Opinion
E072090
06-22-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICKY LOREZ RANSOM , Defendant and Appellant.
Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven Oetting and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1502725) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mac R. Fisher, Judge. Affirmed. Doris M. LeRoy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steven Oetting and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant, Ricky Ransom, was convicted by jury of inflicting injury on an intimate partner, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), when he struck Jane Doe, a homeless woman with whom defendant had a relationship while he also lived on the streets, on the head with an object with sufficient force to require five staples to close the wound. The jury also found the defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) After admitting two prior serious felony convictions, defendant was sentenced to 25 years life. He appeals.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, except where indicated.
On appeal, defendant argues (1) the admission of photographs of Jane Doe's head wound was an abuse of discretion under Evidence Code section 352; (2) the admission of expert testimony about domestic violence relationships was error; and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived defendant of a fair trial. In addition, defendant requested that we independently review the sealed records pertaining to Jane Doe's mental health to determine if the trial court erroneously denied defendant's motion for disclosure of those records. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Jane Doe met defendant in February 2013, when defendant was working nights at a half-way house and before she became homeless. They "got together" in roughly February 2014. They had an intimate, sexual relationship for several months, homeless, staying in a parking lot. Doe had used marijuana and methamphetamine with defendant and she had a mental health history related to coping and anxiety issues. Defendant took care of her and Doe used his mother's address for identification purposes. But they broke up before Thanksgiving, 2014.
Jane Doe referred to it as a "crazy house."
During their relationship, defendant assaulted her at least five times, and the police were called out more than once. On the first occasion, he backhanded her on the face causing her jaw to swell up. The second time he hurt her, they were arguing, and defendant took a "jab" at her, when they lived in a guard shack in Roubidoux. The third assault occurred on Thanksgiving Day in 2014 when defendant struck her in the face, knocking out a tooth.
Defendant was charged with the three later assaults occurring in 2014 and 2015, but the jury failed to reach a verdict on two of the charged incidents. Although the charged as well as uncharged incidents could be considered by the jury as propensity evidence under Evidence Code, section 1109, subdivision (a) (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1162-1164, and fn. 5, disapproving People v. Quintanilla (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 572, [holding that it was improper to instruct the jury it could consider both charged and uncharged offenses as evidence of defendant's propensity to commit domestic violence]), we include only the Thanksgiving Day incident in 2014. We omit any discussion of the last incident of domestic violence because it did not precede the charged offense of which defendant was convicted.
On May 1, 2015, Doe was staying in the parking lot between an automotive store and a smoke shop in Roubidoux. As Doe prepared to go recycling with a stroller, she discovered defendant was there. A bystander, whom Doe knew as "Popeye," was also nearby. Defendant struck Doe on the head, told her he was not playing games, and then left. When he struck her, Doe could not see if he was holding anything. Doe was bleeding pretty badly, so she asked Popeye to call 911, which he did. A sheriff's deputy responded and interviewed Doe, who reported that defendant, whom she named, had hit her over the head.
Doe was transported to a hospital where she was treated. When examined, she was found to have a 5-centimeter laceration, as well as a hematoma in the soft tissue of her head. The sheriff's deputy, with the assistance of a nurse, took a photograph of the injury. Doe was coherent during the interview and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. It required multiple staples to close the wound.
Defendant was charged with inflicting corporal injury on an intimate partner, along with an enhancement allegation that he personally inflicted great bodily injury. (§§ 273.5, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a).) It was further alleged that defendant had suffered two previous convictions for serious felonies ("nickel priors"), within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and two prior serious felony convictions under the Three Strikes law, sections 667, subdivision (e)(2), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(a).
The information charged three counts, including the Thanksgiving Day assault, as well as an assault that occurred after the incident alleged in count 2. Because the jury did not reach a verdict as to those counts, we omit them here.
Defendant was tried by a jury, which convicted him of one violation of section 273.5, subdivision (a), and found true the allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). On the date set for court trial on the prior conviction allegations, defendant admitted the two nickel priors, alleged as enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a), and admitted the Three Strikes allegations.
Defendant made a motion to strike the prior conviction allegations; the court struck the two "nickel priors," which had been found true under section 667, subdivision (a), but denied defendant's motion to strike the Three Strikes allegations. (Ref. People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.) The court imposed a term of 25 years to life for count 2 but stayed the term for the great bodily injury enhancement. Based on the stipulation of the parties as to defendant's inability to pay any fines or fees, the court imposed no restitution fines or fees or assessments.
