Subsequently, our Supreme Court discussed the meaning of "infamous crime" in the context of whether a witness could be impeached with a prior misdemeanor conviction. People v. Renno, 392 Mich. 45, 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974). The Renno Court addressed whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to question the defendant about the details of his prior municipal-ordinance convictions of being drunk and disorderly.

Subsequently, our Supreme Court discussed the meaning of "infamous crime" in the context of whether a witness could be impeached with a prior misdemeanor conviction. People v. Renno, 392 Mich. 45, 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974). The Renno Court addressed whether the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to question the defendant about the details of his prior municipal-ordinance convictions of being drunk and disorderly.

We agree with defendant, however, that the court erred in allowing defendant's witness to be impeached by misdemeanor convictions and in permitting the prosecutor's witness to be rehabilitated by evidence of prior consistent statements. People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), holds that misdemeanor convictions may not be "used by the prosecution solely for impeachment purposes". Id., at 55, 219 N.W.2d at 425.

The trial court denied the motion, and defendant chose not to testify in his own behalf. Defendant claims that the court's ruling is in direct conflict with the rule set forth in People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), which prohibits the use of prior misdemeanor convictions for impeachment purposes. Defendant contends that his convictions for attempted unlawful driving away of an automobile and attempted larceny in a building are misdemeanors, pursuant to MCLA 750.92; MSA 28.287, and are therefore barred from being used for impeachment purposes by Renno, supra.

The trial judge did not err in refusing to allow impeachment of a prosecution witness with a misdemeanor conviction. People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), has been interpreted to prohibit the impeachment of prosecution witnesses with misdemeanor convictions. In People v. Alphus Harris, 56 Mich. App. 517, 528; 224 N.W.2d 680 (1974), this Court stated:

The specific prior conviction in question was that of attempting to use a stolen credit card, punishable by a prison term of not more than 2 years under MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287, as a circuit court, or "high" misdemeanor. In People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), the Supreme Court, in reviewing the question of impeachment by prior convictions, said: "The original legislative purpose behind these statutes is obvious.

Contrary to the argument of defendants, neither MCL 712A.23; MSA 27.3178(598.23), nor People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), precluded the prosecutor's questions relative to prior convictions of a defense witness. Impeachment is not restricted to convictions for felonies, but may include misdemeanors punishable by more than 90 days in jail.

In his opening statement, defense counsel stated his client had "an unblemished record". On direct examination defendant testified that he had never been convicted of any offense, and on cross-examination he again denied any convictions. Subsequently, the prosecution produced a witness, officer Robert Black, who testified that defendant had previously been convicted of the misdemeanor of larceny under $100, MCL 750.356; MSA 28.588. Defendant argues that allowing the misdemeanor conviction into evidence directly contravenes People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974). Renno held that prior municipal ordinance or misdemeanor convictions are inadmissible at trial if intended solely for impeachment purposes.

It is our belief that defendant's claim that she was impeached by use of prior misdemeanor convictions is not supported by the record. Even if this assumption was true, People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), does not mandate reversal, in that its holding does not constitute a per se reversal rule. Under the circumstances of this case, and assuming arguendo that the convictions were for misdemeanors, we hold the error harmless.

Cf. Selzer, Psychiatry for Lawyers Handbook, ch 2, pp 42-85 (4th ed, 1967). We rule that the cases of People v Jackson, 391 Mich. 323; 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974), and People v Renno, 392 Mich. 45; 219 N.W.2d 422 (1974), are applicable to the present case. As this is an interlocutory appeal, we are not faced with the question of retroactivity of these two cases.