Opinion
10-06-2016
Susan Patnode, Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Cynthia Feathers of counsel), for appellant. John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown (Michael F. Getman of counsel), for respondent.
Susan Patnode, Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Cynthia Feathers of counsel), for appellant.John M. Muehl, District Attorney, Cooperstown (Michael F. Getman of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., EGAN JR., LYNCH, ROSE and AARONS, JJ.
LYNCH, J.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Otsego County (Burns, J.), rendered April 3, 2015, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of burglary in the second degree.
Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary in the second degree in satisfaction of a three-count indictment as well as certain other criminal charges both charged and uncharged and waived his right to appeal. Prior to sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that, among other things, his mental state at the time he entered his plea prevented him from knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entering into same. County Court denied defendant's motion, without a hearing, and he was subsequently sentenced, in accord with his plea agreement, to 15 years in prison to be followed by three years of postrelease supervision. Defendant now appeals.
We affirm. Contrary to defendant's contention, a review of the plea colloquy demonstrates that he validly waived his right to appeal (see People v. Bradshaw, 18 N.Y.3d 257, 264–265, 938 N.Y.S.2d 254, 961 N.E.2d 645 [2011] ; People v. Bethea, 133 A.D.3d 1033, 1033, 19 N.Y.S.3d 191 [2015], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 992, 38 N.Y.S.3d 102, 59 N.E.3d 1214 [2016] ). Although no written waiver of appeal was executed, County Court engaged in a thorough plea colloquy with defendant adequately informing him of the trial-related rights that he was automatically relinquishing as a result of the guilty plea, and then explaining that, as part of the plea bargain, he was also required to waive his separate right to appeal. Defendant affirmatively represented that he understood (see People v. Scott, 139 A.D.3d 1266, 1266, 30 N.Y.S.3d 586 [2016], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 1155, 39 N.Y.S.3d 389, 62 N.E.3d 129 [2016] ). Moreover, upon questioning by County Court, defendant acknowledged that he had ample opportunity to discuss the plea agreement with counsel, he indicated that he was clearheaded and was not taking any medication that prevented him from understanding the proceedings and he offered no other evidence to substantiate his contention that his mental state at the time of his plea prevented him from knowingly and voluntarily entering a plea (see People v. Gasparro, 139 A.D.3d 1247, 1248, 30 N.Y.S.3d 580 [2016], lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 929, 40 N.Y.S.3d 358, 63 N.E.3d 78 [2016] ; People v. Johnson, 77 A.D.3d 986, 986–987, 908 N.Y.S.2d 276 [2010], lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 743, 917 N.Y.S.2d 625, 942 N.E.2d 1050 [2011] ). Given defendant's valid waiver of the right to appeal, he is precluded from arguing that the agreed-upon sentence was harsh and excessive (see People v. Gordon, 139 A.D.3d 1265, 1266, 30 N.Y.S.3d 585 [2016], lv. denied 28 N.Y.3d 930, 40 N.Y.S.3d 358, 63 N.E.3d 78 [2016] ).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
PETERS, P.J., EGAN JR., ROSE and AARONS, JJ., concur.