Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. RIF111175, Christian F. Thierbach, Judge.
Robert E. Boyce, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, James D. Dutton and Alana Cohen Butler, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Patrick Renteria (defendant) appeals the trial court’s restitution order, contending that it was not based upon documentation required under Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(4)(B). We will affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2004, defendant was convicted of the murder of his wife (the victim) in the presence of their five-year-old daughter, K. (People v. Renteria (Feb. 23, 2006, E036822) [nonpub. opn.].)
At a restitution hearing on May 21, 2010, the deputy district attorney requested a restitution order for $70,773.05, the amount that the State of California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board (the Board) had paid to K. and her family for expenses related to the crime. In support of the request, the deputy submitted a “Certification of Records for Restitution Hearing” (the Certification) to the trial court. Counsel for defendant, Deputy Public Defender Petrovich (Petrovich), complained that she had not previously seen the Certification, although the deputy district attorney said that he had provided it, twice, to defendant’s trial counsel, another deputy public defender. (People v. Renteria, supra, E036822.) After a recess, Petrovich stipulated to the $5,000 funeral and burial expenses, but argued—at length—that the calculation of the loss of income and support the victim would have provided her daughter had she lived was excessive. K., Petrovich insisted, could not just “step into the shoes” of her dead mother and collect an amount equal to what would have been the victim’s full income. The trial court responded by citing Government Code section 13957, subdivision (a)(4), which allows a “derivative victim” (like K.) to claim both loss of income and support.
After listening to argument from both counsel, the trial court proclaimed itself “satisfied that the amount set forth here in this memo submitted by the... Board is not only fair, but it’s probably less than what [K.] should probably be entitled to.” The trial court then ordered defendant to pay the Board $70,773.05 and “‘additional amounts incurred as determined by the Riverside County Probation Department.’”
As the discussion ended, Petrovich asked if the Certification “packet” was going to become part of the record, and the trial court responded: “It will be right now. The Court will order it filed and made part of the file.” The minute order of May 21, 2010, does not reflect that this was done.
On May 24, 2010, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
On November 4, 2010, the People filed a motion to augment the record on appeal with any documents in the trial court’s file pertaining to calculation of restitution. On December 15, 2010, we granted the request. On January 20, 2011, the superior court clerk filed a “1st Supplemental Confidential Material Transcript” containing copies of the Certification and its attachments: a detailed bill for funeral and burial expenses for the victim; the Board’s statement of support loss calculations and a verification from the Riverside Medical Clinic stating that the dead victim had been employed there full time as a medical assistant; K.’s application for social security benefits; and K.’s health insurance benefits claims for mental health services.
DISCUSSION
“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) “If, as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the Restitution Fund has provided assistance to... a... derivative victim... the amount of assistance provided shall be presumed to be a direct result of the defendant's criminal conduct and shall be included in the amount of the restitution ordered. [¶]... The amount of assistance provided by the Restitution Fund shall be established by copies of bills submitted to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board reflecting the amount paid by the board and whether the services for which payment was made were for medical or dental expenses, funeral or burial expenses, mental health counseling, wage or support losses, or rehabilitation. Certified copies of these bills... together with a statement made under penalty of perjury by the custodian of records that those bills were submitted to and were paid by the board, shall be sufficient to meet this requirement.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(4)(A), (f)(4)(B).)
Defendant’s primary claim is that since the Certification—or “memo” as the trial court called it—was not made part of the record, there is no evidence that it included the certified copies of actual bills paid by the Board as required by the statute. The People answer that despite the absence of copies of the Certification and specific bills in the record, it does appear that the proper documents were before the trial court and formed the basis of its conclusion. We agree with the People. There is no basis for defendant’s conclusion that because the bills were not copied into the record it must be presumed that the trial court’s order lacked evidentiary support and should be reversed; quite the opposite.
Defendant’s claim that the “memo” to which the trial court referred could have been some document other than the Certification and its attachments, discussed by all parties and the trial court, borders on frivolity.
As has long been established in this state, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, a trial court will be presumed to have known and followed applicable law. (Evid. Code, § 664; In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499-500; Ross v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d. 899, 913-914, and cases cited therein.) Here, there is not only an absence of an indication to the contrary, there is positive evidence that the trial court knew and was following applicable law. It cited the relevant Government Code provision authorizing payment to K.; it referenced the required Certification documents; and it stated its intention to have them made part of the file. Through some oversight, this did not happen; but this is not an indication that the trial court did not know or was not following applicable law.
Even without copies of the Certification and its attachments in the file, there was other good evidence that the trial court and the parties all had, and had reviewed, the required documents. The trial court and both counsel repeatedly referred to the documents (what Petrovich called the “packet”). In particular, Petrovich submitted as to the specific amount of the victim’s funeral bill and discussed the Board’s support loss statement in detail. “[T]he calculation that they’ve provided is a net income less taxes—yeah, less than 20 percent tax, in estimated tax, and they have just—the assumption they have gone over when they did the calculation was that the entire net income less taxes would have gone towards [K.’s] support. And that’s—There’s—I don’t know that that’s true. ” Petrovich may have disagreed with the Board’s method for calculating the value of K.’s loss of support from her murdered mother, but she obviously had those calculations in front of her, as did the trial court.
Insofar as defendant’s citation to People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 664, represents an attempt to assert that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting the Board’s method of calculating K.’s losses, we reject such a claim. Giordano said that the basis for the award must be “rational.” (Id. at p. 664.) The trial court’s acceptance of the Board’s calculation of the derivative victim’s economic loss was rational: “I would venture to say that under any theory or any formula that they could come up with, the amount of money that could be contributed to [K.]’s upbringing and support would far exceed what’s being asked for here.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER J., KING J.