Opinion
F077221
06-19-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DEREK RENTERIA, Defendant and Appellant.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. VCF335411)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Kathryn T. Montejano, Judge. Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Louis M. Vasquez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Franson, Acting P.J., Peña, J. and DeSantos, J. --------
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INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Derek Renteria of multiple charges after he fled from police while driving under the influence. Before trial, defendant filed a motion for discovery of certain items from the personnel files of the two officers involved in his pursuit and arrest under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). Defendant argued the officers falsely reported the incident and used excessive force when arresting him, and evidence of the police officers' propensity for excessive force, fabrication, and/or falsification of police reports was relevant to his defense against the charges. The court denied defendant's motion and he appeals.
We reverse in part the court's denial of defendant's Pitchess motion and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Following a car chase with police, defendant was charged with (1) assault upon a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (c); (2) evading an officer while driving with willful wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a); (3) resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1); (4) driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a); (5) driving with a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b); and (6) driving on a suspended driver's license with three prior convictions for driving on a suspended driver's license in violation of Vehicle Code section 14601.2, subdivision (a).
At trial, Officer Clemente Clinton testified he was patrolling in a marked police car with his canine partner on a Saturday morning when he saw a silver car north of him "driving in circles in the middle of the road," a Vehicle Code violation. Officer Clinton was in full uniform at the time. He continued to travel north and initiated his overhead lights to conduct a traffic enforcement stop. Officer Clinton testified the silver car completed one more circle, straightened out, and then "[t]he driver of the vehicle directed the silver vehicle directly into the path of [Officer Clinton's] patrol vehicle." Officer Clinton testified he "was concerned that if that vehicle did collide with [his] vehicle, [he] could have sustained great bodily harm, not only to [him] self, but [his] K-9 partner that was in the rear of [his] patrol vehicle at the time." According to Officer Clinton, he "had to make an evasive maneuver and basically swerve far to the right in order not to be struck by the vehicle." He "didn't see or feel that the silver car was slowing, stopping or making any indications that [it] was not trying to strike [his] vehicle." He explained, "An evasive maneuver is basically something to keep yourself safe and also not disable your vehicle so you can stay in the fight." "Had there been the double line, [the silver car] would have crossed the double line into the northbound lane traveling southbound." He testified the silver car was approximately six feet away when it passed him. Officer Clinton then made a U-turn with his overhead lights and siren on and pursued the silver car. Officer Clinton estimated the silver car was traveling at 40 to 45 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. The silver car ran through stop signs and eventually lost control and slid into a curb, causing the front right tire to pop, but the car continued on the disabled tire until it ended up in a field. Defendant then exited the car and ran through the field into an olive orchard. Officer Clinton testified he deployed his canine partner and ordered defendant to stop or he would be bitten, but defendant continued to run and ignored his commands. Officer Clinton then notified dispatch that defendant had run into an orchard and defendant was ultimately arrested by Officer Oscar Robles.
Officer Clinton later saw defendant at the police station and defendant had "bloodshot, watery eyes," "slurred speech," and "he swayed back and forth ... in an attempt to hold himself up." He also smelled of alcohol. Officer Clinton briefly contacted the two women who were in the car with defendant, Daisy Benavides and Serica Gonzalez. According to Officer Clinton, they too had bloodshot, watery eyes, slurred speech, and smelled of alcohol. The court informed the jury the parties stipulated defendant's blood-alcohol content was 0.10 percent after the incident.
Officer Robles testified he responded to Officer Clinton's call and tried to coordinate with other agencies to establish a perimeter. Officer Robles then saw defendant and ran after him. Officer Robles testified he was yelling for defendant to stop as he chased him and he pointed his gun at defendant as he ran. According to Officer Robles, defendant turned around and took a "fighting stance." Officer Robles told defendant to stop and that he did not want to shoot him. He testified he told defendant to get on the ground but defendant would not comply. After Officer Robles scanned defendant's body and did not see any weapons, he holstered his gun. He testified he used physical force because defendant would not get on the ground: he front kicked defendant in the torso and defendant fell to the ground. Officer Robles then jumped on defendant, flipped him onto his stomach, and pulled his arms behind his back. He told defendant to stop moving or he could break his arm. Defendant vomited and Officer Robles continued to keep him in a control hold until Officer Clinton arrived and helped Officer Robles handcuff defendant.
