Opinion
D077512
05-27-2021
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LESTER KENJI RILEY, Defendant and Appellant.
Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCE383309) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Lantz Lewis, Judge. Affirmed. Gary V. Crooks, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Pulos, Kathryn Kirschbaum and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Lester K. Riley of attempted murder after he randomly attacked and stabbed a 75-year-old man on the street. On appeal, Riley asserts the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial and in failing to order a second competency hearing before sentencing him. He also contends there was insufficient evidence to support his attempted murder conviction. Because we conclude there was no error and substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict, we affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
75-year-old S.H. was on an evening walk with his adult daughter and her two young children. As the family waited at a crosswalk to cross the street, Riley approached them with a steak knife in his hand. Riley made eye contact with S.H. and, without saying a word, rushed at S.H. and started stabbing him. Neither men knew each other. As S.H. tried to back away, he tripped over a rock and fell on his back. Riley continued stabbing S.H. When a witness across the street yelled at Riley—"Hey, what are you doing?"—Riley stopped and fled. Riley never said a word during the attack.
Pursuant to rule 8.90(b)(4) of the California Rules of Court, which governs privacy in opinions, we refer to the victim by his initials.
Police responded within minutes and quickly located Riley about a block away from the crime scene, still holding the knife. He eventually complied with police commands to drop the knife but refused to get on the ground. The police fired a beanbag round and tased Riley to make him comply. As he was being arrested, Riley made "mostly nonsensical" statements to the officers. Concerned he may be suicidal, the officers transported Riley for a mental health evaluation. Blood drawn from Riley did not detect alcohol or drugs in his system.
Riley stabbed S.H. at least five times, including once in the face above his eye, twice in his upper chest, and twice in his left arm. At the hospital, S.H. received stitches, but he did not need surgery and he went home the same day.
A jury convicted Riley of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and two misdemeanor counts of cruelty to a child (§ 273a, subd. (b)). As to the attempted murder and assault charges, the jury also found true the allegations that Riley inflicted great bodily injury upon an elderly person (§ 12022.7, subd. (c)) and personally used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The trial court sentenced Riley to 15 years in prison.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The state alleged that Riley acted deliberately and with premeditation in the commission of the attempted murder. (§ 189). At trial, the court granted Riley's motion to dismiss the allegation pursuant to section 1118.1.
DISCUSSION
I.
No Error in Trial Court's Competency Decision
Riley claims the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial after conducting a hearing on the issue and erred again when it failed to order a second competency hearing at the time of his sentencing. We conclude there was no error. A. Trial Court Proceedings
After arraignment, defense counsel declared a doubt as to Riley's competency to stand trial. The trial court suspended proceedings pursuant to section 1368, set a competency hearing, and appointed Dr. Matthew Carroll to conduct a competency evaluation of Riley.
After evaluating Riley, Dr. Carroll concluded "with reasonable medical certainty, that although [Riley] appears to have a history of psychotic disorder, and clinically has a lower than average intellect, he does understand the nature of the proceedings against him, and he can assist his attorney in a rational manner in his own defense at this time."
Upon reviewing Dr. Carroll's report, Riley asked the court to continue the competency hearing so he could obtain his own evaluation. The court granted the continuance. When the competency hearing was held, Riley's counsel informed the court that he "was able to consult with an independent doctor" and that he would "stipulate to the qualifications of [Dr. Carroll] and submit on those findings."
Based on the parties' stipulation, the trial court received Dr. Carroll's report into evidence at the competency hearing. Neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor offered any argument on the question of Riley's competence. The court determined that Riley was mentally competent to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings. After a two-day trial, the jury convicted Riley on all counts and the court set the matter for sentencing.
A probation officer interviewed Riley to prepare a probation and sentencing report. The probation officer observed that Riley was "polite throughout the interview" and although "[i]t was slightly difficult to keep him on track, . . . he was able to answer most questions posed by the [probation officer], without venturing too far off topic." Riley accepted responsibility for the attack, "but disagree[d] with his actions being labeled and charged as attempted murder." He did not provide details on the attack "on the advice of his attorney," who was present at the interview.
For the sentencing hearing, Riley submitted a statement in mitigation and a report from Dr. David DeFrancesco, whom defense counsel had hired to conduct an independent psychological evaluation of Riley. The purpose of Dr. DeFrancesco's evaluation of Riley was "to assess [Riley] for a mental disorder and if found[, to] describe how it impacts [Riley's] functioning and to provide an opinion regarding his risk for future acts of violence." Dr. DeFrancesco offered no opinion as to Riley's ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him or to rationally assist his attorney in his own defense.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that Riley's mental illness was a mitigating factor warranting a reduced sentence but did not declare any doubt about Riley's competence.