Defendant appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Photographs of the Victim's Injuries.
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph showing the victim's head wound because it was gruesome. Specifically, defendant argues that the court erred in determining that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice, within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352. We disagree.
Under Evidence Code section 351, all relevant evidence is admissible unless prohibited by statute. Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence "having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 930-931.) "'Relevant evidence' means evidence, including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (Evid. Code, § 210.)
However, under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court retains the discretion to exclude relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will" either "necessitate undue consumption of time" or "create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury."
"'The admission of allegedly gruesome photographs is basically a question of relevance over which the trial court has broad discretion.' [Citations.]" (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 353.) "'"A trial court's decision to admit photographs . . . will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect . . . clearly outweighs their probative value. [Citation.] Finally, prosecutors, it must be remembered, are not obliged to prove their case with evidence solely from live witnesses; the jury is entitled to see details of the victims' bodies to determine if the evidence supports the prosecution's theory of the case. [Citations.]'" [Citations.]" (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 163-164.)
A trial court's decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. (People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 713, overruled on a different point in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421; see also, People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 283.)
In People v. Powell, supra, 6 Cal.5th at page 163, defendant claimed it was error to admit a photograph of a gunshot wound because the powder burns were visible in two other photographs and the photograph was inflammatory because it showed a large amount of blood on the victim's chest. The court disagreed that the prejudice from the admission of the photograph outweighed its probative value because the photograph in question revealed the nature of the wound, including the powder burns, much more clearly than the other photograph evidence. (Ibid.)
Other courts have reached similar results where challenged photographs are relevant to the manner of killing. (See People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal. 4th at p. 713; see also, People v. Garcia (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 261, 294. ) "[T]he jury is entitled to see details of the [victim's body] to determine if the evidence supports the prosecution's theory of the case." (People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 624; see also, People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 55.) The People have the burden of proving an enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 323), and are "not obliged to prove these details solely from the testimony of live witnesses" (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 706) or to accept antiseptic stipulations in lieu of photographic evidence. (People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 243.)
Thus, even where photographs are disturbing, they may be admissible, particularly where they "'simply showed what had been done to the victim; the revulsion they induce is attributable to the acts done, not to the photographs.' [Citation.]" (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1215-1216, disapproved on a different ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.)
Here, the photograph in question was the only photograph of the victim's injury and was relevant to the great bodily injury allegation. The photograph depicted flesh, hair and blood on the victim's head, along with the gloved hand of a nurse. Insofar as the People had the burden of proving the enhancement, and the exhibit in question was the only photograph of the injury, the trial court ruled the photograph was more probative than prejudicial.
We have examined the objected-to photograph and agree that it is disturbing, in that it depicts blood and matted hair, but, as the trial court found, it is not unduly gruesome. Although it is difficult to see because of the blood, it shows the size of the laceration and the presence of blood conveys that the injury was more than trivial. The People had the burden of proving that the injury was more than trivial and the exhibit in question was the only actual depiction of the wound.
The court properly weighed the probative value against the potential for prejudice. Considering that the jury was not able to reach a verdict on two of the three counts originally charged, it cannot be said the photograph was unduly prejudicial. In any event, any revulsion induced by the exhibit was attributable to the acts done, not to the photograph. (People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1054.)
The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photograph.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Expert Testimony Regarding Domestic Violence Relationships.
Defendant argues the court erroneously admitted irrelevant and inflammatory testimony about domestic violence relationships, in that such evidence was more prejudicial than probative, within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352. We disagree.
"'"The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence." [Citations.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167.) Evidence Code section 1107 authorizes an expert to testify regarding "'the nature and effect of physical, emotional, and mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence.'" (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 904-905.)
Such evidence, sometimes referred to as "battered woman syndrome" (BWS) has been admitted solely to "disabuse jurors of 'common sense' misconceptions about the behavior of persons in the affected groups, such as rape victims and abused children, and not to prove a fact in issue." (People v. Erickson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1391, 1401, citing People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal. 3d 236, 249-250; In re Sara M. (1987) 194 Cal. App. 3d 585, 589-591; see also People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 1073, 1088.)
