While a trial court's decision regarding sentencing should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion, our supreme court has held that extended-term sentencing was not intended to enhance the punishment for every offense. People v. Reiner, 251 Ill. App.3d 1065, 1067 (1993). Section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides that a trial court may impose an extended-term sentence when a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.

App (1st) 120329-U, ¶¶ 26-27 (statutory maximum); People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL App (2d) 120892-U, ¶ 10 (extended term sentence); People v. Brown, 2013 IL App (1st) 102527-U, ¶ 31 (concurrent sentence); People v. Guerrero, 2011 IL App (2d) 090972, ¶ 99 (sentence reversed); People v. Ramey, 393 Ill.App.3d 661, 671 (2009) (concurrent sentence); People v. Reeves, 385 Ill.App.3d 716, 735 (2008) (same); People v. Williams, 385 Ill.App.3d 359, 371 (2008) (same); People v. Battle, 378 Ill.App.3d 817, 832-33 (2008) (same); People v. Waldron, 375 Ill.App.3d 159, 161 (2007) (same); People v. Smith, 372 Ill.App.3d 762, 772 (2007) (same); People v. Spears, 371 Ill.App.3d 1000, 1008-09 (2007) (same); People v. Dixon, 366 Ill.App.3d 848, 856 (2006) (same); People v. Span, 337 Ill.App.3d 239, 241-42 (2003) (same); People v. Townsell, 336 Ill.App.3d 340, 346 (2003) (statutory maximum); People v. Townsell, 328 Ill.App.3d 616, 620 (2002) (same); People v. Lee, 326 Ill.App.3d 882, 889 (2001) (Apprendi); People v. Reiner, 251 Ill.App.3d 1065, 1067-68 (1993) (extended term sentence). ¶ 131 This trend is in clear tension with Streit and the well-established standards requiring deference to a trial judge's sentencing determination.

¶ 23 In coming to this conclusion, we reject defendant's reliance on People v. Reiner, 251 Ill.App.3d 1065 (1993), where this court held that the defendant's actions were not exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty. There, following a conversation, the defendant punched the victim once in the side of the head and then ran away.

Defendant adds that Caldwell did not have to be armed for defendant's use of force to constitute a reasonable act of self-defense. See People v. Dowdy, 21 Ill. App. 3d 821, 825 (1974) (a mere assault with fists could justify the use of a deadly weapon); People v. Reiner, 251 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1066 (1993) (a single punch to the face that causes any bleeding or bruising is sufficient to qualify as great bodily harm in cases of aggravated battery); People v. Doolan, 2016 IL App (1st) 141780, ¶ 52 (a punch to the head and a kick to the chest during an attempted carjacking were sufficient to prove intent to kill). Defendant also states that he was not required to wait until the harm actually occurred before he could justifiably use force in self-defense—the danger needed only to be imminent.

While defendant's conduct in this case, like that of the defendant in Andrews, could fairly be characterized as brutal, we do not believe that it rises to the level of exceptional brutality required by the extended-term statute. ( Cf. People v. Reiner (1993), 251 Ill. App.3d 1065; People v. Fields (1990), 198 Ill. App.3d 438, 555 N.E.2d 1136.) We therefore find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an extended-term sentence.