The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Reimnitz's conviction, holding that evidence of the Silver Lake incident should not have been admitted, since it had a prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value. People v. Reimnitz, 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380 (1st Dist. 1979). On remand, before a new trial judge, Reimnitz moved for dismissal, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial.
In addition, we have held that the probative value of evidence of a defendant's alleged homosexuality is "outweighed by its inflammatory effect upon the jury." ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 763, cert. denied (1982), 456 U.S. 906, 72 L.Ed.2d 162, 102 S.Ct. 1751; see also People v. Sales (1986), 151 Ill. App.3d 226, 233. • 16 There are also limitations on the admissibility of character evidence.
He argues that because at least three persons testified that the victim left defendant's house, Myers' testimony impermissibly influenced the jury and discounted the credibility of defendant and his brother on this issue. Defendant claims that admission of Myers' testimony of what occurred between her and Ray Lees a year and a half after the victim's death jeopardized his right to be tried solely for the murder ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380), because certain inflammatory testimony might over-persuade the jury and cause them to convict defendant as an "evil person" rather than for the crime charged. 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 763, 391 N.E.2d 380.
On appeal this court reversed the conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial on the grounds that improper evidence prejudicial to defendant had been received. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380.) On remand Judge William Cousins, Jr., granted defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that retrial of defendant pursuant to this court's mandate would violate his right against double jeopardy.
The appellate court agreed that the evidence of the homosexual act should have been excluded, and reversed for a new trial, but declined to reach the question whether Reimnitz's confession had been involuntary and therefore inadmissible. People v. Reimnitz, 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 29 Ill.Dec. 117, 391 N.E.2d 380 (1979). The court invited the parties to introduce further evidence on the issue at the new trial.
People v. Hines (1967), 87 Ill. App.2d 283, 288, 232 N.E.2d 111. Applying these standards, appellate courts have reversed convictions where the prosecution has presented evidence that the defendant engaged in immoral sexual conduct ( People v. Scaggs (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 633, 636, 444 N.E.2d 674; People v. Petitt (1993), 245 Ill. App.3d 132, 140-41, 613 N.E.2d 1358) or homosexual acts ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 763, 391 N.E.2d 380), even where the evidence had some relevance to the prosecution's theory ( People v. Johnson (1991), 215 Ill. App.3d 713, 733, 575 N.E.2d 1247). We find that evidence of prior abortions has similar prejudicial effect.
To this end, a prosecutor is barred from presenting irrelevant evidence that serves no purpose but to prejudicially inflame the passions and prejudice of the jury. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380.) We note that the erroneous admission of evidence of prior criminal activity carries a high risk of prejudice.
• 8 Evidence should be excluded if the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial and inflammatory effect upon a jury. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 762-63.) However, the error in admitting such evidence will not warrant reversing the conviction if it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
• 8 The probative value of motive evidence must be weighed against its prejudicial impact. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380.) Evidence of other crimes or charges can substantially prejudice the case of defendant.
Defendant concedes in his brief that evidence which would unduly arouse the passions of the jury is properly excluded. ( People v. Reimnitz (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 761, 391 N.E.2d 380, cert. denied (1982), 456 U.S. 906, 72 L.Ed.2d 162, 102 S.Ct. 1751.) Matecki's self-serving statement was not probative of a fact in issue in the instant case and could only have served to arouse the passions of the jury; it was therefore properly excluded. • 15 Defendant's final contention is that certain of the prosecutor's remarks during closing and rebuttal arguments constituted reversible error.