Serica Gonzalez testified she worked with defendant at the Pizza Factory and was with him in the car during "the high speed chase." The night before the chase, Gonzalez, defendant, and Daisy Benavides went out and had a couple drinks. Gonzalez testified she stopped drinking right before they were pulled over the next morning and she was drunk. She recalled hearing a siren and seeing lights and testified they "left in the opposite direction"; she did not recall ever seeing a police car in front of their car.
Daisy Benavides testified on behalf of the defense that she was in the passenger seat in the silver car on the date of the incident. She and defendant worked together and had been drinking since they got off work around 1:00 a.m. that morning. The sun had come up and they were driving home from a restaurant when defendant, who was driving, began "doing doughnuts" in the street. Benavides saw the lights of a police car outside of defendant's window about a block away. Defendant then drove away from the officer. Benavides denied that defendant drove towards the police car. She was scared and told defendant to stop. Defendant hit a curb. Benavides did not recall hearing a siren until defendant hit the curb. Defendant then got out of the car and the officer chased him. She testified she did not think defendant was drunk when they left the restaurant.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He, too, recounted that he was drinking with Gonzalez and Benavides after they got off work around 1:00 a.m. on the date of his arrest. Defendant also testified they went to a restaurant after the sun had come up and he was driving Gonzalez home when he decided to do doughnuts in the street. He saw police lights and then drove past the police car and accelerated. Defendant denied seeing the officer swerve his car out of the way. He also denied driving in the officer's path "at all" and testified he did not drive at him. Defendant admitted he ran a stop sign and testified he attempted to "hop the curb" but the tire popped. He testified he did not stop for the officer because he reacted out of "fear" and "adrenaline." He also admitted running from Officer Clinton once he got out of the car. He testified he heard Officer Robles call his name once or twice and defendant stopped. He then followed Officer Robles's order to get on the ground. Defendant testified though he got on his knees when Officer Robles told him to, Officer Robles approached him, threatened to shoot him, and then kicked him in the chest. Defendant denied that Officer Robles needed to use physical force to take him down because defendant was complying; he alleged he did not know why Officer Robles used "excessive force."
In her closing argument, defense counsel conceded defendant "admitted to running from Officer Robles. He admitted to evading Officer Clinton. He admitted to drinking and then driving. He admitted to those things. Those are not in dispute." She argued the only issue in dispute was "Count 1, assault on a police officer with a deadly weapon. [¶] That's the only thing that [defendant] got on the stand and said that he didn't do. He said I wasn't trying to hit the officer. I didn't aim my car at the officer. I wasn't trying to assault him on purpose." She asserted that she was not saying Officer Clinton was a liar but, instead, that "he was wrong; that there's no way for him to know with a certainty what was going on in [defendant]'s mind and whether or not his driving, [defendant]'s driving, was aiming at him on purpose."
The jury convicted defendant of all the charges.
DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, defendant contends the court erred in denying his Pitchess motion.
A. Relevant Procedural History
Before trial, defendant moved for disclosure of certain documents from Officer Clinton's and Officer Robles's personnel files. The motion specifically sought "relevant information bearing on the officers' character, habits, customs, biases, and motives to lie that would explain the use of excessive force, dishonesty, fabrication of which Defendant's [sic] now complains; namely, acts of excessive use of force, dishonesty, falsification of information and anticipated testimony, improper tactics, and other acts suggesting a morally lax character." (Boldface omitted.) Defendant argued such documents were relevant to his defense that the officers fabricated their reports of the incident and the arresting officer, Officer Robles, used excessive force.
