Opinion
E074177
02-16-2021
Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Yvette M. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. SWF1907220) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jeffrey Prevost, Judge. Affirmed. Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbanski and Yvette M. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant and appellant William Clyde Richardson, Jr., of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1); one count of possession of ammunition by a felon (Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a); count 2); and one count of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a); count 3). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted that he had suffered one prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (c) & (e)(1)). Defendant was sentenced to a total term of four years in state prison with 448 days' credit for time served as follows: the midterm of two years, doubled to four years on count 1; a concurrent term of four years on count 2; and a concurrent term of 364 days on count 3.
The trial court granted the People's oral motion to dismiss defendant's five prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he personally possessed a firearm as alleged in count 1. Because sufficient circumstantial evidence demonstrates defendant knowingly and personally possessed the firearm, we affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2019, around 10:00 or 11:00 a.m., Detective Jones of the Murrieta Police Department, along with other officers, conducted a surveillance of defendant's residence located in Wildomar because law enforcement was looking for defendant. Detective Jones was familiar with defendant and could recognize him. Detective Jones was also familiar with defendant's residence.
At around 1:00 p.m., Detective Jones, using binoculars, observed a brown pickup truck drive into the driveway of defendant's residence. Detective Jones then saw several people exit the vehicle, including a male passenger wearing a blue long-sleeved sweatshirt and blue jeans. The male passenger, who Detective Jones identified as defendant, exited the pickup truck with two backpacks and a large guitar case. The pickup truck then drove away. Detective Jones believed the male passenger to be defendant based on having seen defendant before, but he was unable to make an identification with 100 percent certainty at the time he saw defendant exit the pickup truck.
Detective Jones thereafter watched the man he believed to be defendant place the two backpacks on the front porch of the residence, pick up the guitar case, and then walk around the side of the house with the guitar case. The detective had a clear view of the house from his location, approximately 100 yards or less away from defendant's residence.
While Detective Jones remained at the residence, he instructed a sergeant to conduct a traffic stop on the pickup truck. The sergeant drove directly behind the pickup truck and activated his patrol vehicle's emergency lights and sirens, but the truck did not yield. Based on his experience, the sergeant believed the pickup truck took an unusually long time to yield. The sergeant also noted that the pickup truck drove very slowly for about 10 to 15 seconds, despite a lack of traffic. The sergeant could not see what the occupants were doing during that time. The pickup truck eventually stopped in the middle of the road. The sergeant waited 15 to 20 seconds to approach the truck and eventually made contact with the occupants of the truck. The sergeant identified one of the occupants as an associate of defendant, but did not locate defendant in the pickup truck.
After Detective Jones saw defendant walk along the side of the house with the guitar case, between five and 10 minutes later law enforcement assembled to search defendant's residence. Five unmarked patrol vehicles approached the residence "fairly aggressive[ly]," with at least one of the patrol vehicles displaying its red and blue overhead lights, and possibly its strobe light. A person standing outside would have heard the engines revving, the cars accelerating down the road, and then braking hard at defendant's residence.
The team of law enforcement officers searched defendant's residence. Officers located eight to 10 people in the residence, but defendant was not one of them. Detective Jones searched the two backpacks located on the front porch and found some clothing and a partial box of .45-caliber ammunition inside of the backpacks. On the back side of the house, Detective Jones observed a ladder leading up to the roof. He climbed the ladder and saw a guitar case on the roof. The guitar case was located along the same side of the house and in the same direction as where he last saw defendant carrying a guitar case.
Inside the guitar case, Detective Jones found a SKS model rifle with a wood stock and attached bayonet that worked as a stabbing weapon. The rifle was loaded with three live rounds of .30-caliber ammunition in an attached magazine cartridge. The size of the cartridge was 7.62 x 39-millimeter. The guitar case measured 42 to 48 inches tall and could collapse and roll up. However, when Detective Jones saw defendant carrying the guitar case, it appeared straight and rigid, consistent with containing something inside of it.
Law enforcement searched the residence and surrounding area for defendant but did not locate him. The rear of the residence backed up to an open space of dirt trails and vegetation. Detective Jones noticed tall weeds that were bent down, indicating that somebody had moved from the property to the open space.
