Opinion
No. 761 KA 18-00224
11-15-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. COLIN A. RIDEOUT, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SARAH S. HOLT, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KATHLEEN P. REARDON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (MARTIN P. MCCARTHY, II, OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
SARAH S. HOLT, CONFLICT DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (KATHLEEN P. REARDON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (MARTIN P. MCCARTHY, II, OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., BANNISTER, MONTOUR, GREENWOOD, AND KEANE, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Monroe County (Thomas E. Moran, J.), rendered October 13, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree and tampering with physical evidence (two counts).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and two counts of tampering with physical evidence (§ 215.40 [2]). Contrary to defendant's contention, we conclude that the circumstantial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Hines, 97 N.Y.2d 56, 62 [2001], rearg denied 97 N.Y.2d 678 [2001]), is legally sufficient to support the conviction of murder in the second degree (see People v Neulander, 221 A.D.3d 1412, 1412-1413 [4th Dept 2023], lv denied 41 N.Y.3d 984 [2024]; People v Maull, 167 A.D.3d 1465, 1466 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 951 [2019]). Contrary to defendant's further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime of murder in the second degree as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict on that count is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495 [1987]). Defendant's contention that Supreme Court should have severed his trial from that of his codefendants is not preserved for our review because his motions for severance were based on different grounds than those he now raises on appeal (see People v Rolldan, 175 A.D.3d 1811, 1812 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1081 [2019]; People v Howie, 149 A.D.3d 1497, 1499 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1128 [2017]; People v Wooden, 296 A.D.2d 865, 866 [4th Dept 2002], lv denied 99 N.Y.2d 541 [2002]). In any event, we conclude that defendant's contention lacks merit (see generally People v Mahboubian, 74 N.Y.2d 174, 183-185 [1989]). Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the sentence imposed by the court-consecutive indeterminate terms aggregating to 27⅔ years to life imprisonment-is unduly harsh and severe.