As an alternative holding, we also reject these claims on the merits. In particular, we note that the People's nondisclosure of a case pending against one of their witnesses for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated did not constitute a violation of CPL 240.45 (1) (c) because the People were not aware of this pending action during defendants' trial ( see People v Hernandez, 210 AD2d 535, 536, lv denied 84 NY2d 1032). Furthermore, there is no reasonable possibility that disclosure of the open case would have led to defendants' acquittal ( see e.g. People v Richards, 184 AD2d 222, lv denied 80 NY2d 1029). To the extent that defendants' postverdict motions also alleged improper conduct by or toward jurors ( see CPL 330.30), those claims are likewise without merit.
Defendant's various challenges to the introduction of prior consistent statements by the complainant are unpreserved and we decline to review them in the interest of justice. Were we to review these claims, we would find no prejudice to defendant, since he relied heavily on most of the statements in question to attack the reliability of the complainant's testimony ( see, People v. Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 1029), and the remaining statements were stricken with proper curative instructions, after which defendant requested no further relief. The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting expert testimony regarding child sexual abuse syndrome to explain matters beyond the ken of the typical juror, including reactions and behavior of children as a result of sexual abuse ( People v. Grant, 241 A.D.2d 340, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 1011). Contrary to defendant's current claims, each of the subject matters of the expert testimony was properly elicited in response to issues raised by the defense ( see, People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277).
In this sense, the impeachment value of George's prior activities would have been cumulative. Defense counsel's cross-examination of George concerning his heavy involvement in the drug trade and the leniency George received in exchange for his cooperation in this case provided ample basis for the jury to question George's reliability as a witness ( see, People v. Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222, 222-223, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 1029 [no reasonable possibility that failure to disclose witness's two convictions contributed to the verdict where witness extensively cross-examined, his testimony was corroborated by other witnesses and his credibility challenged in the defense summation]; see also, United States v. Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145-146 [2d Cir 1996] [suppressed evidence not material when it merely furnishes an additional basis to impeach a witness whose credibility is already shown to be questionable]; United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1007 [2d Cir 1990], cert denied 500 U.S. 925). More significantly, there was overwhelming evidence establishing defendant's role in the conspiracy, much of it unconnected to George ( see, People v. Martin, ___ A.D.2d ___, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op — [1st Dept, Feb. 10, 1998] [impeachment value of arresting officers' misconduct does not require vacatur of plea where officers' testimony was not sole source of defendant's guilt]).
Upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15). Nor is reversal warranted based on the People's failure to disclose alleged information that one of the People's witnesses had been arrested several times and was previously convicted of harassment, since there was no reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose this information contributed to the verdict ( see, People v Vilardi, 76 NY2d 67, 77; People v Richards, 184 AD2d 222). Significantly, the testimony of that witness was corroborated by the fact that the defendant was found in possession of the complainants' property at the time of his arrest. The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.
absent juror after 15 minutes without inquiry as to juror's whereabouts], lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 923). While some support for defendant's contention that it is an abuse of discretion to direct substitution to avoid a very brief delay may be found in this Court's decision in People v. Brown ( 175 A.D.2d 708, 710 [insufficient reason to refuse to delay trial "for what amounted to no more than two and a half hours"], lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 1074), the concurring memorandum in that case notes that "the trial court did not make the required searching inquiry relating to the availability of a juror for continued service and to the effect of a temporary absence of a juror on the case as a whole" ( supra, at 710 [Smith, J.]). Defendant's observation that a court may direct substitution of a juror where the juror's continued availability, though brief, is not "`readily ascertainable'" is valid ( People v. Gordon, 185 A.D.2d 199 [absent indication ill juror would soon recover, discharge was proper]; People v. Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222 [length of absence of juror whose brother had just suffered a stroke was unascertainable], lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 1029; People v. Ray, 182 A.D.2d 387 [uncertainty that juror whose apartment burned would return in two days as indicated sufficient for discharge], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1053; People v. Cook, 176 A.D.2d 209 ["juror could not advise when she would be available"], lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 825). The conclusion he draws from this observation — that substitution of a juror may only be directed when the juror's continued availability is unascertainable — is not. In People v Robustelli ( 189 A.D.2d 668, 669, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 975), this Court held that a juror whose presence on the Monday following "was probable though not certain", was properly discharged where the proceedings had already been adjourned for one and one half days and the jurors had "`expressed anxiety about the duration of the trial'".
ndant's claims that the People's lay witnesses were improperly permitted to give a "psychiatric evaluation" of the complainant's apparent emotional state after the attack upon her, and that their descriptions of her crying and sobbing were prejudicial to him, were not preserved by the general objections registered thereto ( People v Tevaha, 84 N.Y.2d 879). Moreover, since defendant placed in issue whether any rape occurred, the complainant's prompt outcry and descriptions of her emotional state soon after the attack became relevant to material issues in the case ( People v Terrence, 205 A.D.2d 301, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 873). Any issue raised by the People's introduction of portions of the complainant's Grand Jury testimony was not preserved by objection, and in any event its introduction was proper rebuttal to defendant's implication on cross-examination, based on other portions of the complainant's Grand Jury testimony, that the complainant's trial testimony was a recent fabrication ( People v Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222, lv denied 80 N.Y.2d 1029). We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
It was entirely proper for the court to base its protective order with respect to Rosario material on the prosecutor's in camera representations, on the record, that the defendant had a history of threatening witnesses (see, CPL 240.50, 240.90 Crim. Proc. [3]; People v. Boyd, 164 A.D.2d 800, 802-803). The court's order properly balanced the interests of the prosecution witnesses in their safety against the defendant's right to mount a defense (see, People v. Boyd, supra; People v. Rhodes, 154 A.D.2d 279). Because all the Rosario material was turned over early enough for the defendant to use it effectively during cross-examination at the trial, no prejudice resulted from a protective order shielding the identity of certain prosecution witnesses until the day before they were to testify (see, People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, cert denied 368 U.S. 866; People v Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222; People v. Blagrove, 183 A.D.2d 837; People v. Bennett, 162 A.D.2d 820). We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Sibadan, supra, at 35. See also People v. Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222, 222-23 (1st Dept. 1992) (reversal not warranted where People failed to disclose that one of their witnesses "had two prior convictions under different names, there being no reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose contributed to the verdict. . . . The witness was extensively cross-examined, his testimony corroborated by several other witnesses, and his credibility challenged during summation.
Evidence which merely impeaches a witness's general credibility as to a collateral matter, on the other hand, is rarely material. And the unexcused failure to disclose such evidence to the defendant does not provide a basis for a new trial ( People v Battee, 122 A.D.2d 526; see also, People v Richards, 184 A.D.2d 222; People v Irvin, 180 A.D.2d 753; People v Ramos, 147 Misc.2d 672). Here, by no stretch was McKernan's off-duty incident for brandishing a weapon directly probative of any issue at the defendants' trial.