) Consent to or mere knowledge of the commission of a crime does not constitute the aiding, abetting, planning or commission of that offense. ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 61, 554 N.E.2d 174, 190; People v. Washington (1970), 121 Ill. App.2d 174, 181.) The mere presence of a defendant at the scene of the crime does not render him or her accountable ( Reid, 136 Ill.2d at 61, 554 N.E.2d at 190; People v. Ruiz (1982), 94 Ill.2d 245, 256, 447 N.E.2d 148, 152; People v. Ruckholdt (1984), 122 Ill. App.3d 7, 10, 460 N.E.2d 847, 850), even when coupled with defendant's flight from the scene or knowledge that a crime was being committed.
" Where the defendant acquiesces in the answer given by the circuit court to the jury's question, the defendant cannot later complain that the circuit court abused its discretion. Love, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 316, citing People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 38 (1990). Moreover, if the defendant fails to object at trial or to raise the issue in his posttrial motion, as in this case, the issue is waived for appellate review.
) As the court of review, we must consider that the jury heard and saw the witnesses, and thus was in the best position to judge the witnesses' credibility, to determine the weight to be given their testimony, to decide the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 61, 554 N.E.2d 174, 190.) We are not at liberty to substitute our judgment for that of the jury on those issues.
We note that "[i]n reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, a reviewing court's analysis is limited; we must determine whether the circuit court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence." ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 56.) In addition, on a motion to suppress, it is the trial court's duty to resolve conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses.
¶ 15 Jurors are entitled to have their questions answered. People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 39 (1990). Where a jury has raised an explicit question on a point of law arising from the facts over which there is doubt or confusion, the court should attempt to clarify the question.
The general rule is that, when a trial court receives a question from the jury during deliberations, the court has a duty to instruct the jury further or clarify the point of law that has caused doubt or confusion. Van Winkle v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 291 Ill. App.3d 165, 172 (1997); People v. Millsap, 189 Ill.2d 155, 160 (2000); People v. Childs, 159 Ill.2d 217, 228-29 (1994); People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 39 (1990). The trial court, however, has discretion and in exercising that discretion, depending on the nature of the question, may choose to draft an answer to a jury question, or choose to abstain from responding.
Generally, jurors are entitled to have their questions answered. ( People v. Reid (1990), 136 Ill.2d 27, 39, 554 N.E.2d 174; People v. Clark (1972), 52 Ill.2d 374, 391, 288 N.E.2d 363.) The circuit court has a duty to instruct the jury where clarification is requested, the original instructions are incomplete, and the jurors are manifestly confused.
In People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174 (Ill. 1990), Reid was charged and convicted of murder and armed robbery in an Illinois Circuit Court (the court of general jurisdiction). One of Reid's two confederates shot and killed the victim during the robbery, and the state prosecuted Reid under a felony murder theory as well as an aider and abettor. While deliberating, the jurors, like Moore's jury, asked the trial judge whether it could find Reid guilty of one charge and not the other.
We now turn to the question of whether defendant has waived review of the trial judge's response to the jury's note on the basis that defense counsel failed to object to the alleged error or to properly raise such error in a posttrial motion. The State claims that because defense counsel neither made an objection at the time of the alleged error nor stated the reason as a basis for error in a posttrial motion, the question has been waived on review.People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 186, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988); People v. Williams, 173 Ill.2d 48, 85, 670 N.E.2d 638 (1996); and People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 38, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990). We note that defense counsel did not object to the response given to the jury at the time of the alleged error.
A trial court's decision to answer or refrain from answering a question from the jury will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Reid, 136 Ill.2d 27, 38-39 (1990); People v. Kamide, 254 Ill. App.3d 67, 72 (1993). It is well established that a trial judge may properly decline to answer a jury's questions when the instructions are legally correct and understandable, further instruction would mislead the jurors, jurors raise questions of fact, or an answer or explanation by the court would likely direct a verdict.