Opinion
Ind. No. 21-0304
08-23-2021
Hon. Miriam E. Rocah Westchester County District Attorney Joseph Goubeaud, Esq. Attorney for Defendant (#19-1266) Angelo G. MacDonald., Esq. Attorney for Defendant (#21-0304)
Unpublished Opinion
Hon. Miriam E. Rocah Westchester County District Attorney
Joseph Goubeaud, Esq. Attorney for Defendant (#19-1266)
Angelo G. MacDonald., Esq. Attorney for Defendant (#21-0304)
DECISION AND ORDER
HON. SUSAN M. CAPECI, A.J.S.C.
In this proceeding where the defendant has been charged by indictment #21-0304 with two counts of assault in the second degree (P.L. 120.05 (2) and 120.05 (12)), unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (P.L. 135.10), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (P.L. 265.01 (2)), and menacing in the second degree (P.L. 120.14 (1)), and by indictment #19-1266 with attempted murder in the second degree (P.L. 110/125.25 (1)), assault in the first degree (P.L. 120.10 (1)), criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree (P.L. 265.01 (2)), and criminal contempt in the first degree (P.L. 215.51 (b)(v)), the People move to consolidate the above indictments for trial. The defendant has objected to the consolidation of these cases for trial.
Defendant's counsel under Indictment #19-1266 has filed an affirmation in opposition. No response to the motion was filed by his counsel under Indictment #21-0304.
The defendant was charged with the above noted offenses under Indictment #19-1266 with respect to an incident that occurred on July 11,2019. The charges under Indictment #21-0304 were based upon an incident that occurred on February 21, 2021. Each case involved a different victim.
The People seek to consolidate the above indictments for trial, contending that although the cases involve different victims, they will make a pre-trial Molineux motion to allow evidence of either of the assaults to be admitted at the trial of the other, under the various theories of intent, absence of mistake, modus operandi, or common scheme or plan. They argue that there are similarities between the two assault cases, which include the defendant's calls to police to warn them of her need to attack each of these men due to alleged crimes they had been committing, and that she attacked each of them as they sat in her kitchen having a drink. The defendant had a prior intimate relationship with each of the victims, and the victims were known to each other.
Alternatively, the People argue that each indictment is joinable since each involves offenses that are statutorily similar to each other, as they both involve assaults.
The defendant opposes consolidation of the indictments for trial, contending that they involve different complainants on different dates, and that it would be prejudicial to her to try the cases together.
Two offenses are "joinable" when, even though based upon different criminal transactions, "such offenses or the criminal transactions underlying them, are of such nature that either proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second, or proof of the second would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the first" (CPL 200.20(2)(b); see also CPL 100.45(1) [applying CPL 200.20 to misdemeanor informations]).
Pursuant to CPL 200.20 (2)(c), two offenses are also "joinable" when, "[e]ven though based upon different criminal transactions, and even though not joinable pursuant to paragraph (b), such offenses are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law" (CPL 200.20(2)(c)).
"It is clear that the decision to consolidate separate indictments under CPL 200.20... is committed to the sound discretion of the Trial Judge in light of the circumstances of the individual case, and the decision is reviewable on appeal...only to the extent that there has been an abuse of that discretion as a matter of law. Trial courts should generally weigh the public interest in avoiding duplicative, lengthy and expensive trials against the defendant's interest in being protected from unfair disadvantage" (People v Lane, 56 N.Y.2d 1 (1982)).
Although the charges could be joinable as the same or similar in law, as both incidents involve assaults, the Court declines to order the indictments consolidated for trial (CPL 200.20 (4), (5)). Given that each incident involved use of a knife against a person known to the defendant, there is a strong possibility of a conviction "by reason of the cumulative effect of the evidence rather than by its separate and distinct relevance to each incident" (People v Stanley, 81 A.D.2d 842 (2d Dept 1981) [severance granted where each separate incident involved assaultive and threatening behavior with a knife]). The risk of prejudice to the defendant under these circumstances warrants a separate trial on each indictment.
For the above stated reasons, the People's motion to consolidate the above Indictments for trial is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.