The trial court expressed sympathy for Riley's mental health issues but stated public safety was its priority. The court noted that Riley had a "history of escalating violence," and there was "uncertainty of what's going to happen if Mr. Riley is in an unstructured environment." The court sentenced Riley to a term of 15 years in prison. B. Legal Principles
" ' "Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent." ' " (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1032 (Mai), quoting Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162, 181; § 1367, subd. (a) ["A person shall not be tried or adjudged to punishment . . . while that person is mentally incompetent"].) " ' "A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he or she lacks ' "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—[or lacks] . . . a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him." ' " ' " (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1032; § 1367, subd. (a)) ["A defendant is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner."].) The law presumes the defendant competent unless he proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. (§ 1369, subd. (f).)
"Both federal due process and state law require a trial judge to suspend trial proceedings and conduct a competency hearing whenever the court is presented with substantial evidence of incompetence, that is, evidence that raises a reasonable or bona fide doubt concerning the defendant's competence to stand trial." (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 847 (Rogers).) Accordingly, section 1368 provides that, "[i]f, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, . . . a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant" (§ 1368, subd. (a)) or if defense counsel declares a doubt as to the defendant's mental competence (§ 1368, subd. (b)), the court shall order a competency hearing and suspend criminal proceedings until the defendant's mental competence has been determined (§ 1368, subd. (c)).
"Substantial evidence of incompetence exists when a qualified mental health expert who has examined the defendant states under oath, and ' " 'with particularity,' " ' a professional opinion that because of mental illness, the defendant is incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings against him, or of cooperating with counsel." (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 1032-1033.) "Evidence of incompetence may [also] emanate from [other] sources, including the defendant's demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations." (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847.) " '[M]ore is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements' " by the defendant. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 742 (Welch).)
"On appeal, the reviewing court determines whether substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, supports the trial court's finding" as to defendant's competence during a competency hearing. (People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 131, citing People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.) "By the same token, and absent a showing of 'incompetence' that is 'substantial' as a matter of law, the trial judge's decision not to order a competency hearing is entitled to great deference, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the defendant[.]" (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033 [" ' "An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant's conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper." ' "].)
The trial court's duty to conduct a competency hearing under section 1368 arises any time "prior to judgment" when substantial evidence of incompetency arises. (§ 1368, subd. (a); People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152-1153 (Jones).) This duty is ongoing and continuous, even where there has already been a pretrial competency hearing. (People v. Melissakis (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 52, 62.) "When a competency hearing has already been held and the defendant has been found competent to stand trial, however, a trial court need not suspend proceedings to conduct a second competency hearing unless it " 'is presented with a substantial change of circumstances or with new evidence' casting a serious doubt on the validity of that finding." (Jones, at p. 1153.)
We review a trial court's decision to not declare a doubt and not hold a competency hearing "for reasonableness by asking whether there was substantial evidence supporting a finding of incompetence." (People v. Hines (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 583, 599.) "If the defendant presented substantial evidence of incompetence, there is a bona fide doubt as to competence as a matter of law, and the trial judge must order (or be directed to order) a full competency hearing. If the defendant has not presented substantial evidence of incompetence, the decision of whether to order a full competency hearing lies within the discretion of the trial court (and we review the decision for abuse of discretion)." (Ibid.) C. The Initial Determination of Competency
After evaluating Riley, Dr. Carroll concluded Riley understood the nature of the proceedings against him and could rationally assist his attorney in his own defense. Upon receiving Dr. Carroll's psychiatric report, Riley consulted with his own independent doctor. He then stipulated to Dr. Carroll's qualifications and submitted to Dr. Carroll's findings. Thus, the sole evidence before the trial court at the competency hearing was Dr. Carroll's expert opinion that Riley was mentally competent to stand trial. That is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Riley was competent. (See People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1391-1393 [holding one expert's testimony and report "provide[d] substantial evidence supporting the trial court's competency determination"].)
Although he submitted on Dr. Carroll's findings at the competency hearing, Riley now contends "there was no evidence" in Dr. Carroll's report "that [he] could have assisted in any way in his lawyer's defense of him." The record does not support this argument.
Dr. Carroll's detailed observations and findings demonstrate ample support for his conclusion that Riley understood the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to rationally assist in his own defense. He observed that Riley was cooperative throughout the evaluation. Riley made eye contact with Dr. Carroll, "[h]is speech was of normal rate, rhythm, and volume," and "[h]is thought process was logical and goal directed."