On the following day, April 3, 2019, Detective Jones and his team found defendant at a different residence in Wildomar. Detective Jones was aware that an associate of defendant's resided at that residence. Defendant was still wearing the same clothes as the day before, and had the same hairstyle and facial hair. Detective Jones recognized defendant as the same person that he saw the day before carrying the guitar case. Defendant's clothes appeared dirty, as though he had been wearing them for many days without washing them. He smelled as though he had not bathed and appeared unshaven. Prior to Detective Jones's arrival, defendant had provided the wrong name and date of birth to another officer. However, when Detective Jones arrived at the location and identified defendant as the person he had seen the day before, defendant gave his true name.
Officers searched defendant and found a bindle containing approximately two grams of heroin in the coin pocket of his pants. In the front pockets of defendant's pants, the officers found two live 7.62 x 39-millimeter rifle cartridges and one live .22-caliber rifle cartridge.
An investigator examined the rifle, the cartridge found in the rifle, and the ammunition found in defendant's pockets. The investigator explained that SKS rifles were designed in the World War II era and were "designed around the cartridge 7.62 x 39-millimeter rifle cartridge [sic]." The investigator also noted that the SKS rifle found on the roof of defendant's house was in very good working condition and that the rifle was loaded with three rounds of live 7.62 x 39-millimeter rifle cartridges. The investigator compared the ammunition found in the SKS rifle with the ammunition found in defendant's pockets and concluded they were all live unexpended rounds of the same caliber. The investigator also determined that two of the rounds found in defendant's pockets matched the same manufacturer and year as two of the rounds found in the SKS rifle, indicating that the rounds were packaged and sold together. The investigator further noted that manufacturers sell a limited amount of ammunition each year.
The parties stipulated that defendant had been convicted of a prior felony, prohibiting him from possessing a firearm.
Defendant offered no affirmative evidence but argued the People had not proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt. As to count 1, possession of the rifle, defense counsel asserted it "relies on circumstantial evidence" and there was no direct evidence to prove defendant possessed the rifle. Defense counsel also pointed out that there were nine to 10 people in the residence on the first day the officers searched for defendant and noted different possible inferences of the evidence.
III
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that he possessed a firearm because the evidence was too speculative to connect him to the SKS rifle found on the roof of his residence. Because more than sufficient circumstantial evidence demonstrates defendant knowingly and personally possessed the SKS rifle, we disagree.
"'"When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.] We determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court "presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence."' [Citation]" (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212-1213, italics omitted.) "'"The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]"'" (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1006.)
In considering the record as a whole, we "'must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.'" (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) "Our role is to determine the legal sufficiency of the found facts and not to second guess the reasoning or wisdom of the fact finder." (People v. Lashley (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 938, 946.) In other words, we do not substitute our own interpretation of the record in place of the jury's determinations regarding witness credibility and disputed issues of fact. (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 106; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
It is well settled that a single eyewitness's identification of a suspect as the perpetrator of a crime is sufficient to sustain a conviction. (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 573-575; Evid. Code, § 411 ["Except where additional evidence is required by statute, the direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact."].) "'The strength or weakness of the identification, the incompatibility of and discrepancies in the testimony, if there were any, the uncertainty of recollection, and the qualification of identity and lack of positiveness in testimony are matters which go to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and are for the observation and consideration, and directed solely to the attention of the jury in the first instance . . . .'" (People v. Mohamed (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 515, 522.)
Penal Code section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), states that "[a]ny person who has been convicted of . . . a felony under the laws of the United States, the State of California, or any other state, . . . and who owns, purchases, receives, or has in possession or under custody or control any firearm is guilty of a felony." "To 'possess' a firearm means 'having "'"actual control, care and management of"'"' the firearm. [Citations.]" (In re Charles G. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945, 951.) Possession of a firearm "may be proven circumstantially, and possession for even a limited time and purpose may be sufficient." (In re Daniel G. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 824, 831 (Daniel G.).)
