Therefore, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies and, even if the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant would still be admissible. Defendant, citing People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App. 3d 760 (1990), nevertheless argues that the good-faith exception does not apply where the warrant is based on a "bare-bones" affidavit, and he asserts that such is the case here because the affidavit did not name the places to be searched or describe these locations with particularity. In Reed, the affidavit was considered "bare-bones" because none of the defendants in question were named or otherwise described in the warrant.

(majority decision found De Simone inapplicable because warrant did not specifically state "all persons"; dissent inferred that warrant was for all persons and applied De Simone).Brooks v. State, 593 So.2d 97, 98 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Betts v. State, 920 P.2d 763, 764 (Alaska Ct.App. 1996); People v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Colo.Ct.App. 1990); United States v. Graves, 315 A.2d 559, 561 (D.C. 1974); Bergeron v. State, 583 So.2d 790, 791 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991); People v. Reed, 202 III. App.3d 760, 147 Ill. Dec. 829, 559 N.E.2d 1169, 1171-72 (1990); State v. Prior, 617 N.W.2d 260, 264-65 (Iowa 2000); State v. Thomas, 540 N.W.2d 658, 665-66 (Iowa 1995); State v. Vandiver, 257 Kan. 53, 891 P.2d 350, 357 (1995) ("the affidavit must contain facts sufficient for the issuing magistrate to believe that the premises are confined to ongoing illegal activity and that every person within the orbit of the search possesses the items sought by the warrant") (emphasis added); Sutton v. State, 128 Md.App. 308, 738 A.2d 286, 293 (1999); Commonwealth v. Smith, 370 Mass. 335, 348 N.E.2d 101, 105 (1976) (upholding "all persons" warrant because supporting affidavit made it "probable that any person in the apartment was a participant in the trafficking in heroin there") (emphasis added); State v. Allard, 674 A.2d 921, 923 (Me. 1996); State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Minn. 1985); State v. Pecha, 225 Neb. 673, 407 N.W.2d 760, 765 (1987); State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 382 A.2d 638, 646 (1978) (affidavit must provide "probable cause to believe that al

As the foregoing hypotheticals illustrate, this interpretation of "accept" deprives the warrant of the particularity required to uphold its validity. See People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App. 3d 760, 763 (1990) (search warrant that mentioned only one specific name and then encompassed all " 'other persons present in a public bar' " held defectively open-ended and unconstitutional). ¶ 37 Here Harris was in no different position than the receptionist in Bui.

Nor are we aware of a published decision where a drug transaction on the street provides probable cause for the search of the drug seller's residence. Cf. People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App. 3d 760, 764, 559 N.E.2d 1169 (1990) (officer testified that in "16 years on the police force, he had never known of a raid or search * * * where members of the general public were searched because they happened to be in a specified public place"). Where a successive warrant is sought before the same judge, a question is raised whether in reviewing the second warrant the "great deference" due to a judicial determination of probable cause should apply the second time around.

Defendant relies on Hieber, 258 Ill. App.3d at 152, 629 N.E.2d at 240, which concluded that, "if a *** reviewing court would find a clear lack of probable cause, this is sufficient to suppress evidence." Hieber, in turn, relied on People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App.3d 760, 764, 559 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (1990), in which the court stated: "[T]he good-faith exception does not apply to a search warrant that is based on a `bare[-]bones' affidavit." Absent the quotation of Reed, the Hieber analysis seems questionable.

See Bradley, 609 N.E.2d at 423-24 (no reasonable belief in validity of warrant which misrepresented the reliability of informant and did not provide sufficient evidence to meet the totality of the circumstances test); State v. Huggins, 733 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.D.C. 1990) (affidavit did not provide temporal context for information); United States v. Corrigan, 809 F. Supp. 567 (M.D.Tenn. 1992) (same); People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App.3d 760, 147 Ill.Dec. 829, 832, 559 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (1990) (bare bones, facially overbroad warrant); State v. Diamond, 628 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Me. 1993) (affidavit based solely on non-criminal behavior and containing no information from which to corroborate that evidence of criminal activity would be found); State v. Hammett, 784 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Md. App. 1989) (bare bones affidavit). It is curious, and troubling, that, although the petitioner does not raise the issue, a search of the house, including in places in which a motorcycle could not possibly fit was authorized by, and conducted pursuant to, this warrant.

An affidavit is "bare-bones" where it is completely lacking in setting forth a basis for probable cause. Id. ¶ 22; see also People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App. 3d 760, 764 (1998) (holding affidavit was "bare-bones" where "none of the defendants in question were named or otherwise described or identified in the affidavit"). A bare-bones affidavit is " 'one that states only "suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge." '

306 Ill. App. 3d at 180. However, in People v. Reed, the court found that the good faith exception did not apply because the affidavit for the search warrant, which named none of the defendants, was bare-boned and was facially overbroad in that it allowed the search of all persons in a public bar. 202 Ill. App. 3d 760, 764 (1990). Good faith was also found in People v. Cooke, where the appellate court found that the affidavit was partially valid in that the facts supported the warrant for weapons but not for drugs. 299 Ill. App. 3d 273, 282 (1998).

While the 20–page complaint is not bare-bones in and of itself, it is bare-bones with regard to defendant's Cromwell address. As stated, the nearly two pages of “probable cause” evidence attempting to create a nexus between defendant's criminal drug trafficking activity and his family's Cromwell home was entirely lacking. See People v. Reed, 202 Ill.App.3d 760, 764, 147 Ill.Dec. 829, 559 N.E.2d 1169 (1990) (good-faith exception inapplicable where affidavit was bare-bones and search warrant was overbroad); cf. Beck, 306 Ill.App.3d at 181, 239 Ill.Dec. 65, 713 N.E.2d 596 (good-faith exception applied because the 16–page complaint contained “extensive information about defendant's activities and residences,” creating at least an arguable basis for an officer to believe probable cause existed to search defendant's home, which he purchased under an alias). Probable cause regarding the other locations cannot be bootstrapped to supply probable cause, and by implication, good faith, for the Cromwell location.

However, this is not a bare-bones affidavit here. See People v. Reed, 202 Ill. App.3d 760, 764 (1990) (good-faith exception does not apply to a search warrant based on a "bare-bones" affidavit), quoted in Cooke, 299 Ill. App.3d at 281. The 16-page document contained extensive information about defendant's activities and residences.