Opinion
A168909
04-17-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDDIE RAPOZA, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. SC053584A)
We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.).
GOLDMAN, J.
In 2005, Eddie Rapoza was convicted by a jury of one count of first degree murder and two counts of second degree murder. (Pen. Code § 187; all undesignated sections are from this code). At trial, it was undisputed that Rapoza drove off a cliff in a van containing his pregnant wife and four-year-old daughter. Although Rapoza claimed after the crash that his foot had become caught beneath one of the pedals, he admitted during a subsequent interrogation that he intended to drive off the cliff, killing himself and his passengers. The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder, and two consecutive terms of 15 years to life for the second degree murders.
This brief summary of facts is drawn from the Court of Appeal's prior opinion in Rapoza's direct appeal. (People v. Rapoza (Aug. 10, 2007, A110285 [nonpub. opn.].) We rely on that opinion solely for the purpose of summarizing the background of this case. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222 (Delgadillo).).
In November 2022, Rapoza sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. After appointing counsel, receiving briefing from Rapoza's counsel and the District Attorney, and reviewing the record of conviction, the superior court denied the petition. The court found that Rapoza was not entitled to relief because, among other reasons, he was the sole participant in the crime; he was the actual killer; and no instructions were given that would have permitted the jury to convict him of murder based on the felony murder or natural and probable consequences theories of liability. Rapoza has appealed that ruling, and his counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. Because we received a letter from Rapoza urging us to consider the merits of his appeal, we address the argument he has made. (Id., at p. 232.)
Rapoza's initial petition was incorrectly filed under section 1170.95, which by that time had been amended and renumbered as section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10, eff. June 30, 2022.) In February 2023, Rapoza refiled his petition under the proper code section. In May 2023, for reasons unknown, Rapoza filed a third petition.
It is well settled that section 1172.6 precludes relief as a matter of law where the record of conviction shows a defendant was the sole perpetrator and actual killer. In Delgadillo, for example, our Supreme Court determined that the defendant was "not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6" because he "was the actual killer and the only participant in the killing." (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233; see also People v. Garcia, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969 [affirming denial of resentencing because the record of conviction "unequivocally establishes" the defendant was the sole perpetrator and the actual killer]; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 47-48 [petition for resentencing may be summarily denied when, without factfinding, weighing conflicting evidence, or making credibility determinations, the record of conviction irrefutably establishes as a matter of law that the jury determined the defendant was the actual killer].) Rapoza does not dispute that he was the sole participant in the crime and the actual killer. He claims, however, that he is entitled to resentencing because it was possible, under the instructions given at his trial, that the jury convicted him based on the natural and probable consequences theory of liability. While we can see why Rapoza makes this argument, it misunderstands what the natural and probable consequences doctrine is.
Rapoza argues that CALJIC No. 3.40, which instructs the jury on the proximate cause required for murder-that the death be "a direct, natural and probable consequence" of a defendant's act-permitted the jury to find him guilty "based on a natural and probable consequences theory that is no longer legally viable." Although the instruction uses the phrase "natural and probable consequence," it does not embody the natural and probable consequences doctrine, which provides that "an accomplice who aided and abetted a crime could be liable, not only for that target offense, but also for any additional offense (including murder) . . . even if the accomplice did not intend the additional offense." (People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1146.) As the California Supreme Court explained, CALJIC No. 3.40 "does not concern the imputed malice theory of criminal liability that is part of the natural and probable consequences doctrine of accomplice liability affected by [section 1172.6]." (Ibid.) The same is true of the "natural consequences" language found in CALJIC Nos. 8.11, defining implied malice, and 8.31, defining second degree murder when resulting from a dangerous act. (See People v. Martinez (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 334 ["[T]he use of the term 'natural consequences' in the . . . definition of implied malice does not import into the crime of murder the case law relating to the distinct 'natural and probable consequences' doctrine developed in the context of aiding and abetting liability"].)
Accordingly, no cognizable legal issues have been raised by Rapoza or his appellate counsel. Further, we have independently reviewed the record and are satisfied no arguable issue exists and that Rapoza's attorney has fully complied with the responsibilities of counsel. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 231-232.)
Disposition The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: BROWN, P. J., STREETER, J.