Riley was able to provide information about his general background; educational, occupational, relationship, legal, and drug and alcohol history; and psychiatric history. Riley knew he had been charged with murder but asserted that he did "not intend to murder the victim." Riley expressed remorse multiple times during the evaluation, saying he was " 'sorry' " and " 'didn't mean for it to happen.' "
Dr. Carroll's report also included sufficient evidence that Riley understood the nature of his criminal proceedings. He knew he had been arrested because he "stabbed a man," but he intended to plead not guilty to the charges. Dr. Carroll indicated Riley understood the pleas of guilty and not guilty. Riley knew he had a lawyer assigned to him, with whom he had met with "a few times." Riley's understanding of the role of his attorney was to " 'fight on [his] behalf. Speak to the judge and DA.' " Riley indicated the judge would decide as to his guilt, but understood that "if the jury was present, they would make that decision."
Absent contradictory expert opinion or evidence that creates a reasonable doubt about his competence, on appeal, we reject Riley's request that we simply override Dr. Carroll's expert opinion. (People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 288 (Laudermilk).) "We cannot by a process of fragmentizing the report or fastening attention to isolated parts of it, substitute other conclusions for the expert opinion of [the psychiatrist]. To do so would be not merely to defeat the purpose of expert opinion evidence but to discard such evidence for mere psychiatric speculation clearly outside our province." (Ibid.)
Riley also contends that a comment he made to Dr. Carroll—"I know I didn't murder the man[,] [b]ecause I stabbed him in the shoulder"—was "nonsensical and factually false." He also claims the fact that he "had such a strong (and strange) opinion of a complete stranger was evidence that [he] was not in touch with reality and would not be able to assist in his defense." But even as Riley concedes in his opening brief, "[u]nder the substantial evidence test, the defendant must show more than bizarre actions or declarations" to demonstrate his inability to rationally assist in his defense. (See Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 285.)
Riley stabbed the victim in the bicep, not the shoulder.
Finally, Riley contends he was not "forthcoming" with Dr. Carroll about his mental health history and, citing People v. Mayes (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 908, 919 (Mayes), he argues the "failure of a defendant to cooperate with a court-appointed psychiatrist . . . at any stage of the proceedings may be a symptom of mental incompetence." We disagree. Dr. Carroll observed that Riley was "very vague" about his psychiatric history, which could equally suggest that Riley is not a good historian of his own medical history, not a failure to cooperate. To the contrary, Dr. Carroll noted that Riley was cooperative throughout the evaluation.
Moreover, Mayes does not help Riley's argument. In Mayes, after spending five to six minutes with the court-appointed psychiatrist, the defendant refused to participate with the examination. (Mayes, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at p. 911.) As a result, the psychiatrist reached only one conclusion: Mayes was " 'uncooperative.' " (Ibid.) The trial court penalized Mayes for his failure to cooperate by refusing to allow him to present other "evidence material to the question of his competency"—namely from other experts—during his competency hearing. (Id. at p. 919.) Those are not the facts here.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's initial determination that Riley was competent to stand trial. D. Defendant's Competence at the Time of Sentencing
Riley contends there was substantial new evidence presented to the court, prior to sentencing, that cast serious doubt on its initial determination that Riley was competent, and which required the court to conduct a second competency evaluation. He argues the "new" evidence appeared from: (1) Dr. DeFrancesco's report that he suffered from an " 'Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder' "; (2) Riley's statements to the probation officer that he had "kids," when in fact he has one child, and that he was not "responsible for [the victim's actions]," when the evidence showed the victim did nothing to provoke the attack; (3) comments by the attorneys and trial judge at the sentencing hearing acknowledging (and empathizing with) his mental illness; and (4) Riley's statement to the court at the sentencing hearing, which he argues "demonstrated his mental illness." We disagree that any of these—taken together or separately—triggered the requirement for a new competency hearing.
Dr. DeFrancesco offered no opinion nor did he evaluate Riley for his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings or to rationally assist his attorney in his own defense. The purpose of Dr. DeFrancesco's evaluation of Riley was "to assess [Riley] for a mental disorder and if found[, to] describe how it impacts [Riley's] functioning and to provide an opinion regarding his risk for future acts of violence." Defense counsel argued Dr. DeFrancesco's report was support for a mitigated sentence. He did not, on the basis of Dr. DeFrancesco's report, declare a doubt as to Riley's competency at the sentencing hearing.
Moreover, Dr. DeFrancesco's report does not cast serious doubt on Dr. Carroll's opinion or the trial court's initial determination that Riley was competent. He found Riley "oriented appropriately to person, place, time, and situation." He noted that Riley spoke "quickly with a mild stutter," occasionally losing his train of thought. Riley also had "disorganized speech where he was unable to share consistently his thoughts in a connected and linear manner." Dr. DeFrancesco, however, estimated that Riley was in the "[a]verage range of functioning for all areas assessed," except that Riley was in the moderate impairment range for short-term memory and judgment and in the mild range of impairment for expressive language.
