Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CRF08-80
BUTZ, J.On February 19, 2008, defendant Terrell Alexander Rice entered a Mervyn’s department store, selected several items of merchandise, and left the store without paying for the items. Defendant then punched a loss prevention officer, who confronted him outside the store, before being subdued with the help of officers from the Marysville Police Department. Defendant was charged with second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211) and second degree burglary (§ 459).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On April 2, 2008, defendant pleaded no contest to second degree robbery in exchange for dismissal of the burglary count and a stipulated middle term sentence of three years in state prison. Prior to entering his plea, defendant was informed by the trial court that because second degree robbery is a violent felony within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(9), he would be “limited to 15 percent time credit” under section 2933.1, subdivision (a). When asked whether he understood, defendant responded: “Yes, ma’am.”
On April 21, 2008, defendant orally moved the trial court to withdraw his no contest plea, asserting that when he entered his plea he believed he would not be subject to a limitation on the earning of time credits. The trial court then reviewed the transcript and informed defendant that he was “advised as to the 15 percent limitation.” Nevertheless, the court continued the matter and appointed separate counsel to explore the possibility of additional grounds to have the plea withdrawn.
On May 19, 2008, appointed counsel informed the court that he had reviewed the transcript and believed the plea to be valid. Appointed counsel then explained defendant’s position to the court: Notwithstanding the admonition regarding the time credit limitation, defendant claimed that his attorney “told him that he thought . . . the Court was wrong [about the time credit limitation] and they would straighten it out at the time of sentencing. And if he hadn’t been told that, he wouldn’t have entered the plea.” The trial court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea, observing that when asked whether any promises had been made to defendant to induce his plea, other than those made in open court, he responded, “No.”
The trial court subsequently sentenced defendant to the agreed-upon middle term of three years in state prison. The court also imposed a $600 restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), a suspended $600 parole revocation restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.45, and a $20 court security fee pursuant to section 1465.8. Defendant was also (1) ordered to provide DNA samples pursuant to section 296, (2) given notice that he could no longer possess firearms or ammunition pursuant to section 12021, and (3) advised of his parole rights and his right to appeal. Defendant’s presentence custody credit was calculated at “90 days’ actual time served and 14 days’ [conduct credit] pursuant to [section] 2933.1 . . ., for a total of 104 [days].”
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 2, 2008. His request for a certificate of probable cause was denied the following day.
We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and asks us to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., HULL, J.