In his Pitchess motion, defendant detailed his account of the incident versus the accounts of the incident as told by the officers in their reports. He asserted, "Officer Clinton states that as he approached [defendant's] car it continued to travel south towards his patrol vehicle. He states that the driver then turned the car directly towards his patrol car. Officer Clinton states he had to swerve hard to the right to avoid being struck by the silver car. Officer Clinton states that he believes the driver intentionally tried to strike his patrol car." Defendant further noted that Officer Robles's report stated that "he used physical force" and "push-kicked [defendant] in the chest and abdomen and forced him to the ground" before "put[ting] him in an arm hold with his arms at his back" and telling defendant his arm would break if he moved.
Defendant attached an affidavit from his counsel in which she averred "Officer Robles approached [defendant] and kicked him in the upper abdomen" after defendant "went down to his knees with his hands in the air" and then kneed defendant in the head, "causing him to hit his head to the ground." Defense counsel further averred "the officers fabricated the alleged aggressive and uncooperative conduct ascribed to [defendant]," and "Officer Clinton fabricated [defendant] attempting to hit his patrol car while he was driving at the beginning of the pursuit. [Defendant] did not deliberately turn his car towards [O]fficer Clinton's patrol vehicle or attempt to strike him."
At the hearing on defendant's Pitchess motion, the attorney for the City of Woodlake argued the body camera footage from defendant's arrest reflected defendant asked Officer Robles why he kicked him and Officer Robles responded he did so because defendant would not get down. Thus, the alleged use of force "does not assist him in a defense" to the charged crimes. He further argued "[t]he declaration which ... has the operative facts for this motion does not dispute that the defendant fled the scene," and it states defendant did not "deliberately" attempt to strike Officer Clinton's car. Accordingly, defendant "never denied that he made that swerving move" but rather stated "that he did not deliberately attempt to engage in that act." He further argued, with regard to Officer Clinton's report that defendant drove at him, there was not an issue of the officer's credibility but rather, "[i]t's one person's perception over another and really ..., both sides perceived the same event" but the defendant just alleged "a different state of mind engaging in that conduct." The body camera footage that captured the moments after defendant was handcuffed was submitted and the court reviewed it.
The court noted in the body camera footage, there was a "conversation about whether or not [defendant] had been kicked, and the defendant was very clear that he resented the fact that he was kicked. ... [Officer Robles] said why he did that, in order to stop the defendant, and then the defendant ha[d] his own ... spin on how the officer should do it in a different way so that the two of them could go down together." Based on this discussion, the court held it did not find there was "good cause to go further" with the Pitchess motion and, accordingly, denied it.
Defense counsel reiterated the motion as it related to Officer Clinton, arguing it was "defendant's position that he didn't swerve at [Officer Clinton], and so it's not that he is disputing the state of mind he was in. It's the conduct of swerving his car towards the officer's vehicle." She argued Officer Clinton's police report in which he asserts defendant swerved his car towards his patrol car is a "falsification[]." And "if the officer is lying in his police report, it affects his credibility," and "prior incidents of dishonesty" were relevant to his credibility as a witness. Additionally, she argued Officer Robles's report "discusses at length ... how [defendant] was confrontational; that he didn't get on the ground when ordered" and resisted arrest. Defendant disputes "all of that" and the assertion he was resisting arrest was "a falsification ... to justify [Officer Robles's] excessive force." She argued they were "alleging a different[, plausible, alternative] set of facts than what both officers claim happened that day from the beginning of the incident throughout."
The attorney for the City of Woodlake responded, "That's not the only threshold," the "factual scenario has to be internally consistent. Here, it's not." He argued, in the body camera footage, "defendant is not disputing that the force was unreasonable, ... he disagree[d] with the way force was applied." He further contended defendant did not dispute Officer Robles's alleged statement that defendant "wasn't going down."
The court held it was not finding a "contradiction as described" after viewing and listening to the transcript from the body camera footage. It denied defendant's motion.
B. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
On a showing of good cause, a criminal defendant is entitled to the discovery of relevant documents or information contained within the personnel records of a police officer accused of misconduct against the defendant. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b); Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016 (Warrick).) "To initiate discovery, the defendant must file a motion supported by affidavits showing 'good cause for the discovery,' first by demonstrating the materiality of the information to the pending litigation, and second by 'stating upon reasonable belief' that the police agency has the records or information at issue." (Warrick, supra, at p. 1019; see Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) "This two-part showing of good cause is a 'relatively low threshold for discovery.'" (Warrick, at p. 1019.)
The supporting affidavit "'must propose a defense or defenses to the pending charges.'" (Garcia v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 71; see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) The materiality requirement requires a defendant "'to establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer's version of events.'" (Garcia, supra, at p. 71; see Warrick, supra, at p. 1021.) "Counsel's affidavit must also describe a factual scenario that would support a defense claim of officer misconduct. [Citation.] 'That factual scenario, depending on the circumstances of the case, may consist of a denial of the facts asserted in the police report.'" (Garcia, at p. 71; see Warrick, at pp. 1024-1025.)
A showing of good cause is measured by "relatively relaxed standards" that serve to ensure the production for trial court review of "all potentially relevant documents." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 84.) "[T]o obtain in-chambers review a defendant need only demonstrate that the scenario of alleged officer misconduct could or might have occurred." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1016.) "Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges." (Id. at p. 1026.) Additionally, "the information sought must be described with some specificity to ensure that the defendant's request is not so broad as to garner '"all information which has been obtained by the People in their investigation of the crime"' but is limited to instances of officer misconduct related to the misconduct asserted by the defendant." (Id. at p. 1021.)
"If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) "The statutory scheme thus carefully balances two directly conflicting interests: the peace officer's just claim to confidentiality, and the criminal defendant's equally compelling interest in all information pertinent to his defense." (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 84.) "The 'relatively relaxed standards' for showing good cause are offset by the protective provisions for in camera review." (People v. Hustead (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 410, 416.)
We review a trial court's ruling on a Pitchess motion for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 992.)
C. Analysis
Defendant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Pitchess motion because he established good cause for the court to conduct an in camera review. He contends defense counsel's affidavit "denied the allegations made by the police officers and described how the evidence of the police officer's pattern of dishonesty and filing false police reports was needed to defend against the charges." He does not appear to challenge the court's ruling regarding the discovery of documents related to excessive force. The People respond it was reasonable for the court to conclude the evidence defendant offered in support of his motion did not conflict with Officer Clinton's report but, rather, simply challenged defendant's state of mind when he drove towards Officer Clinton. They acknowledge defense counsel stated in argument that defendant denied driving towards Officer Clinton, but argue this argument was insufficient to constitute evidence in support of defendant's motion. Additionally, they contend defendant's allegation that Officer Robles's report contained misstatements was too vague and broad to sufficiently support a finding of good cause. We conclude the court abused its discretion in concluding defendant had not established good cause as necessary to obtain an in camera review of the materials in Officer Clinton's personnel file.
Here, the record reflects defendant offered a plausible, alternative factual scenario in his Pitchess motion to that presented by Officer Clinton's report, and he alleged the documents sought were relevant to his defense. In her affidavit in support of the Pitchess motion, defense counsel averred that "Officer Clinton fabricated [defendant] attempting to hit his patrol car while he was driving at the beginning of the pursuit. [Defendant] did not deliberately turn his car towards [O]fficer Clinton's patrol vehicle or attempt to strike him." The City of Woodlake argued these statements amounted to a concession by defendant that he turned his car towards Officer Clinton's and almost struck him, but that he simply denied doing so intentionally. The court appears to have agreed with the city and denied the Pitchess motion in part on that basis.
