People v. Rayford

3 Citing cases

  1. People v. Olson

    128 Ill. App. 3d 560 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 15 times
    Noting that "prejudice is the natural result of erroneously instructing the jury on an uncharged offense"

    Further, several recent cases have permitted the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to nol-pros a charge even upon appeal of the cause under circumstances where the charges in question were equally serious in nature and were not lesser included offenses of the others. (See People v. Rayford (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 124, 126, 432 N.E.2d 1041; People v. Schultz (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 379, 382, 392 N.E.2d 322.) In People v. Martin (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 196, 214, 459 N.E.2d 279, this court permitted the State to proceed on a less specific and less serious offense where both parties agreed to this result.

  2. People v. Artis

    232 Ill. 2d 156 (Ill. 2009)   Cited 388 times
    Holding "that under the one-act, one-crime doctrine, sentence should be imposed on the more serious offense and the less serious offense should be vacated"

    Schultz, 73 Ill. App. 3d at 382. In People v. Ray ford, 104 Ill. App. 3d 124, 126 (1982), the appellate court, without discussion, allowed the State to choose which of two Class X felonies it would pursue on appeal. People v. Eubanks, 279 Ill. App. 3d 949, 963 (1996), relied on a decision of this court, People v. Holman,

  3. People v. Martin

    121 Ill. App. 3d 196 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 27 times
    In Martin, Mr. Whitman argued that since he was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and two counts of armed violence, and all counts arose from the same single act committed during the robbery, only one count of armed violence can stand and the other three counts must be vacated.

    ( People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill.2d 94, 98; People v. Mormon (1982), 92 Ill.2d 268, 270.) Although there is some judicial expression that the conviction for armed robbery is the more specific and the more serious offense, and therefore it should stand while the armed violence conviction and sentence should be vacated ( People v. Velleff (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 820, 825-26), other decisions express deference to the prosecutorial discretion granted to the State. (See People v. Rayford (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 124.) In this case, since both crimes are Class X felonies and the State and the defendants agree that the armed-violence conviction should stand, we shall abide by their choice.