The version of the rule in effect until 1995 recognized two types of contempt: criminal and civil. People v. Razatos , 699 P.2d 970, 974 n.1 (Colo. 1985). Generally, criminal contempt and civil contempt were differentiated by the purpose of the proceeding and type of sanctions requested.
Our case law and the prior version of C.R.C.P. 107 have referred to contempt as "civil" and "criminal." See, e.g., People v. Barron, 677 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Colo. 1984); People v. Rezatos, 699 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo. 1985); see also C.R.C.P. 107(e) (1994). But these authorities make it clear that these terms refer to the "purpose and character of the sanctions," they don’t describe which set of procedural rules applies to the action.
Husband instead focuses on cases that discuss the difference between a past ability to pay and a present one. See, e.g. , Estate of Elliott , 993 P.2d 474 ; People v. Razatos , 699 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1985). ¶ 31 Husband's cases, though not dispositive, are informative.
¶ 23 For Fifth Amendment purposes, the privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to answers that would themselves support a conviction but also to those that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the accused. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20, 121 S.Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158 (2001) ; People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 976 (Colo.1985). Accordingly, “[t]he right not to incriminate oneself is not triggered solely by the existence or even likelihood of a criminal prosecution; rather, ‘[w]hen a witness can demonstrate any possibility of prosecution which is more than fanciful he has demonstrated a reasonable fear of prosecution sufficient to meet constitutional muster.’ ”
¶ 23 For Fifth Amendment purposes, the privilege against self-incrimination extends not only to answers that would themselves support a conviction but also to those that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the accused. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 20, 121 S.Ct. 1252, 149 L.Ed.2d 158 (2001) ; People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 976 (Colo.1985). Accordingly, “[t]he right not to incriminate oneself is not triggered solely by the existence or even likelihood of a criminal prosecution; rather, ‘[w]hen a witness can demonstrate any possibility of prosecution which is more than fanciful he has demonstrated a reasonable fear of prosecution sufficient to meet constitutional muster.’ ”
We hold that it does. In People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1985), we described the Sixth Amendment rights of a person charged with both civil and criminal contempt: The deprivation of a person's liberty has the same effect on the confined person when jailed after civil or other types of proceedings as when imprisoned after conviction for a crime.
¶109 "[B]efore a court can compel a response . . . in the face of a claim of the privilege, it must be ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to incriminate." People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 976 (Colo. 1985) (emphasis in original) (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 488 (1951)).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution can be invoked by anyone whose statements or answers might incriminate that person by admitting the commission of illegal acts or furnishing a chain in the link of evidence needed to prosecute him or her for a crime. People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 976 (Colo. 1985). The burden lies with the person asserting the right to remain silent to establish that the privilege is properly invoked.
The county court, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 407(a)(2) and (d), held Guthrie in criminal contempt of court. Criminal contempt proceedings are designed to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court by imposing punishment on the contemnor. People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo.1985). Our original jurisdiction is an appropriate means to review summary contempt orders.
As to the trial court's second point, we observe that "criminal contempt is not a common law or statutory crime" in Colorado. People v. Razatos, 699 P.2d 970, 974 (Colo. 1985) (citation omitted). Additionally, not all protections available for criminal defendants are available to those charged with criminal contempt.