an adult. As for the defendant in Stacey, he was an adult, 33 years old (Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 206), and the supreme court did say that, when imposing a sentence, "age" was one of the factors a trial court should consider, along with the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, and habits (id. at 209). But the supreme court's decision to reduce the defendant's sentence in Stacey had nothing to do with his age. Instead, the supreme court found that the sentence was "manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offenses." Id. at 210. ¶ 98 Because defendant is an adult, youth is not much of a mitigating factor for him. Adults are expected to act like adults. By applying the epithet "immature" to an adult with no intellectual disability, one does not say something in mitigation; one says something in aggravation.
¶ 99 4. The Influence of His Troubled Background
¶ 100 Defendant argues that the trial court "ignored [his] troubled background and the influence this background had on his actions." Quoting Boyd, defendant explains that he "started off as a victim of crime himself[] and the knowledge that he was sexually abused affected his 'beliefs about himself, his self esteem, his self-confidence and other aspects of his self concept.' " He suggests that "the abuse [he] suffered as a child made him more easily influenced and more prone to react emotionally." ¶ 101 In determining a sentence, the trial court should consider "the stimuli which motivated [the defendant's] conduct." People v. Zapata, 347 Ill. App. 3d 956, 966 (2004). As for the question of what were the actual "stimuli" in this case, the trial court did not have to uncritically accept the defense narrative that defendant killed Arnulfo out of righteous indignation as a fellow sufferer of sexual abuse and as a champion of Arnulfo's alleged victims. For one thing, the court had only defendant's word (via Boyd and the probation officer) that he had been sexually abused as a child, and defendant had no independent recollection of suffering any sexual abuse. Instead, he purported to repeat what his adoptive mother had told him. So, even though defendant presents his victimhood as an objective fact, it is unsubstantiated. ¶ 102 Even if, as Boyd suggested, defendant really believed he had been sexually abused as child, the trial court did not have to believe that defendant's self-image as a victim of child sexual abuse was truly what motivated him to murder Arnulfo. It appears, from the text messages, that defendant initially proposed to Maria that he merely knock Arnulfo out, tie him up, and "make it look like a kidnapping." Defendant intended to "have gloves" so that he would not "leave any finger prints." So, he wanted to avoid detection. Maria, also, was concerned about the dire "consequences of being c[a]ught." Obviously, if Arnulfo were dead, he would not be able to tell on them. Defendant no doubt realized this, and on July 10, 2010, before he even presented to Maria the rationale of avenging sexual abuse, he told her, "[W]hatever i do to your uncle don't stop me please," and, the next day, he told her, "[I]f he fights back well you understand righ[t]." The subsequent talk of eliminating a sexual abuser could be regarded as a rationalization. Reading the text messages, one could infer that, because dead men told no tales, defendant intended to murder Arnulfo anyway, from the start, and that transforming Arnulfo into an ogre helped facilitate the murder by raising defendant and Maria to the necessary pitch of ferocity and obscuring, in a pro forma way, the wickedness of the deed.
¶ 103 5. Rehabilitative Potential
¶ 104 Article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution provides: "All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. Defendant contends that sentencing him to 53 years in prison is inconsistent with the objective of restoring him to useful citizenship, considering that, when he is finally released from prison, he will be in his seventies. ¶ 105 The framers of the Illinois constitution must have realized that an offense could be so serious that determining a penalty in accordance with the seriousness of the offense would be irreconcilable with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. See People v. Nobles, 83 Ill. App. 3d 711, 717 (1980) ("If the death penalty which makes impossible the restoration of the offender to useful citizenship is not precluded, then the life imprisonment of the offender would not be precluded either."). The trial court could have decided that the circumstances and manner of Arnulfo's murder were so terrible that a sentence of imprisonment shorter than 50 years would have failed to reflect the seriousness of the offense. "A defendant's rehabilitative potential *** is not entitled to greater weight than the seriousness of the offense." People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 261 (1995).