We disagree with the trial court's assessment and conclude defendant established good cause with regard to the records requested from Officer Clinton's personnel file. On their face, the referenced statements in defense counsel's affidavit contradict Officer Clinton's assertion in his report that defendant "directed the silver vehicle directly towards [his] marked patrol vehicle." Indeed, the quoted language alleges Officer Clinton lied about defendant attempting to strike his car and, instead, that defendant "did not ... attempt to strike [Officer Clinton's car]." To the extent there was confusion regarding the semantics of the statements and whether the term "intentionally" was meant to modify both the verbs "turn" and "attempt to strike," defense counsel clarified at the hearing that defendant denied swerving towards and attempting to strike Officer Clinton's car entirely, rather than simply challenge his state of mind at the time. That denial formed the basis of a defense to the assault upon a peace officer charge (count 1) to which Officer Clinton's propensity to commit perjury and falsify police reports was relevant. And the scenario described in defense counsel's declaration is internally consistent; it conflicts with the police report only in denying that defendant attempted to strike Officer Clinton's car. (See Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1027.) Accordingly, defendant established good cause for an in camera review of Officer Clinton's personnel file and the court abused its discretion in denying review. (See id. at p. 1023 ["By denying the factual assertions made in the police report ... defendant established 'a reasonable inference that the [reporting] officer may not have been truthful'"]; People v. Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 416-417 [good cause established where affidavit alleged "officer made material misstatements with respect to his observations, including fabricating [the defendant]'s alleged dangerous driving maneuvers," defendant "did not drive in the manner described by the report and that his driving route was different from that found in the report," and "a material and substantial issue in the trial would be the character, habits, customs and credibility of the officer"; "[i]t demonstrated that [defendant]'s defense would be that he did not drive in the manner suggested by the police report and therefore the charges against him were not justified"].)
However, to the extent defendant is alleging he established good cause for the court to conduct an in camera review of Officer Robles's personnel file, we disagree. Even if we were to assume defendant's motion and supporting affidavit sufficiently alleged misstatements by Officer Robles in his police report, defendant has not drawn a logical connection between the alleged misrepresentations and his defense to any of the alleged charges. (See Garcia v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 71; Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1022.) Rather, as the court noted below, defendant admitted running from both Officers Clinton and Robles—conduct which preceded defendant's alleged noncompliance with Officer Robles's orders and the use of force, and conduct that was sufficient to establish the charges of evading a police officer and resisting, obstructing, or delaying arrest. (See People v. Christopher (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 431 ["'physical resistance, hiding, or running away from a police officer have been found to violate [Penal Code] section 148'"]; In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329 [same]; People v. Allen (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 981, 986-987 [same].) He also admitted to driving while under the influence and did not contest that his driver's license was suspended at the time. Indeed, at trial, he only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as it related to count 1, assault with a deadly weapon upon a police officer, which related to defendant's actions towards Officer Clinton. Thus, documents from Officer Robles's personnel file regarding any false statements or perjury in the past (should they exist) would not assist defendant. Accordingly, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion by denying defendant's Pitchess motion as it related to Officer Robles.
Because we conclude defendant has established good cause for Pitchess discovery entitling him to the trial court's in-chambers review of Officer Clinton's personnel records relating to fabricating police reports and committing perjury, we remand the case on that basis. (See People v. Hustead, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 419.) If there is no discoverable information in Officer Clinton's personnel file, then the trial court is ordered to reinstate the original judgment and sentence, and the judgment is ordered affirmed. (Ibid.) If, however, there is relevant discoverable information in the officer's file, defendant should be given an opportunity to determine if the information would have led to any relevant, admissible evidence that he could have presented at trial. (Ibid.) If defendant is able to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of the discovery, the trial court should order a new trial. (Ibid.) If defendant is unable to show any prejudice, then the conviction is ordered reinstated, and the judgment is ordered affirmed. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
For the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to conduct an in camera hearing on defendant's discovery motion consistent with this opinion. If the hearing reveals no discoverable information in Officer Clinton's personnel file that would lead to admissible evidence helpful to defendant's defense, the trial court shall reinstate the original judgment and sentence, which shall stand affirmed. If the in camera hearing reveals discoverable information bearing on the officer's honesty that could lead to admissible evidence helpful to defendant in defense of the charge, the trial court shall grant the requested discovery, allow defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice, and order a new trial if prejudice is demonstrated.