Summary
holding that "the police officer had a reasonable suspicion" to stop the defendant's vehicle based on suspected traffic infractions
Summary of this case from People v. HinshawOpinion
March 21, 1994
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Harrington, J.).
Ordered that the judgments are affirmed.
The defendant's claim that the hearing court improperly denied suppression of evidence and statements made by him is devoid of merit. It is axiomatic that a police officer may stop a motor vehicle on a public highway when the stop is premised upon a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle's occupants had been, are then, or are about to be, engaged in conduct in violation of law (see, People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 563). To achieve a level of reasonability, the police officer's suspicion must be "`based upon "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion" (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21)'" (People v. Sobotker, supra, at 563, quoting People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 420).
In this case, contrary to the defendant's contention, the police officer had two distinct grounds for the stop of the defendant's vehicle. First, the police officer testified that the defendant's vehicle was weaving between two lanes in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1128 (a). In addition, the police officer testified that several days earlier he had run a check on the defendant's license after seeing the defendant behind the wheel of a parked car. In this manner, the police officer learned that the defendant, who the officer had arrested for driving while intoxicated on a prior occasion, did not have a valid license. Therefore, at the time he stopped the defendant, the police officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating his vehicle without a valid license in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510 (see, People v. Gales, 187 A.D.2d 606). The police officer's testimony concerning these two grounds was wholly credited by the hearing court and there exists no basis for disturbing its determination (see, People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94; People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88).
The defendant's remaining contention is without merit (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Thompson, J.P., Santucci, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.