People v. Reardon

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Smith

    248 Ill. App. 3d 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 14 times

    The motion has been treated as analogous to a pretrial motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case. ( Roehrig, 45 Ill. App.3d at 194; see also, e.g., People v. Mueller (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 234 (order granting defendant's "motion to suppress" results of blood-alcohol test under section 11-501.4 affirmed on appeal without discussing distinction between motion to suppress and motion in limine); People v. Reardon (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 44 (similarly, order granting defendant's "motion to suppress" written results of blood-alcohol test under section 11-501.4 affirmed on appeal). • 3 The primary difference between these two motions is that, unlike a motion in limine, a motion to suppress evidence is not based upon the ordinary rules of evidence but rather upon the defendant's constitutional rights.

  2. People v. Solis

    655 N.E.2d 954 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 4 times

    According to defendant, because the physician did not receive the results of his blood-alcohol test in writing, the test results are inadmissible. Blood-alcohol test results not in compliance with the criteria set forth in section 11-501.4 have been held inadmissible. ( People v. Mueller (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 234, 237, 581 N.E.2d 817; People v. Reardon (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 44, 47-48, 570 N.E.2d 791.) In the instant case, the trial court granted defendant's motion and ruled that the blood-alcohol test results were inadmissible based on its finding that the blood-alcohol test results which the emergency room physician received and considered in his treatment of defendant were not received in writing, contrary to the requirement of the statute.

  3. People v. Rushton

    254 Ill. App. 3d 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 9 times

    Although Kanehann testified that she initially received defendant's test results over the telephone, she clearly stated that she also received the written printout while she was treating defendant and that she used the information in that printout for purposes of his treatment and diagnosis. The cases relied upon by defendant, People v. Reardon (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 44, and People v. Mueller (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 234, are therefore inapposite to this case. In People v. Ethridge (1993), 243 Ill. App.3d 446, we examined the application of this statute and concluded that a computer-generated printout would constitute a "written" result within the meaning of section 11-501.4:

  4. People v. Niemiro

    256 Ill. App. 3d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 15 times
    Considering the trial court's oral pronouncements as reflected in the transcripts of the proceedings

    We disagree and find that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the written results of the blood-alcohol tests submitted to the court in this case complied with the statutory mandates of section 11-501.4 of the Code. We have considered the cases cited by defendant, namely, People v. Mueller (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 234, 581 N.E.2d 817, and People v. Reardon (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 44, 570 N.E.2d 791, both Third District Appellate Court cases, which upheld trial court rulings suppressing blood-alcohol test results tendered by the State. According to the very narrow interpretation of section 11-501.4 of the Code in these cases, written tests results had to be received and considered by the treating physician in the emergency room and the same piece of paper had to be entered into evidence.

  5. People v. Ethridge

    243 Ill. App. 3d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 16 times
    In Ethridge, the court considered whether the State was required to admit the blood sample as part of the foundation for admitting the test results.

    Because of our belief that computer-generated printouts may be commonly used by emergency medical care providers under circumstances similar to those present in this case, we hold that such printouts are the functional equivalent of written test results as contemplated by section 11-501.4. To hold to the contrary would effectively eviscerate the applicability of section 11-501.4 in these types of cases. Defendant's reliance on People v. Reardon (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 44, and People v. Mueller (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 234, is misplaced because in those cases the written results were not in existence at the time of treatment. Here, the written result, i.e., the computer printout, was in fact in existence at the time defendant was treated.

  6. People v. Mueller

    581 N.E.2d 817 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 7 times

    Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95 1/2, par. 11-501.4(a). This court recently examined this provision in People v. Reardon (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 44, 570 N.E.2d 791. In Reardon, we affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress blood-alcohol test results.