In addition, " this court has an obligation to take notice of matters which go to the jurisdiction of the circuit court" in each case before us. Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill.2d at 334, 264 Ill.Dec. 283, 770 N.E.2d 177.          In reaching its decision, the appellate court relied on this court's decision in In re C.R.H., 163 Ill.2d 263, 206 Ill.Dec. 100, 644 N.E.2d 1153 (1994), which relied, in turn, on People v. R.S., 104 Ill.2d 1, 83 Ill.Dec. 339, 470 N.E.2d 297 (1984), and People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill.2d 77, 67 Ill.Dec. 813, 445 N.E.2d 293 (1983). A review of the history of these cases is in order.

Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 18 L.Ed.2d at 549, 87 S.Ct. at 1446. This court has adopted the holding in Gault that due process of law requires that notice in juvenile proceedings be equivalent to that constitutionally required in criminal or civil cases ( People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 81) and that adequate notice to a minor and his or her parents is a requirement of due process ( In re J.P.J. (1985), 109 Ill.2d 129, 135). This court has also found that inadequate notice to a parent whose address is known violates the rights of parent and child to due process.

However, we note the record reflects no attempt to notify Kankakee County juvenile court services of the supplemental proceedings in Champaign County. In People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 78-79, 445 N.E.2d 293, 294 (1983), the supreme court dealt with the issue of whether the "jurisdiction of the circuit court [is] properly invoked when the State fails to name or notify a court-appointed guardian of a minor in a proceeding brought against [a] guardian's charge." The court held the trial court's jurisdiction was not properly invoked and its order void because the State had neither named nor notified the guardian of the proceeding.

Summons and a copy of the petition are to be directed to each of the respondents named in the petition. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 37, par. 704-3(1); see In re R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77 (in certain situations a person other than the minor and his parents must also be named as a respondent).) Service is to be made personally or by leaving a copy at the person's abode and mailing a copy of the summons to that address.

In support of this contention respondent relies on the recent decision of our supreme court in People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297. There, the court held that the failure to notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in a failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction and renders its orders void. (See also People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293.) Respondent argues that this clear language applies to the present juvenile proceeding also. It is clear that the minors here were not properly notified pursuant to the requirements of the Juvenile Court Act.

Noncompliance with the notice provisions of the Act here allowed an adjudication of wardship without notice to a named parent, whose address was contained in the petition, and thus violated the right of parent and child to due process ( In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428; In re J.W. (1981), 87 Ill.2d 56). As was stated in People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 83: "A pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void.

This view is fully consistent and in alignment with the decisions of our supreme court which have held that the of lack of notice to a noncustodial parent whose address is known is a jurisdictional defect, which voids any orders made by that court. See People v. R.S., 104 Ill.2d 1, 6, 83 Ill.Dec. 339, 470 N.E.2d 297, 300 (1984) (holding that “fail[ure] to notify the minor's mother, a named respondent with a known address, of the juvenile proceedings against her son, did not properly invoke the trial court's [subject matter] jurisdiction and [that therefore] * * * the court's order of adjudication * * * and subsequent orders were void" ); [316 Ill.Dec. 122] People v. R.D.S, 94 Ill.2d 77, 83, 67 Ill.Dec. 813, 445 N.E.2d 293, 296 (1983) (holding that “ [a] pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void" ). Where a judgment is void it can be attacked at any time and is not subject to the rule of waiver.

However, the failure to name and serve a necessary party in a juvenile proceeding (in this case Kenya's plenary guardian of the person) raises the question not of personal jurisdiction over that party, but of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill.2d 77, 83 (1983) ("A pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void"); In re A.H., 195 Il. 2d 408, 423-24 (2001); In re C.R.H., 163 Ill.2d 263, 271-72 (1994); In re J.L.S., 188 Ill. App.3d 815, 816 (1989). Such an objection cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. Segers v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill.2d 421, 427 (2000); Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill.2d 507, 515 (1994).

In late June 1981, he was visiting his mother for the summer but was to return to his grandmother and continue his education in Oxford, Indiana. • 2 An identical factual issue was presented in People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293, where the minor was living with his mother at the time the petition was filed but legal guardianship remained with the Department of Children and Family Services. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the failure to name and serve the legal guardian rendered the trial court's orders void because jurisdiction was not properly invoked. "Neither the minor, the minor's mother, the guardian, nor any other interested party ever filed a petition with the circuit court seeking a change in custody prior to the filing of the three petitions at issue here.

Respondents rely principally on the recent decision of this court in In re Crouch (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 694, 476 N.E.2d 69, appeal denied (1985), 106 Ill.2d 554, for the proposition that failure to notify a known respondent in a juvenile proceeding results in the failure to properly invoke the circuit court's jurisdiction and that all orders of the trial court are voidable. This argument is based on the three-judge plurality and four-judge majority decisions of the supreme court to that effect in People v. R.D.S. (1983), 94 Ill.2d 77, 445 N.E.2d 293 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring), and People v. R.S. (1984), 104 Ill.2d 1, 470 N.E.2d 297 (Goldenhersh, J., specially concurring), respectively. In Crouch, this court also observed that consistent with Justice Goldenhersh's special concurrences in both R.D.S. and R.S., the orders entered by the circuit court in violation of the statutory provisions of the Juvenile Court Act requiring notice were erroneous and hence voidable for that reason alone.