Opinion
05-08-2024
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Justino J. REYES, Jr., appellant.
Gary E. Eisenberg, New City, NY, for appellant. Anthony P. Parisi, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Arnie M. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
Gary E. Eisenberg, New City, NY, for appellant.
Anthony P. Parisi, District Attorney, Poughkeepsie, NY (Arnie M. Johnson of counsel), for respondent.
MARK C. DILLON, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeals by the defendant from two judgments of the County Court, Dutchess County (Peter M. Forman, J., at plea under Superior Court Information No. 173/19; Jessica Segal, J., at plea under Superior Court Information No. 112/21 and at sentences), both rendered November 30, 2021, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree under Superior Court Information No. 173/19, and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and false personation under Superior Court Information No. 112/21, upon his pleas of guilty, and imposing sentences.
ORDERED that the judgment rendered under Superior Court Information No. 173/19 is reversed, on the law, the plea of guilty is vacated, and the matter is remitted to the County Court, Dutchess County, for farther proceedings on the superior court information; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment rendered under Superior Court Information No. 112/21 is affirmed.
[1–3] " ‘[A] trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences’ " (People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d 254, 258, 997 N.Y.S.2d 671, 22 N.E.3d 179, quoting People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d 242, 244-245, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081; see People v. Cabrera, 189 A.D.3d 1609, 1609, 135 N.Y.S.3d 290). "To meet due process requirements, a defendant ‘must be aware of the postrelease supervision component of that sentence in order to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently choose among alternative courses of action’ " (People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d at 258, 997 N.Y.S.2d 671, 22 N.E.3d 179, quoting People v. Catu, 4 N.Y.3d at 245, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 825 N.E.2d 1081). "Without such procedures, vacatur of the plea is required" (People v. Turner, 24 N.Y.3d at 258, 997 N.Y.S.2d 671, 22 N.E.3d 179). It is not enough for a court to generally inform a defendant that a term of postrelease supervision will be imposed as a part of the sentence (see People v. Boyd, 12 N.Y.3d 390, 393, 880 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 N.E.2d 898; People v. Cabrera, 189 A.D.3d at 1609, 135 N.Y.S.3d 290). Rather, in order for a plea of guilty to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a court must inform the defendant of either the specific period of postrelease supervision that will be imposed or, at the least, the maximum potential duration of postrelease supervision that may be imposed (see People v. Boyd, 12 N.Y.Sd at 393, 880 N.Y.S.2d 908, 908 N.E.2d 898; People v. Cabrera, 189 A.D.3d at 1609, 135 N.Y.S.3d 290).
[4] Here, during the plea proceeding under Superior Court Information No. 178/19, the County Court did not specify the period of postrelease supervision to be imposed and did not explain that a term of postrelease supervision would be imposed even if the defendant successfully completed a substance abuse diversion program. As the People properly concede, the court’s failure to so advise the defendant prevented his plea from being knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see People v. Pryor, 217 A.D.3d 780, 780-781, 189 N.Y.S.3d 738; People v. Cabrera, 189 A.D.3d at 1610, 135 N.Y.S.3d 290). Accordingly, the judgment under Superior Court Information No. 178/19 must be reversed, the defendant’s plea of guilty vacated, and the matter remitted to the County Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedings on the superior court information. In contrast, the record establishes that the defendant’s plea of guilty under Superior Court Information No. 112/21 was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see People v. Sougou, 26 N.Y.3d 1052, 1055–1056, 23 N.Y.S.3d 121, 44 N.E.3d 196; People v. Braunskill, 206 A.D.3d 821, 822, 168 N.Y.S.3d 347).
[5] With respect to Superior Court Information No. 112/21, the record does not demonstrate that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264-265, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645). The County Court did not discuss the appeal waiver until after the defendant had already admitted his guilt (see People v. Diallo, 196 A.D.3d 598, 598, 147 N.Y.S.3d 454), and the court failed to ascertain whether the defendant "understood the nature of the appellate rights being waived" and the consequences of waiving those rights (People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 559, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970; see People v. Daniel, 188 A.D.3d 908, 908, 132 N.Y.S.3d 303). Accordingly, the purported waiver does not preclude appellate review of the defendant’s excessive sentence claim. Nevertheless, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit.
DILLON, J.P., MILLER, DOWLING and VOUTSINAS, JJ., concur.