People v. Ranney

4 Citing cases

  1. People v. Meredith

    209 Mich. App. 403 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 16 times
    In Meredith, this Court held that an act as insignificant as driving through Oakland County on a journey from Saginaw to Detroit was an overt act in furtherance and perpetration of a conspiracy to deliver cocaine.

    Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the prosecutor asserts that the law regarding conspiracy has not changed and that the trial of a conspiracy case may be had in any jurisdiction where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy took place. People v Ranney, 304 Mich. 315, 319-320; 8 N.W.2d 80 (1943). The prosecutor claims that an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in Oakland County because Lavinia Peoples drove through Oakland County on her way to and from Detroit to purchase cocaine for distribution in Saginaw.

  2. People v. Watson

    307 Mich. 596 (Mich. 1943)   Cited 40 times
    In People v. Watson, 307 Mich. 596 (1943), the Court held that it was error for the prosecutor to inform the jury in his opening statement that others who had been charged jointly with Watson had pleaded guilty.

    "An overt act in connection with the conspiracy thus took place in Detroit and defendants could have been tried by either the recorder's court for the city of Detroit or the Wayne circuit court." In People v. Ranney, 304 Mich. 315, the defendant was convicted of the crime of conspiracy to obstruct justice in Wayne county. We there said:

  3. People v. Clifford Jordan

    172 N.W.2d 495 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 4 times

    There is evidence, if believed by the jury, to warrant a conviction in this case." People v. Ranney (1943), 304 Mich. 315, 320. See, also, People v. Schram (1965), 1 Mich. App. 279. Defendant's second issue is grounded on the prosecutor's closing remarks to the jury.

  4. People v. Schram

    1 Mich. App. 279 (Mich. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 33 times

    Unfortunately for his position, the jury didn't so view it and the Court is powerless to tell a jury what to believe. It would serve no good purpose to list all of the authorities for the proposition that credibility of testimony is solely for the jury, since this is not actually in issue, but the principle is reaffirmed in People v. Pettijohn (1938), 283 Mich. 108; People v. Moore (1943) 306 Mich. 29; People v. Ranney (1943), 304 Mich. 315, (page 320): "The weight to be given the testimony produced by the people was for the sole consideration of the jury.