Opinion
H030476
5-22-2007
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. AMELIO EREDIA RENTERIA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Defendant Amelio Eredia Renteria appeals from judgment entered following guilty or no contest pleas in two cases. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike a prior "strike" conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12.) We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
Hereafter all unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We take our background discussion from the preliminary hearing transcript and the probation officers reports.
In January 2005, defendant was hired by VTF Services (VTF) to work as a landscaper. VTF is a nonprofit, vocational training organization that employs approximately 45 persons, most of whom have mental health or other disabilities. VTF was aware that defendant had a criminal history when he was hired. He was terminated on June 16, 2005, for excessive absences and for clocking in but not appearing at the job site where he was assigned. In the course of his brief employment, defendant stole checkbooks and credit cards from his employer. Between mid-May and mid-June 2005, he cashed some of the checks and attempted to use others to purchase auto parts. He used the stolen credit cards to purchase gasoline and merchandise. The total loss to the victims of these crimes was more than $ 15,000. Defendant was charged in case No. EE504525 with three counts of second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), two counts of check forgery (§ 470, subd. (d)), two counts of possession of stolen property (§ 496, subd. (d)), two counts of attempted grand theft (§§ 487, subd. (a), 664), three counts of using a stolen credit card (§ 484g, subd. (a)), and five counts of possessing a forged check with intent to pass it (§ 475, subd. (a)).
One afternoon in September 2005, a Santa Clara police officer observed defendant in a car parked in a motel parking lot. The officer knew that defendant was on parole. The officer asked for consent to search defendant for drugs or weapons, whereupon defendant produced a baggie containing 0.19 grams of "ice" methamphetamine. In case No. CC503621, defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)).
The information in both cases alleged that defendant had suffered one prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and that he had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The strike prior was a 1996 conviction for second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)). The robbery occurred when defendant and his friends approached two other men, asked for money, then pushed one of the men to the ground. Defendant hit and kicked the victim and flashed a knife. One of defendants accomplices took a gold necklace from around the victims neck. Defendant was sentenced to prison for three years for that crime.
In 2003, defendant was convicted in two cases of possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). He was sentenced to prison and was on parole in when he was arrested in the current cases.
Defendant pleaded no contest in the stolen property case and guilty in the possession case. Both pleas were entered with the understanding that the trial court would consider his Romero motion. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).)
In contemplation of sentencing, the executive director of VTF submitted a victim impact statement. In it she stated that, in addition to the time and money defendants conduct had cost the organization, his crimes had shaken the trust among the VTF employees and increased the level of anxiety within the vulnerable workforce. In discussing the crimes with the employees, the executive director learned that during his six months on the job, defendant had been aggressive and intimidating to the workers, threatening them to keep quiet about various incidents.
In his Romero motion, defendant explained to the court that he had had a rough and unstable childhood, he never finished high school, he became a father at the age of 16, and he had developed an addiction to controlled substances. He was now determined to turn over a new leaf and asked the court to strike the strike and allow him "the opportunity to address the underlying cause of his lengthy history with the criminal justice system."
The trial court denied the request. The court noted that the strike prior was a serious offense and that defendant had been personally involved in the physical violence and was in possession of a knife at the time. The prior strike was remote, "although not excessively remote, and, based on criminal history, does not appear to suggest an aberrant period—a single period of aberrant behavior." Although the current charges were not serious or violent, they were numerous and "they did have a considerable impact on several of the victims." The court further observed that defendant was on parole at the time of the current crimes and that his parole officer had described him as doing poorly on parole. The court recognized that defendant had a substance abuse problem and had recently done well while in custody, "[b]ut, in sum, notwithstanding the defense arguments to strike the prior conviction under Romero and other cases, I cant find on this record that [defendant] is outside the spirit of the three-strikes law."
The trial court sentenced defendant to nine years and four months in case No. EE504525 and a consecutive one year and four months in case No. CC503621, for a total of 10 years and eight months in prison.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that, in denying the Romero motion, the trial court failed to consider that the underlying cause of defendants criminal behavior was his drug addiction and that residential drug treatment, rather than incarceration in prison, would better serve the public safety interests that the Three Strikes law was intended to serve.
Section 1385 permits a trial court to strike an allegation of a prior felony conviction in cases brought under the Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) The decision to strike a prior conviction may be made only for "`"articulable reasons which can withstand scrutiny."" (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) In ruling on a motion to strike priors under section 1385, the court "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the schemes spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
A defendant has the right to seek review of a courts decision not to strike a prior conviction. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376.) The courts decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard, and the burden is on defendant to show that the courts decision was "`"irrational or arbitrary."" (Ibid.) "`In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review. [Citation.] Concomitantly, `[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. "An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge."" (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.)
In the present case, the trial courts articulated reasons for denying the Romero motion show that the court carefully considered all the factors bearing upon the determination, including defendants current commitment to breaking his drug addiction. The trial court properly considered that, in connection with the prior strike conviction, defendant had personally participated in an unprovoked, violent attack and had displayed a deadly weapon. The strike conviction had taken place about nine years prior to the current crimes, but defendant served time for that crime only to re-offend in 2003 and again in 2005. Thus, the strike prior was not, as the court noted, an isolated incident of criminal behavior. It is true that the current property crimes did not involve acts of violence. But the express intent of the Three Strikes law is "to ensure longer prison sentences" for any defendant with a qualifying strike who subsequently commits "a felony." (§ 667, subd. (b).) The nonviolent nature of the current felony does not alone take the crime outside the spirit of the law. "To conclude otherwise would rewrite the statute to only trigger a longer prison sentence for those defendants who commit a violent or threatening felony after having committed at least one strike. That is not the laws letter or spirit." (People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 344.) In any event, the current crimes were not minor. They were extremely numerous, were perpetrated by defendants abusing the trust his employer had shown in hiring him, and had a significant impact upon the organization and the vulnerable employees who worked there.
Although defendants current promise of reform is admirable, his criminal history shows that he had failed to deal with his drug problem in the past and continued to break the law. That is, he falls squarely within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding defendant to the consequences of that law.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
Rushing, P.J.
Elia, J.