Opinion
B326864
01-30-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CRISTIAN REYES, Defendant and Appellant.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TA132870 . Teresa P. Magno, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GRIMES, J.
Defendant and appellant Cristian Reyes appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95. Former section 1170.95 was renumbered and recodified as section 1172.6 with no change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For clarity, we refer to former section 1170.95 only by its new designation (section 1172.6).
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder of Samuel Guzman. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant personally used and discharged a firearm causing Guzman's death. Defendant was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison (25 to life for the murder, plus a consecutive 25 to life for the firearm enhancement). (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (d).) We affirmed defendant's conviction with a modification to the abstract of judgment not relevant to the present appeal. (People v. Reyes (Aug. 11, 2016, B266108) [nonpub. opn.].)
After the passage of Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), defendant filed, in propria persona, a petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. Defendant declared under penalty of perjury that he had been charged and convicted of murder under the felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory of imputed malice and that he could no longer be convicted in light of the changes made to Penal Code sections 188 and 189. Defendant requested the appointment of counsel.
The trial court appointed counsel for defendant. The People filed an informal response opposing defendant's petition, arguing that defendant was prosecuted as the direct perpetrator in the fatal shooting and that the jury was not instructed with felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, any other theory of imputed malice or aiding and abetting.
The trial court denied defendant's petition finding he had failed to establish a prima facie case of eligibility for relief, explaining that he had been convicted of first degree murder as the direct perpetrator.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
We independently review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) Our review of the record here demonstrates that defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We therefore affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's petition.
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) states that "[a] person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime" may file a petition for sentencing relief.
The record of conviction here unequivocally establishes that defendant was prosecuted and convicted of first degree murder as the actual shooter and not under any of the enumerated theories set forth in the statute. Defendant's jury was not instructed with any of those theories. Moreover, defendant testified at his trial and admitted to shooting the victim, but claimed it was in selfdefense. (People v. Reyes, supra, B266108.)
Defendant does not contest that his jury was not instructed with felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine or any other theory of imputed malice as required by section 1172.6. And, he concedes that he was found to be the "actual perpetrator" of the first degree murder of Guzman. Defendant nonetheless argues that the court's denial was "premature" because he may have been able to present evidence at an evidentiary hearing that showed that someone else took the fatal shot.
Defendant's argument stands section 1172.6 on its head. Defendant ignores the statutory eligibility requirements for a prima facie showing and contends he should be allowed to jump directly to an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of attempting to cast doubt on the jury verdict and to raise an entirely new defense from the claim of self-defense he raised at trial. Nothing in the statutory language, the legislative history or the Supreme Court decisions interpretating section 1172.6 support such an argument.
Defendant did not establish his eligibility for resentencing and his petition was properly denied. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 ["If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition."].) Furthermore, we find defendant's due process and equal protection arguments have no basis in law and for that reason decline to discuss them.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant and appellant Cristian Reyes's petition for resentencing is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: STRATTON, P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.