Further, several recent cases have permitted the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to nol-pros a charge even upon appeal of the cause under circumstances where the charges in question were equally serious in nature and were not lesser included offenses of the others. (See People v. Rayford (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 124, 126, 432 N.E.2d 1041; People v. Schultz (1979), 73 Ill. App.3d 379, 382, 392 N.E.2d 322.) In People v. Martin (1984), 121 Ill. App.3d 196, 214, 459 N.E.2d 279, this court permitted the State to proceed on a less specific and less serious offense where both parties agreed to this result.
Schultz, 73 Ill. App. 3d at 382. In People v. Ray ford, 104 Ill. App. 3d 124, 126 (1982), the appellate court, without discussion, allowed the State to choose which of two Class X felonies it would pursue on appeal. People v. Eubanks, 279 Ill. App. 3d 949, 963 (1996), relied on a decision of this court, People v. Holman,
( People v. Simmons (1982), 93 Ill.2d 94, 98; People v. Mormon (1982), 92 Ill.2d 268, 270.) Although there is some judicial expression that the conviction for armed robbery is the more specific and the more serious offense, and therefore it should stand while the armed violence conviction and sentence should be vacated ( People v. Velleff (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 820, 825-26), other decisions express deference to the prosecutorial discretion granted to the State. (See People v. Rayford (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 124.) In this case, since both crimes are Class X felonies and the State and the defendants agree that the armed-violence conviction should stand, we shall abide by their choice.