Opinion
C089370
06-11-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL ERIK RICKLES, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 18FE011296)
Appointed counsel for defendant Michael Erik Rickles filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and asking this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After reviewing the entire record, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
I. BACKGROUND
Additional background is included below as relevant.
On May 11, 2018, the People charged defendant with committing numerous lewd acts on several different children between July 2000 and April 2014. Defendant pled no contest to two of those counts; the remainder were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. In exchange for defendant's plea, the People agreed to a maximum term of five years in state prison.
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
The trial court appointed Dr. Mary Gable to conduct a Penal Code section 288.1 evaluation of defendant to determine his mental condition. Dr. Gable submitted her evaluation to the court on April 19, 2019. She concluded defendant was a person with "pedophilic disorder and . . . antisocial orientation."
The court found no unusual circumstances warranting probation and sentenced defendant to five years in state prison. Defendant waived a hearing on his ability to pay fines and fees, and the trial court imposed the mandatory fines and fees.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal but did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
II. DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant filed a supplemental brief raising numerous grievances about the judicial system and the process by which he was convicted. We will address these in turn. A. Challenges to Validity of the Plea
Defendant claims he was never read his Miranda rights and was never shown a warrant for his arrest. He also claims law enforcement entered his home without a warrant. Defendant also explains in great detail how he entered into his plea agreement under "duress": He was beaten by another inmate, causing him to fear for his safety; he was sleep deprived because of the conditions in county jail; he was promised probation or parole by his trial counsel; and the trial court judge bullied him.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 .
Having reviewed the record, we disagree with defendant's characterization of the trial court judge's conduct at the time of his plea. The trial court judge appropriately questioned defendant to ensure he understood the plea agreement and gave defendant adequate time to discuss the matter with trial counsel. --------
Defendant also contends the police report giving rise to his arrest was filled with "embellishments, exaggerations, and lies." He contends trial counsel failed to adequately investigate his case prior to the plea agreement, and the victims were exploited and coerced into lying about the abuse.
These claims all challenge the validity of defendant's plea. Defendants must obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal a guilty or no contest plea. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5.) Because defendant failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, we cannot consider these claims on appeal. B. Exculpatory Evidence
Defendant also claims the state withheld, and then destroyed, potentially exculpatory evidence. Specifically, he says there were "recent," "positively favorable" text messages and cell phone calls between him and his victims that would have exonerated him. The state, he claims, withheld those records and then destroyed them.
In general, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the prosecutor to disclose favorable and material evidence to the defendant. (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [10 L.Ed.2d 215, 219] (Brady).) Evidence in the possession of the prosecution must be preserved when its "exculpatory value . . . was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [was] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." (California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479, 489 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 422] (Trombetta).) Thus, it is not required that "evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant" be preserved. (Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57 [102 L.Ed.2d 281, 289] (Youngblood).) Furthermore, although good or bad faith is irrelevant when the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence material in its possession to the defendant, "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." (Id. at p. 58.)
Defendant's claims under Brady and Trombetta/Youngblood are nevertheless forfeited because he did not raise these claims in the trial court. (People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1300 [Trombetta/Youngblood claim forfeited for failing to raise in the trial court]; People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 714 [Brady claim forfeited for failing to raise in the trial court].) C. Bail
Defendant claims the trial court did not set reasonable bail following his arrest, leaving defendant in county jail without access to resources to prepare his defense. Now that defendant has been convicted, this claim is moot. (See People v. Lowery (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 902, 904 [claims of excessive bail rendered moot by conviction].) D. Expert Opinion
Defendant also challenges the court appointed psychiatrist's diagnosis that defendant is a person with "pedophilic disorder and . . . antisocial orientation." He claims the diagnosis is "defamatory." Defendant's challenge to the credibility of the expert's opinion is not properly before this court. (See People v. Poe (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 826, 831 ["It is not the role of this court to redetermine the credibility of experts or to reweigh the relative strength of their conclusions"].) E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing
Defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing. We disagree.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under federal and California constitutional standards, a defendant must, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove: (1) his trial counsel's representation was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) the deficiency resulted in prejudice to defendant. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218.) The defendant must affirmatively prove that, but for counsel's errors, defendant had a reasonable probability of a better outcome, where a " 'reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' " (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 389.)
1. Promise of Probation
First, defendant argues trial counsel "promised" him he would receive "parole/probation . . . but instead [he] received a 5 year prison sentence." The record on appeal does not support defendant's claim.
At the plea hearing, defense counsel noted for the record that defendant was "eligible for probation if there are unusual circumstances." The court advised defendant: "So if I find or the judge who is here finds there are unusual circumstances, then you could get probation. But a judge has to find that in order to get you probation.
"THE DEFENDANT: Okay.
"THE COURT: Do you understand all that?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Hope for the best.
"THE COURT: Pardon?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Hope for the best.
"THE COURT: All right. That's—exactly. But you've got to, as I say, prepare for the worst.
"THE DEFENDANT: Hopefully that's not the case."
Thus, on this record it is evident trial counsel did not promise defendant probation but made it clear probation was possible only if the trial court found unusual circumstances.
2. Lying to the Court
Defendant also argues that his trial attorney "made the false claim [defendant] had Gulf War Syndrome" to the trial court judge. As a result of that lie, defendant claims, the trial court "refused to take into consideration during [his] sentencing [him] being a U.S. Armed Forces Veteran (Air Force) with service-connected mental health disabilities such as Bipolar II and PTSD. (From 1991 (the Gulf War) to 2008)." Again, the record does not support defendant's claim.
Whether defendant does or does not have Gulf War Syndrome, it is evident from the record that the trial court did consider defendant's military service and service-connected mental health disabilities when sentencing defendant. The court considered the probation report, the psychiatric evaluation prepared by the court's expert, and defendant's mitigation statement. The probation report and psychiatric evaluation both clearly identified defendant's military service, as well as his bipolar diagnosis.
Because neither claim is supported by the record on appeal, both claims fail. F. Judicial Bias
Defendant contends the trial court judge's remarks at sentencing demonstrated bias against defendant. Defendant forfeited this claim by not raising it below. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110.) G. Wende Review
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/_________
RENNER, J. We concur: /S/_________
MAURO, Acting P. J. /S/_________
DUARTE, J.