Moreover, "[p]ossession may be actual or constructive. Actual possession means the object is in the defendant's immediate possession or control. A defendant has actual possession when he himself has the weapon. Constructive possession means the object is not in the defendant's physical possession, but the defendant knowingly exercises control or the right to control the object. [Citation.]" (Daniel G., supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 831.) "To establish constructive possession, the prosecution must prove a defendant knowingly exercised a right to control the prohibited item, either directly or through another person. [Citations.] Possession may be shared with others. [Citation.] But mere proximity to the weapon, standing alone, is not sufficient evidence of possession. [Citation.]" (People v. Sifuentes (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1417 (Sifuentes), disapproved on another ground in People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 304, fn. 6; see People v. Elder (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1313.)
Defendant maintains that Detective Jones's observation of defendant with the guitar case coupled with his possession of similar ammunition to the rifle found in the guitar case was too speculative to permit a finding he possessed the rifle. The claim is meritless.
Here, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish that defendant knowingly possessed the loaded SKS rifle found on the roof of his residence. Detective Jones identified defendant as the person carrying the guitar case with the SKS rifle. Detective Jones was familiar with defendant, could identify him, and conducted a surveillance of his residence in order to locate him. The detective also had a clear view of defendant and the residence. In addition, despite the presence of others at the time of the search, the uncontroverted evidence established that defendant resided at the house. And, although the rifle was found on the roof, it was along the path defendant had taken attempting to evade officers.
While Detective Jones was initially unable to make a 100 percent identification on the day he saw defendant carrying the guitar case, he confirmed that it was indeed defendant carrying the guitar case. When defendant was located the following day, the detective noted that defendant was still wearing the same clothes and had the same facial hair as when he carried the guitar case with the firearm. Moreover, when defendant was found the next day at one of his associate's residences, officers located the same ammunition as that loaded in the SKS rifle in his pant pockets, further connecting him to the rifle.
Relying on Sifuentes, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th 1410, defendant argues "[e]vidence of knowledge of the rifle's presence was simply too speculative, too nebulous to sustain a conviction for the crime of unlawful firearm possession." In Sifuentes, the issue was whether the defendant constructively possessed a firearm. (Id. at p. 1417.) The police had executed a warrant on a motel room, where the defendant and a fellow gang member were found. The defendant was lying on the bed nearest the door. The fellow gang member knelt on the floor near a second bed, his right hand reaching down under the mattress where, it was later discovered, a firearm was located. (Id. at pp. 1413-1414.) The appellate court held this was insufficient to establish that the defendant was in constructive possession of the firearm. (Id. at p. 1419.) The only evidence the People relied on was expert testimony concerning the nature of a "gang gun," and in particular that such guns were "'accessible' to gang members 'at most times.'" This testimony, without more, was insufficient to establish that the defendant had the right to control the firearm at the moment the police arrested the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1417-1418.)
The evidence here was significantly stronger than in Sifuentes. Here, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendant knew the SKS rifle was inside the guitar case and that defendant hid the guitar case on the top of the roof of his residence after he evaded law enforcement. Unlike Sifuentes, therefore, where the defendant was simply lying on a bed and the gun was much closer to, and in the actual possession of, another gang member, here the evidence suggests that defendant had sole dominion over the rifle. In other words, in Sifuentes the defendant's relation to the gun was mere presence. Here, there was evidence defendant exercised control or dominion over the rifle, which supports the jury's finding that defendant possessed the rifle.
Defendant simply refuses to acknowledge the distinction between reasonable inferences and speculation. "An inference is a logical and reasonable deduction or conclusion to be drawn from the proof of preliminary facts. [Citations.] It is the province of the trier of fact to decide whether an inference should be drawn and the weight to be accorded the inference. . . . [T]o constitute an inference, the conclusion must to some degree reasonably and logically follow from the preliminary facts. If, upon proof of the preliminary facts, the conclusion is mere guesswork, then we refer to it by such words as speculation, conjecture, surmise, suspicion, and the like; and it cannot rise to the dignity of an inference." (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 373-374.)
The observation of defendant carrying a guitar case containing the SKS rifle and the same ammunition as found in the rifle in defendant's possession is reasonably interpreted as showing defendant had actual possession of the rifle. Given the surrounding circumstances, a rational trier of fact could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the rifle, even if, as defendant contends, "there was absolutely no direct testimony connecting the rifle to [defendant]." Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a conviction.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J. We concur: RAMIREZ
P. J. SLOUGH
J.