This court has already distinguished Jackson from Illinois cases involving defendants subject to commitment upon completion of a discharge hearing in which the State demonstrated evidence of the defendants' guilt. See People v. Raseaitis, 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 607 (1984); Yiadom v. Kiley, 204 Ill. App.3d 418, 425-27 (1990); Barichello v. Campagna, 276 Ill. App.3d at 273. The test of whether a statute violates equal protection is whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective, with the burden on those challenging the law to prove that it is arbitrary and invalid.

Contrary to petitioner's conclusion, however, Jackson does not automatically entitle relator to release in the instant case. In People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 607, 467 N.E.2d 1098, the court contrasted the Indiana statute at issue in Jackson with the Illinois statute, and concluded: "It is significant that under the Illinois statute defendants are subject to the extended treatment period only after a discharge hearing at which the State must meet its burden of, in effect, proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

During this time, the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure were amended to provide for a modified procedure in the confinement of an accused found unfit to stand trial. See People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 476 N.E.2d 1098. On December 10, 1981, pursuant to defendant's request, the court held a fitness hearing, under the new, amended provision to the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein the court determined that defendant was not fit to stand trial and would not be fit within one year. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, pars. 104-23(b), 104-28.)

• 1 Defendant maintains that he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is well established that an extrajudicial confession is insufficient to support a conviction unless corroborated by other evidence ( People v. Avery (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 771, 410 N.E.2d 1093), and, in Illinois, proof of the corpus delicti satisfies the corroboration requirement ( People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 603, 467 N.E.2d 1098, citing People v. Willingham (1982), 89 Ill.2d 352, 432 N.E.2d 861). It is sufficient if the evidence other than the confession "either tends to show that a crime did in fact occur, that is, to establish the corpus delicti [citation], or otherwise sufficiently corroborates the confession in its material elements to satisfy the court that the confession was not the product of imagination. [Citation.]" ( People v. Avery (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 771, 777, 410 N.E.2d 1093, 1098.)

To determine legislative intent, the court will examine the entire statute and attempt to identify both the statutory objective and the problem sought to be eliminated. ( City of Springfield v. Board of Election Commissioners (1985), 105 Ill.2d 336, 341, 473 N.E.2d 1313, 1315.) The court must also choose a construction which gives the statute a clear and logical meaning rather than a meaning which renders it illogical, useless, or unreasonable. ( People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 604, 467 N.E.2d 1098, 1102, citing Havlik v. Marcin (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 532, 270 N.E.2d 189; 2A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction sec. 45.12 (4th ed. Rev. 1984).) Neither defendant nor the city disagrees with these general principles of law and their applicability to Ordinance 4-28.

One of the primary objectives in enacting these provisions was to ensure that criminal defendants who are found unfit, and for whom there is no substantial possibility of attaining fitness, will not be indeterminately institutionalized. People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 605, 467 N.E.2d 1098, 1102; Report, Governor's Commission for Revision of the Mental Health Code of Illinois of 1976 (1976). The principal vehicle for achieving this objective is a "discharge hearing."

However, the legislature has determined that the State's interest in determining whether an accused would become competent in the near future will not justify a commitment period which exceeds the maximum sentence he would have received had he been convicted and sentenced under section 5-8-1. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104-25(g)(4); see also People v. Rink (1983), 97 Ill.2d 533, 543-44, 455 N.E.2d 64.) The unfit defendant's commitment period is limited because he may be brought to trial for his crimes if he recovers from his mental illness during the commitment period. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 104-25(g)(1); People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 607, 467 N.E.2d 1098. In contrast, an insanity acquittee must either be released or civilly committed at the conclusion of his criminal commitment period.

725 ILCS 5/104-25(a)-(b) (West 1998). Although a court's determination at a discharge hearing that the State has proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not constitute a technical determination of guilt, the standard of proof is the same as that required for a criminal conviction.People v. Raseaitis, 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 603 (1984). A criminal defendant has a right to be present at every stage of the trial against him, from arraignment to final disposition.People v. Davis, 69 Ill. App.3d 548, 551 (1979).

As in the case of criminal convictions, the State is required to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, although the trial court's determination that the State has met its burden of proof does not constitute a technical determination of guilt. People v. Rink (1983), 97 Ill.2d 533, 455 N.E.2d 64; People v. Burt (1986), 142 Ill. App.3d 833, 492 N.E.2d 233; People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 467 N.E.2d 1098. In his appeal, defendant claims that the evidence presented at his discharge hearing was not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the court must choose a construction which gives the statute a clear and logical meaning rather than a meaning which renders it absurd, illogical, useless or unreasonable. People v. Raseaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 600, 604, 467 N.E.2d 1098, 1102. Section 5-8-4 states in part: