People v. Reimnitz

12 Citing cases

  1. Reimnitz v. State's Attorney of Cook County

    596 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ill. 1984)   Cited 3 times

    The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Reimnitz's conviction, holding that evidence of the Silver Lake incident should not have been admitted, since it had a prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value. People v. Reimnitz, 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380 (1st Dist. 1979). On remand, before a new trial judge, Reimnitz moved for dismissal, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial.

  2. People v. Johnson

    215 Ill. App. 3d 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 42 times
    In Johnson, the defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and the reviewing court considered whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's challenges of certain venirepersons for cause.

    In addition, we have held that the probative value of evidence of a defendant's alleged homosexuality is "outweighed by its inflammatory effect upon the jury." ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 763, cert. denied (1982), 456 U.S. 906, 72 L.Ed.2d 162, 102 S.Ct. 1751; see also People v. Sales (1986), 151 Ill. App.3d 226, 233. • 16 There are also limitations on the admissibility of character evidence.

  3. People v. Schulz

    506 N.E.2d 1343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 26 times
    In Schulz, a witness testified that the defendant, charged with murder, said after the incident that he was glad that his girlfriend (the decedent) was gone, because he was in love with another woman.

    He argues that because at least three persons testified that the victim left defendant's house, Myers' testimony impermissibly influenced the jury and discounted the credibility of defendant and his brother on this issue. Defendant claims that admission of Myers' testimony of what occurred between her and Ray Lees a year and a half after the victim's death jeopardized his right to be tried solely for the murder ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380), because certain inflammatory testimony might over-persuade the jury and cause them to convict defendant as an "evil person" rather than for the crime charged. 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 763, 391 N.E.2d 380.

  4. People v. Reimnitz

    423 N.E.2d 934 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    On appeal this court reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial on the grounds that improper evidence prejudicial to defendant had been received. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380.) On remand Judge William Cousins, Jr., granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that retrial of defendant pursuant to this court's mandate would violate his right against double jeopardy.

  5. Reimnitz v. State's Attorney of Cook County

    761 F.2d 405 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 60 times
    Holding that the custodian of a petitioner who is out on bail pending resolution of his habeas proceeding is the municipal court which has jurisdiction over his criminal case

    The appellate court agreed that the evidence of the homosexual act should have been excluded, and reversed for a new trial, but declined to reach the question whether Reimnitz's confession had been involuntary and therefore inadmissible. People v. Reimnitz, 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380 (1979). The court invited the parties to introduce further evidence on the issue at the new trial.

  6. People v. Ehlert

    274 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 21 times
    In Ehlert, the jury deliberated for three days before coming to a unanimous guilty verdict, and the court noted that the "[p]rosecutors virtually conceded in closing argument their inability to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the actual charge."

    People v. Hines (1967), 87 Ill. App.2d 283, 288, 232 N.E.2d 111. Applying these standards, appellate courts have reversed convictions where the prosecution has presented evidence that the defendant engaged in immoral sexual conduct ( People v. Scaggs (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 633, 636, 444 N.E.2d 674; People v. Petitt (1993), 245 Ill. App.3d 132, 140-41, 613 N.E.2d 1358) or homosexual acts ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 763, 391 N.E.2d 380), even where the evidence had some relevance to the prosecution's theory ( People v. Johnson (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 713, 733, 575 N.E.2d 1247). We find that evidence of prior abortions has similar prejudicial effect.

  7. People v. Bailey

    249 Ill. App. 3d 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that it is not error per se for a prosecutor to use the first person in addressing the jury

    To this end, a prosecutor is barred from presenting irrelevant evidence that serves no purpose but to prejudicially inflame the passions and prejudice of the jury. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380.) We note that the erroneous admission of evidence of prior criminal activity carries a high risk of prejudice.

  8. People v. Sargent

    207 Ill. App. 3d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 7 times

    • 8 Evidence should be excluded if the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial and inflammatory effect upon a jury. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 762-63.) However, the error in admitting such evidence will not warrant reversing the conviction if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

  9. People v. Bleitner

    189 Ill. App. 3d 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 11 times

    • 8 The probative value of motive evidence must be weighed against its prejudicial impact. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380.) Evidence of other crimes or charges can substantially prejudice the case of defendant.

  10. People v. Neumann

    148 Ill. App. 3d 362 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 39 times
    In State v. Neumann, 148 Ill. App.3d 362, 101 Ill.Dec. 899, 499 N.E.2d 487 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051, 107 S.Ct. 2184, 95 L.Ed.2d 840 (1987), the court held that a criminal record does not disqualify a person from testifying; it merely goes to his credibility.

    Defendant concedes in his brief that evidence which would unduly arouse the passions of the jury is properly excluded. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380, cert. denied (1982), 456 U.S. 906, 72 L.Ed.2d 162, 102 S.Ct. 1751.) Matecki's self-serving statement was not probative of a fact in issue in the instant case and could only have served to arouse the passions of the jury; it was therefore properly excluded. • 15 Defendant's final contention is that certain of the prosecutor's remarks during closing and rebuttal arguments constituted reversible error.