Opinion
1209 KA 14-00857
11-13-2015
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Jason A. RANSIER, Defendant–Appellant.
Linda M. Campbell, Syracuse, for Defendant–Appellant. Gregory S. Oakes, District Attorney, Oswego (Amy L. Hallenbeck of Counsel), for Respondent.
Linda M. Campbell, Syracuse, for Defendant–Appellant.
Gregory S. Oakes, District Attorney, Oswego (Amy L. Hallenbeck of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, WHALEN, AND DeJOSEPH, JJ.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM:Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of burglary in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.25 [2 ] ). “By failing to object to [County C]ourt's ultimate Sandoval ruling, defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention ... that the ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion” (People v. Tolliver, 93 A.D.3d 1150, 1151, 940 N.Y.S.2d 398, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 968, 950 N.Y.S.2d 120, 973 N.E.2d 218 ). In any event, we conclude that the court's Sandoval ruling did not constitute a “clear abuse of discretion warranting reversal” (id. at 1151–1152, 940 N.Y.S.2d 398 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant with respect to his prior conviction of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, a crime involving individual dishonesty (see People v. Williams, 98 A.D.3d 1234, 1235, 951 N.Y.S.2d 281, lv. denied 21 N.Y.3d 947, 968 N.Y.S.2d 10, 990 N.E.2d 144 ). Contrary to defendant's contention, the court's Sandoval ruling was not inconsistent and contradictory merely because the court further ruled that the People could generally ask defendant whether he had been convicted of a felony and not the specific crime of burglary in the third degree. The court properly balanced the probative value of each conviction against the risk of prejudice to defendant (see People v. Henry, 74 A.D.3d 1860, 1862, 902 N.Y.S.2d 742, lv. denied 15 N.Y.3d 852, 909 N.Y.S.2d 29, 935 N.E.2d 821 ).
By failing to renew his motion for a trial order of dismissal after presenting evidence, defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish his intent to commit a crime inside the dwelling (see People v. Hines, 97 N.Y.2d 56, 61, 736 N.Y.S.2d 643, 762 N.E.2d 329, rearg. denied 97 N.Y.2d 678, 738 N.Y.S.2d 292, 764 N.E.2d 396 ). In any event, that contention lacks merit (see People v. Beaty, 89 A.D.3d 1414, 1416–1417, 932 N.Y.S.2d 280, affd. 22 N.Y.3d 918, 977 N.Y.S.2d 172, 999 N.E.2d 535 ; People v. Bergman, 70 A.D.3d 1494, 1494, 894 N.Y.S.2d 635, lv. denied 14 N.Y.3d 885, 903 N.Y.S.2d 774, 929 N.E.2d 1009 ). Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.