Dr. DeFrancesco diagnosed Riley as "appear[ing] to have some form of psychotic illness," specifically "Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder." But this is not new information or new evidence. Dr. Carroll had made similar if not the same observations of Riley's mental illness. Dr. Carroll noted that Riley's jail psychiatric records indicated prior diagnoses for psychotic and personality disorders. He also noted that Riley denied hearing voices at the time of the offense and he observed that Riley was not hearing voices or experiencing hallucinations during his evaluation.
However, "evidence of mental illness alone is not sufficient to raise a doubt about a defendant's competence to stand trial." (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 271.) "The question is whether [Riley's] mental illness interfered with his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the criminal proceedings or to communicate with his counsel about his defense." (Ibid.) And here, Dr. DeFrancesco (and Dr. Carroll) did not opine "that because of [his] mental illness, the defendant is incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings against him, or of cooperating with counsel." (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1033.) However, "[e]ven supposing" Riley had some form of mental illness, our review of the record—including his comments at sentencing—does not show that he lacked an understanding of the nature of the proceedings or the ability to assist in his defense. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1064.)
We also dispose of the argument that Riley's odd statements to the probation officer cast serious doubt on the court's initial competency determination. As we previously stated, " 'more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements' " by the defendant. (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 742.)
We conclude there was not a substantial change of circumstances or new evidence casting serious doubt on the validity of the trial court's initial determination that Riley was competent to stand trial. Thus, the trial court was not required to suspend criminal proceedings at the time of sentencing to conduct a second competency evaluation and there was no abuse of discretion in its decision not to do so.
II.
Substantial Evidence Supported the Attempted Murder Conviction
Riley asserts there is insufficient evidence of his specific intent to kill to support a conviction for attempted murder. We do not agree.
In assessing this claim, we "review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [Riley] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11 (Rodriguez); accord People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 44.) We presume the evidence supports the jury's judgment. (Rodriguez, at p. 11.) And we also " ' "presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." ' " (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739 (Smith).) " ' " ' "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment." ' " ' " (Rodriguez, at p. 11, citing People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.)
To convict Riley of attempted murder, the jury found he (1) made a direct but ineffectual act toward killing S.H. and (2) he intended to kill S.H. (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 739; CALCRIM No. 600.) Intent to kill and express malice are the same thing for purposes of attempted murder. (Smith, at p. 741.) Express malice requires a showing that the defendant actually desired the intended result (i.e. death) or knew " ' " 'to a substantial certainty' " ' " that death would occur. (Id. at p. 739.) Evidence of motive, however, is not required to establish an intent to kill. (Id. at pp. 740-741.)
Intent to kill or express malice is often inferred from the defendant's acts and the circumstances of the crime. (See People v. Lee (1987) 43 Cal.3d 666, 679.) "Absent such direct evidence, the intent obviously must be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the [defendant's] actions and words." (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 945-946 (Lashley).)
Here, Riley intentionally attacked an unarmed victim and stabbed him at least five times, in vulnerable areas of his body, including once in the face above his eye and twice in his upper chest. Riley stopped the attack only when a witness yelled, "Hey, what are you doing?" This alone is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of Riley's intent to kill. (See People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 701-702 (Avila) [evidence of defendant's repeated attempts to stab the victim, who was unarmed and trapped, and his successful stabs to the victim's arm and leg, "alone is substantial evidence of defendant's intent to kill"]; People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552 (Gonzalez) [intent to kill demonstrated in part by evidence of unprovoked attack that rendered unarmed victim prone and defenseless as the defendant repeatedly stabbed him]; People v. Moore (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1114 [substantial evidence supported intent to kill where defendant stabbed victim in an "extremely vulnerable area of the body"].)
Riley, however, argues there could not be sufficient evidence of an intent to kill because the victim did not suffer serious enough injury. But "the degree of the resulting injury is not dispositive of defendant's intent. Indeed, a defendant may properly be convicted of attempted murder when no injury results." (Avila, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 702.) Moreover, the victim testified he covered his heart because Riley was aiming for his vital organs. That the victim was able to thwart fatal blows or the defendant may have had poor aim does not invalidate intent to kill. (Avila, at p. 702 [jury could reasonably infer the victim avoided further injury because of how he defended himself during the attack]; Gonzalez, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552 [fact that the defendant missed the victim's "heart and lungs was fortuitous rather than indicative of the absence of an intent to kill"]; Lashley, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 945 [where "victim may have escaped death" due to defendant's "poor marksmanship" does not invalidate intent to kill].)
Riley also contends the jury could not have found specific intent to kill S.H. because he did not know S.H. Riley states that "[a]side from possible delusion, there was no motive for [him] to have stabbed [S.H.]." Motive is not required to establish an intent to kill. (Smith, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 740- 741.) Moreover, Riley argued that he lacked motive to the jury and, therefore, the intent to kill. The jury rejected that argument.
In sum, we conclude there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Riley had the specific intent to kill S.H.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J. WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, Acting P. J. IRION, J.