The Double Jeopardy Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides protection against a second prosecution of the same offense after acquittal or conviction, and it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498, 104 S. Ct. 2536, 2540, 81 L. Ed. 2d 425 (1984); see also People v. Palisoc, 2002 Guam 9, P35; San Nicolas, 2001 Guam 4, P8. The Double Jeopardy Clause is made applicable in Guam by the Organic Act and Guam's Criminal and Correctional Code. See People v. Angoco, 2004 Guam 11, P17. In two cases, People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, and People v. San Nicolas, 1999 Guam 19, this court indicated seemingly inconsistent stances on the issue of multiple convictions. In Reyes, the defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and two counts of use of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence in the record could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, P7 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). "When a criminal defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to ascertain whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.

"[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction," this court inquires as to "whether the evidence in the record could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Sangalang, 2001 Guam 18 ¶ 20 (citations omitted); People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32 ¶ 7; People v. Leon Guerrero, 2001 Guam 19 ¶ 32. Because "this is a highly deferential standard of review," "[w]hen a criminal defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to ascertain whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

"The Ninth Circuit has noted that this is a highly deferential standard." People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, P7 (citations omitted) (quoting People v. Gill, Crim. No. 92-00099A, 1994 WL 150934, at *6 (D. Guam App. Div April 15, 1994)). "Whether the missing witness instruction should be given is a matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court."

While a denial of habeas relief cannot be appealed, pursuant to 8 GCA § 135.74, the government may appeal a grant of habeas relief. See Borja v. Bitanga, 1998 Guam 29, P12. A court's decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus is reviewed de novo. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is properly brought on a petition for writ of habeas corpus . People v. Ueki, 1999 Guam 4, P5; People v. Perez, 1999 Guam 2, P33. Although this court has stated that such a claim is a question of law to be reviewed de novo, People v. Camacho, 1999 Guam 27, P16; People v. Kintaro, 1999 Guam 15, P10; Ueki, 1999 Guam 4, at P5; Perez, 1999 Guam 2, at P33; People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, P9; People v. Quintanilla, 1998 Guam 17, P8, the two-prong test we adopted from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), by necessity requires review of both fact and law. Thus, to clarify the standard, we adopt that set forth by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: "[a] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de novo."

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend V. The Bill of Rights of the Organic Act of Guam similarly provides that "no persons shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of punishment . . . ." 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(d) (1950); see also People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, P23 (recognizing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution is made applicable to Guam through the Organic Act). It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against successive prosecutions as well as successive criminal punishments for the same crime.

In conducting this review, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution and we ascertain whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, P7 (citation omitted). As a consequence of forming the roadblocks on three separate occasions, Appellant was arrested and charged for the Obstruction of Governmental Functions, a violation of Title 9 GCA § 55.45 which provides:

Whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel is a question of law. People v. Quintanilla, 1998 Guam 17, P8; People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, P9; People v. Perez, 1999 Guam 2, P33. Where this legal query turns significantly on the facts of a particular case, the issue becomes a question of fact as well. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2070, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

We have held that "a defendant may be prosecuted for multiple offenses arising from the same conduct if the conduct establishes the commission of more than one offense." People v. Aguirre, 2004 Guam 21 ¶ 18 (citing People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32); see also People v. Afaisen, 2016 Guam 31 ¶ 52. Thus, at the onset of a criminal case, the People may elect to prosecute a defendant under section 70.10.1(a)(1) or section 70.10(a)(3), or both, if the circumstances permit.

On this record—which in the light most favorable to the People includes evidence of bleeding in addition to pain inside the vagina—a "rational trier of fact could have found the essential element[] of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Sangalang, 2001 Guam 18 ¶ 20 (quoting People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32 ¶ 7).C. Motion for a New Trial