¶ 106 6. Legitimate Factors in Mitigation, Weighed Against the Factors in Aggravation
¶ 107 This is not to deny the legitimate factors in mitigation: defendant's confession, his guilty pleas, his testimony against Maria, his lack of any prior criminal record, and his expressions of remorse. Defendant overstates his case, however, when he asserts that the trial court "ignored" these mitigating factors. Something must have led the court to impose less than the maximum punishment of 60 years' imprisonment for first degree murder. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a)(1) (West 2010). It could not have been the manner in which defendant killed Arnulfo. The autopsy photographs in the record show where the claws of the hammer sank into his skull again and again. They show the gaping lacerations on his throat. They show the cloth taped over the his mouth and nose, with the duct tape wrapped around and around his head, as if to stifle his last breath. ¶ 108 When weighing the factors in mitigation against the factors in aggravation, including the exceptional brutality of the murder (see 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) (West 2010)), the trial court might well have asked, Which is the real Jarrod R. Riley? The Jarrod R. Riley in the text messages seems a radically different person from the Jarrod R. Riley in the videotaped confessions and in the sentencing hearing. It can be said in his favor that he came clean immediately after his arrest, but the nobility of his doing so might be somewhat alloyed by the inevitability that the police would put two and two together anyway, if the police had not done so already. ¶ 109 The trial court could have concluded that the real Jarrod R. Riley is the one in the text messages, whereas the confessions and the statement in allocution show his public face. As he tells Maria in one of the text messages, "[Y]ou might see a side of me tomorrow that very few [people] see." When this underage girl comes around to his point of view and agrees with him that her uncle "must be eliminated," he laughs out loud ("Lol") and praises her for "starting to sound and act like [him]." When she tells him that she, too, can be "evil bad cruel sometimes," he urges her to be so "more often" because "it will help [them] in the future a lot." He gets "excited" about murdering a man half his size; the prospect of doing so is seemingly an aphrodisiac for him. He wants to have sex with Maria, beforehand, in her parents' bed. He solicits her to participate in a threesome for money. Far from being a passive dupe, as defendant portrays himself in his brief, he gives Maria pep talks and exhorts her to harden her heart so that she can endure the horrible things he plans to do to her uncle. He actively enlists her aid in committing the murder and plans it out with her over the course of several days. He comes up with a plan whereby he uses Arnulfo's kindness against him, ambushing him when he comes in to repair the bathroom. ¶ 110 Considering the factors in aggravation and the light they shed on defendant's moral character, the trial court could have reasonably decided that the mitigating factors were insufficient to reduce the prison sentence more than 10 years below the statutory maximum. "The sentencing judge adequately considered the mitigating and aggravating factors, and it is not our duty to reweigh the factors involved in his sentencing decision." Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d at 261-62. We should not alter a sentence unless we find an abuse of discretion. People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 (1977). This is the most deferential standard of review known to the law. People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 50 (2001). To be an abuse of discretion, a decision must be clearly illogical, arbitrary, unreasonable, contrary to law, or not the product of conscientious judgment. People v. Covington, 395 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1002-03 (2009). Our mere disagreement with a sentence would not justify our reducing it. Id. We should reduce a sentence only if it is outside the "bounds of reason." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. That phrase does not fairly describe the sentences in the present case.
¶ 111 B. Additional Presentence Credit
¶ 112 Defendant was arrested in Camden, Tennessee, on July 15, 2010. He waived extradition, and he was transported to Illinois on July 22, 2010. The mittimus, however, gave him presentence credit only from July 22, 2010, to the date of sentencing, March 16, 2011. Defendant argues he is entitled to presentence credit for each day he spent in custody for the present offenses, regardless of whether he was held in Tennessee or Illinois. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-100(b) (West 2010); People v. Elder, 392 Ill. App. 3d 133, 139 (2009). ¶ 113 The State agrees with defendant on this point, and so do we. Detention in another state is to be credited against a defendant's sentence if the detention in the other state is a result of the offense for which the defendant is sentenced. Id. at 138.
¶ 114 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 115 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment as modified: the sentence is to be modified by giving defendant presentence credit from July 15, 2010, through March 15, 2011. Otherwise, the sentence remains unaltered. We direct the trial court to amend the sentencing order accordingly. ¶ 116 Affirmed as modified.