"Whether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo." People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 422, 427, 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017). "The Michigan Vehicle Code ... prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated."
Id . When interpreting a statute, " ‘we must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.’ " People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 422, 428, 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017), quoting People v. Miller , 498 Mich. 13, 25, 869 N.W.2d 204 (2015). Moreover, "[n]ontechnical words and phrases" should be construed according to their plain meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used.
When interpreting a statute, the appellate court must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause and not render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 422, 427-428, 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017). "When a word or phrase is not defined by the statute in question, it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of the word or phrase."
"Whether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo." People v Rea, 500 Mich 422, 427; 902 NW2d 362 (2017) (citation omitted). "Because courts are wary of creating crimes, penal statutes are to be strictly construed and any ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of lenity[.]"
The application raised a single claim: I. Whether contrary to U.S. Const. Ams. V, XIV; Const 1963, Art 1, § 17, it was a violation of Appellant Michael Deardoff's constitutional right to a proportionate and individualized sentence, for him to be sentenced to 30 - 90 months' in prison, for driving (while intoxicated) an all-terrain-vehicle on his shared private property that had a posted sign "Private Property - Keep Out", where this occurred just after the Court of Appeals held in People v. Rea, 315 Mich. App. 151 (2016) that driving intoxicated on a private driveway was permissible? (Only after this offense did the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Rea, 500 Mich. 422 (2017) overrule the Court of Appeals.) The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal "for lack of merit in the grounds presented."
We must also avoid any construction that would render any part of a statute surplusage or nugatory, if possible. People v. Rea , 500 Mich. 422, 428, 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017). The rape-shield statute generally prohibits the admission of "[ (1) ] [e]vidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct, [ (2) ] opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and [ (3) ] reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct...." MCL 750.520j(1).
To the extent that it is relevant to Houghton's sufficiency argument, we also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation, such as "[w]hether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute." People v Rea, 500 Mich. 422, 427; 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017).
Principles of statutory construction counsel us to give effect to every word, phrase, and clause, and avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. People v Rea, 500 Mich. 422, 427-428; 902 N.W.2d 362 (2017).
Additionally, "[w]hether a defendant's conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute is a question of statutory interpretation that is reviewed de novo." People v Rea, 500 Mich 422, 427; 902 NW2d 362 (2017). This Court interprets statutes pursuant to the Legislature's intent.
"MCL 257.625(1) prohibits operating a vehicle while intoxicated in three types of locations: (1) upon a highway, (2) in a place open to the general public, or (3) in a place generally accessible to motor vehicles." People v Rea, 500 Mich 422, 428; 902 NW2d 362 (2017). "Operate" also means "[c]ausing an automated motor vehicle to move under its own power in automatic mode upon a highway or street regardless of whether the person is physically present in that automated motor vehicle at that time," MCL 257.35a(b), but there is no indication that this provision is applicable in this case.