"The relevance of this evidence is based on the possibility that the jurors will doubt that a witness who claims to have been abused has indeed acted in the manner to which he or she testified, and therefore the jurors might unjustifiably develop a negative view of the witness's credibility. [Citation.] Even if the defendant never expressly contests the witness's credibility along these lines, there is nothing preventing the jury from ultimately finding in its deliberations that the witness was not credible, based on misconceptions that could have been dispelled by BWS evidence. Thus, there is no need for the defendant first to bring up the potential inconsistency between a witness's actions and his or her testimony before the prosecution is entitled to attempt to dispel any misperceptions the jurors may hold by introducing BWS evidence, provided, of course, that there is an adequate foundation for a finding that the witness has been affected by BWS." (People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 293.)
"[A] properly qualified expert may testify to BWS when it is relevant to a contested issue at trial other than whether a criminal defendant committed charged acts of domestic violence." (People v. Gadlin (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 587, 592, citing People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 1076, 1082; People v. Morgan (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1213-1217.)
In People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th 892, 907, the California Supreme Court observed that when the trial testimony of an alleged victim of domestic violence is inconsistent with what the victim had earlier told the police, the jurors may well assume that the victim is an untruthful or unreliable witness. (Id., at p. 906.) Thus, when the victim's trial testimony supports the defendant or minimizes the violence of his actions, the jurors may assume that if there really had been abusive behavior, the victim would not be testifying in the defendant's favor. (Brown, at p. 906, citing People v. Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1087.)
Here, the defense argued that Jane Doe was not credible because she was a drug-addled and mentally ill homeless woman who misidentified the defendant as the perpetrator of her injuries. The victim's testimony acknowledged she continued to remain in a relationship with defendant even after he had abused her. The expert testimony was proffered to explain common features of victims of domestic violence, which might be confusing for the average lay juror to understand about the common behavior of such victims. The detective's testimony was not offered as an opinion on defendant's guilt, or any other improper purpose, and the fact the jury was unable to reach a verdict on two of the three charges shows that the jury did not consider it for any improper purpose.
The court properly exercised its discretion in admitting the expert testimony.
a. The Cumulative Effect of the Evidentiary Rulings Did Not Result in an Unfair Trial.
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the two evidentiary errors deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
Defendant argues that the cumulative impact of the errors was prejudicial. We disagree.
It is true that a series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1009; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844.) However, we have found no errors in the admission of evidence, so collectively they were not prejudicial. (See People v Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1019 ["we find any arguable errors also to be harmless when considered collectively, for the same reasons we have found no prejudice from them individually"].) There was no series of trial errors resulting in prejudice to defendant.
Defendant was entitled to a fair trial, but not a perfect one. (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 926, 1009, and cases cited; see also, People v. Jasso (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1378.) Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial.
3. Review of Sealed Record of In Camera Review of the Victim's Mental Health Treatment Records.
Prior to trial, defendant subpoenaed the victim's mental health records from the Riverside County Department of Mental Health. Defendant sought to introduce those records to impeach her credibility. On March 16, 2017, defendant made a motion for disclosure of the subpoenaed documents. In his motion, he asserted that at the preliminary hearing, the victim denied having any mental health issues, which was inconsistent with what she had told an officer near the date of the assault.
The Honorable Jackson Lucky, judge of the Superior Court of Riverside County, reviewed the records in camera, and ordered that they be retained by the court until trial. The trial court made a record of its ruling that no records were discoverable.
On April 7, 2017, the records were received and the court commenced in camera review. After reviewing the records, the court conducted a hearing on the defendant's request for disclosure of the subpoenaed records. The court ordered that the records be retained by the court until trial, but indicated there was very little discoverable information.
On October 2, 2018, the trial court conducted in limine proceedings, including defendant's request for disclosure of the subpoenaed records. After the court reviewed the records in camera, it denied disclosure, stating that nothing in the records would fulfill the defendant's need for pretrial discovery to provide him with a defense in the case.
When a defendant seeks confidential information, and makes a showing sufficient to justify in camera inspection, the trial court must examine those documents and make a record of what it has examined. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1229.) After conducting in camera review, the trial court has discretion regarding which documents, if any, it will disclose to the party seeking discovery. (Ibid.) Defendant requests, and the People do not object, that we review the sealed record of the trial court's in camera review of the victim's mental health treatment records.
On appeal, upon request, the Court of Appeal may conduct in camera review of the sealed personnel records considered by the trial court. (People v. Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1229-1230; see also, People v. Anderson (2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 391; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.) We have now done so and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disclose the records to defendant. (See People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 330, applying the abuse of discretion standard.)
The trial court properly denied the motion for disclosure.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: McKINSTER
J. RAPHAEL
J.