Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC596200
Premo, J.
Defendant Delray King Rawls pleaded no contest to second degree robbery (two counts), false imprisonment, vehicle theft, receiving stolen property, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of marijuana. He also admitted several firearms enhancements. Before sentencing, defendant asked the trial court to discharge his retained counsel (plea counsel) and appoint substitute counsel so as to explore a motion to withdraw his pleas. The trial court asked defendant for his reasons to withdraw the pleas, heard defendant’s reasons, and denied the motion to withdraw without addressing the motion to substitute. It then sentenced defendant to 16 years and four months in prison. On appeal, we reversed the judgment with directions to entertain the motion to substitute before entertaining the motion to withdraw. (People v. Rawls (Aug. 16, 2007) H030501 [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, defendant retained new counsel and moved to withdraw his plea on the ground that the trial court, when accepting his plea, had failed to advise him of the mandatory minimum prison sentence of 12 years. The trial court agreed that it had omitted the advice. It then held an evidentiary hearing during which plea counsel testified that she had advised defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence. The trial court concluded that its omission was nonprejudicial and denied the motion to withdraw. It then sentenced defendant to 16 years and four months and issued defendant a certificate of probable cause to appeal. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
The following occurred at the hearing on defendant’s motion to withdraw.
Defendant testified that, at the plea hearing, the trial court had told him of the maximum term of 25 years and four months. And he affirmed that plea counsel had told him of “a maximum exposure of 25 years, 24 years, something like that.” But he denied that plea counsel had advised him about a mandatory minimum term. And he claimed that plea counsel had told him about his being “program eligible” for “drug treatment mainly.” He asserted that he had understood that the trial court could have given him a sentence of drug treatment and he would not have pleaded no contest had he known of the mandatory minimum prison sentence.
Plea counsel testified that she had informed defendant early in the attorney-client relationship that a robbery conviction would make him ineligible for probation and an admission to a firearm enhancement carried a consecutive 10-year term. She added that her notes reflected that defendant had “repeatedly asked... why, why, why he had to go to prison for such a long time.” She indicated that she had communicated to defendant and his family that “the absolute best case scenario appeared to be 12 years” and the best strategy toward that scenario was to retain an expert to obtain a social history and present the history at sentencing in an attempt to mitigate the sentence. She affirmed that she was certain that she “had conveyed to [defendant] on at least one occasion, on multiple occasions, that he faced a minimum sentence of 12 years prior to his plea, that he faced a minimum sentence of 12 years if he were to plead guilty to [the] charges.” She added that her notes said, “no probation, no suspended sentence, subdivision G, enhancement can’t be stricken under [Penal Code section] 1385,” which reflected her research “adnauseam... because [defendant] was so adamant that I needed to find a way that he didn’t have to go to prison, and that was the whole point why he terminated [prior counsel] and retained me was to hope to somehow find a way around that enhancement, the draconian nature of that enhancement.”
The trial court concluded that the evidence was “overwhelming” that plea counsel had advised defendant of the mandatory minimum sentence. It agreed that it had erred by failing to advise defendant “as to both the maximum and the minimum terms.” But it held that the error was harmless because “there must be a showing that it would be reasonably probable that had it not been for the [error] that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached if he’d been properly advised” and “the Court does not believe that [defendant] would’ve been more likely to receive a result more favorable than the sentence that the Court pronounced in this case.”
DISCUSSION
Penal Code section 1018 allows a trial court to grant a defendant’s application to withdraw his or her guilty plea “before judgment... for a good cause shown....” It also directs that “This section shall be liberally construed... to promote justice.” Though Penal Code section 1018 is to be liberally construed, it “does not relieve the applicant from coming forward with requisite proof that the ends of justice will be subserved by permitting him to change his plea from guilty to not guilty.” (People v. Brotherton (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 195, 201.) However, the promotion of justice includes a consideration of the rights of the prosecution, which is entitled not to have a guilty plea withdrawn without good cause. (People v. Hightower (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 923, 928.) These same principles apply to pleas of no contest. (See People v. Superior Court (Barke) (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 710, 715-716.)
“To establish good cause, it must be shown that defendant was operating under mistake, ignorance, or any other factor overcoming the exercise of his free judgment. [Citations.] Other factors overcoming defendant’s free judgment include inadvertence, fraud or duress. [Citations.] However, ‘[a] plea may not be withdrawn simply because the defendant has changed his mind.’ ” (People v. Huricks (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1208.)
The determination of good cause is that of the trial court. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1254.) Once the trial court has made the determination of good cause, a reviewing court will not disturb the decision unless abuse of discretion is clearly demonstrated. (Ibid.) To exercise judicial discretion, “a court must know and consider all material facts and all legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent, and just decision.” (People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 59, 65.) “A court abuses its discretion when its ruling ‘falls outside the bounds of reason.’ ” (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 666.)
When entering a guilty plea, the defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of the conviction. (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 604.) Here, the parties do not dispute that the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment was a direct consequence of defendant’s plea and that the trial court failed to advise defendant of that consequence. Thus, it follows that defendant presumptively entered his plea involuntarily (under ignorance), which establishes a case of good cause for withdrawal of his plea.
“Unlike the admonition of constitutional rights... advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated. Rather, the rule compelling such advisement is ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ [Citations.]... [¶]... ‘Unlike an uninformed waiver of the specified constitutional rights which renders a plea or admission involuntary and requires that it be set aside, an uninformed waiver based on the failure of the court to advise an accused of the consequences of an admission constitutes error which requires that the admission be set aside only if the error is prejudicial to the accused.’ [Citation.] ‘A showing of prejudice requires the appellant to demonstrate that it is reasonably probable he would not have entered his plea if he had been [properly advised].’ ” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022-1023.)
Defendant argues that the “record is clear that [he] would not have accepted the plea had he been properly advised.” He relies on his testimony and the objective fact that a plea subjecting him to a mandatory minimum term of 12 years is less attractive than one allowing for probation. Defendant’s analysis is erroneous.
The evidence was overwhelming that defendant knew of the mandatory minimum term. The trial court made a specific finding to this effect after hearing contradictory testimony. Defendant minimizes this pivotal point. He acknowledges plea counsel’s testimony only in a one-sentence footnote. And he insists that the record shows that “whatever [plea counsel] had told [him], he did not trust or believe or understand” so that “had the trial court, rather than [plea counsel] whom he did not trust, informed [him] that [it] would not be granting him probation but instead would be imposing a sentence of at least 12 years, then it would have been reasonably probable that [he] would not have entered the plea.”
The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and can reject evidence as unworthy of credence. (Oldenburg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 733, 742.) Where two conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, it is the reviewing court’s duty to adopt the one supporting the challenged order. (People v. Knight (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 337, 344.) “[A] reviewing court must adopt the trial court’s factual findings if substantial evidence supports them.” (People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1254.)
Since defendant knew of the mandatory minimum term, it follows that the trial court’s failure to advise defendant of that term did not affect defendant’s decision to enter his plea. As the trial court itself concluded, the error was therefore harmless.
Defendant argues that the trial court “applied an incorrect standard of prejudice.” We agree. But our agreement does not assist defendant.
The trial court articulated that its error was harmless because it was not reasonably probable that defendant would have received a different sentence in the absence of the error. But the correct standard is whether it is reasonably probable that defendant would not have entered his plea in the absence of the error.
We, however, review the trial court’s ruling rather than its reasoning. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19 [“a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason”].) Here, the trial court’s finding that defendant knew of the mandatory minimum sentence supports its no-prejudice conclusion. The trial court therefore correctly denied defendant’s motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.