People v. Reed

Full title: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALAXSTAIR…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

Date published: Jun 25, 2014

2014 Ill. App. 4th 130116 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

Opinion

NO. 4-13-0116

06-25-2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALAXSTAIR REED, Defendant-Appellant.

POPE

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 09CF358

Honorable

Heidi N. Ladd,

Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE POPE delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court's letter notifying the Department of Corrections of its dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition did not constitute an order authorizing the Department of Corrections to forfeit defendant's good-conduct credit. ¶ 2 In October 2012, defendant, Alaxstair Reed, filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2012)). In January 2013, the trial court dismissed defendant's petition and found it was frivolous and patently without merit. In January 2013, the court sent a letter to the Pontiac Correctional Center (Pontiac) notifying the warden of the court's ruling. ¶ 3 Defendant argues the trial court's letter to the warden at Pontiac amounts to an order authorizing the Department of Corrections (Department) to forfeit good-conduct credit. He requests this court to "order the trial court to instruct the [Department] that it may not revoke [his] good time, and that if it has, it must restore the credit." We affirm.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In June 2009, a jury found defendant guilty of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2008)). In November 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant to 14 years' imprisonment. In November 2011, this court affirmed. People v. Reed, 2011 IL App (4th) 100441-U, ¶ 25. ¶ 6 In October 2012, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition pursuant to section 122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2012)). Defendant argued the Rantoul police department violated his constitutional rights when it used electronic-surveillance equipment without a court order. Defendant did not indicate when the police used this equipment or attach any evidence supporting his allegations. ¶ 7 In January 2013, the trial court, in a written order, dismissed defendant's postconviction petition. The court found defendant had failed to establish any factual basis that would support his claim and the petition was "frivolous and patently without merit." ¶ 8 In January 2013, the trial court sent a letter to the warden at Pontiac stating, as follows:

"Dear Warden:
Enclosed please find an Order on a Petition for Post-Judgment Relief which was determined to be frivolous and patently without merit.
I am informing you of this pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)
with regard to the inmate's good conduct credits."

¶ 9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 Defendant argues the trial court's letter to the warden at Pontiac amounts to an order authorizing the Department to forfeit good-conduct credit. He requests this court to order the trial court to instruct the Department that it may not revoke his good-conduct credit, or if it has, order the Department to restore his good-conduct credit. ¶ 12 Defendant's interpretation of the trial court's letter as an order authorizing the Department to hold a hearing to revoke sentencing credit is unpersuasive. He understands this court's decision in People v. Shevock, 353 Ill. App. 3d 361, 818 N.E.2d 921 (2004), to hold a trial court's letter informing the Department the court found the defendant's postconviction petition frivolous "constitutes an order authorizing the [Department] to institute proceedings to revoke" good-time credit. Defendant is mistaken. In Shevock, the record contained a similar letter informing the warden the defendant's postconviction petition was frivolous and patently without merit. Id. at 363, 818 N.E.2d at 924. The Department held a hearing and revoked six months of good-conduct credit. Id. at 362, 818 N.E.2d at 923. This court rejected the defendant's claim the trial court had deprived him of due process by finding his postconviction petition was frivolous. Id. at 366, 818 N.E.2d at 926. This court stated as follows:

"The trial court's summary dismissal of the postconviction petition served merely as the basis of a 'charge' before [the Department], the tribunal empowered to find defendant guilty or not guilty of the [Department]-defined offense of 'frivolous pleading' (20 Ill. Adm.
Code § 504, app. A, No. 212 (2003) [citation]." Id.

Shevock does not support defendant's assertion the trial court's letter is an order. Here, as in Shevock, the trial court's letter was simply a letter notifying the Department of the court's dismissal order. Defendant provides no support for the contention the court cannot inform the Department of its dismissal. Also, he does not argue the Department is obligated to conduct a disciplinary hearing upon notification of a dismissal. ¶ 13 The dismissal can form the basis for the Department to bring charges against the prisoner to revoke good-conduct credit. In that disciplinary proceeding, the Department must show the prisoner filed a frivolous lawsuit, as defined by the statute. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) (West 2012). Defendant is correct a first postconviction petition is not included in the definition of a "lawsuit" under section 3-6-3(d)(2) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d)(2) (West 2012)). However, this is an argument he can present to the Department if it initiates a hearing pursuant to section 3-6-3(d) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(d) (West 2012)). Nothing in the record before us indicates the Department initiated a disciplinary proceeding against defendant to revoke good-conduct credit. In any event, challenges to the Department's revocation of good-conduct credit should be brought in an action against the Department, not an appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition.

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment. As part of our judgment, we award the State its $50 statutory assessment as costs of this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2012). ¶ 16 Affirmed.