Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC586018.
Premo, J.
Ranger Insurance Company appeals from a judgment after the trial court entered an order denying its motion to set aside summary judgment and vacate forfeiture of a criminal defendant’s bail bond. Ranger argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bail bond at a master trial calendar hearing because the trial court had not ordered the defendant to be present for that hearing. We disagree, and therefore affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
Ranger posted bond on March 17, 2005. On October 24, the defendant was present with counsel before the master trial calendar judge who announced, “I’ll place the matter on standby.” Counsel replied, “Okay. Thank you,” and the proceedings concluded. On October 31, the matter remained on the master trial calendar, and the trial court called the case. The defendant’s counsel was present, but the defendant was not. Counsel informed, “I have no explanation for his absence.” The trial court ordered the defendant’s bail forfeited and issued a no-bail bench warrant for the defendant’s arrest. Notice of forfeiture was mailed to Ranger, and Ranger moved to vacate the forfeiture. Ranger argued that the record did not reflect that the defendant was given notice of a duty to appear in court on October 31. The trial court denied the motion and entered a summary judgment against Ranger for $25,000.
DISCUSSION
Ranger reiterates its argument that the record does not show that the trial court had ordered the defendant to appear or the defendant had actual notice to appear.
“The forfeiture or exoneration of bail is entirely a statutory procedure, and forfeiture proceedings are governed entirely by the special statutes applicable thereto. [Citation.] Sections 1305 through 1309 govern bail forfeiture. [Citation.] Because the law abhors forfeitures, these statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the surety.” (People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1549, 1552 (Ranger Ins.).) “Section 1305, subdivision (a) requires that bail be forfeited if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear for arraignment, trial, or judgment, or upon any other occasion when his or her presence in court is lawfully required.” (Ibid.) Section 977, subdivision (b)(1) states, in pertinent part: “In all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless he or she shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver of his or her right to be personally present, as provided by paragraph (2).” Section 977, subdivision (b)(2), provides the specific wording for the written waiver.
The referenced sections are Penal Code sections. Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The question the court had to resolve in Ranger Ins., was whether the defendant was required to appear on the date set for trial, that is, the master trial calendar hearing, or whether the defendant’s written waiver operated at that time. (Ranger Ins., supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1552.) In that case, the court noted that “[i]f defendant’s presence was required, the court had to forfeit the bail bond or lose jurisdiction. If defendant’s presence was not required because of the waiver, the court would retain jurisdiction over the bail bond and could order it forfeited later.” (Id. at pp. 1552-1553.) The court found that the defendant’s presence was required at the master trial calendar hearing, despite his written waiver. “Although a section 977 waiver was in place, by its own terms it did not apply to the trial date. Trial includes the day on which the parties are called to try their case. Under section 1305, defendant must appear for trial. When defendant failed to appear on the date on which his case was set for trial, the master trial calendar hearing, he defaulted within the meaning of section 1305. The trial court was thus required to declare a forfeiture on that date or lose jurisdiction to do so later.” (Id. at p. 1554.)
Ranger argues here, as did the surety in People v. Sacramento Bail Bonds (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 118, 120 (Sacramento), that the defendant’s bail could not be forfeited under section 1305 for failing to appear unless the court had ordered him to be present for the particular hearing (or facts show actual notice of the particular hearing). The Sacramento court disagreed, finding that bail could be forfeited if a defendant failed to appear on a date ordered by the court or otherwise required by law. (Sacramento, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at pp. 121-122.) Since the defendant in Sacramento had failed to appear at a trial status conference when his presence was lawfully required, the court held that the trial court had properly forfeited the defendant’s bail and correctly denied the surety’s motion to vacate forfeiture. (Ibid.)
Here, the defendant was present on October 24, 2005, when his case was placed on standby on the master trial calendar. He then failed to appear at the master trial calendar hearing on October 31, when his presence was lawfully required. Accordingly, the trial court properly forfeited the defendant’s bail and correctly denied Ranger’s motion.
Ranger claims that People v. Classified Ins. Corp. (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 341, supports its position that a specific court order is required in order to forfeit bail even where appearance is statutorily mandated. It relies on the following statement from Classified Ins.: “Appellant contends that before a court can forfeit bail a defendant’s appearance must be required by a specific court order commanding his appearance at a date and time certain. We agree.” (Id. at p. 344.) Ranger’s analysis is erroneous.
In Classified Ins., bail was forfeited when the defendant failed to appear at a section 995 hearing. But no rule of law required the defendant’s presence, and the record did not reflect that the defendant had actual notice of the hearing.
“To the extent Classified Ins. suggests in dictum that ‘before a court can forfeit bail a defendant’s appearance must [always] be required by a specific court order commanding his appearance at a date and time certain’ [citation], we respectfully decline to follow it. To our knowledge no other case has construed section 1305 to require categorically such an order of court. Although Classified Ins. relied on People v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. (1977) 77 Cal.App.3d Supp. 7, the latter case expressly recognized section 1305 was satisfied ‘. . . when a defendant fails to appear on a date ordered by the court (or otherwise required by law, such as to surrender for judgment . . . .)’ (National Auto., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at Supp. 9, italics added.) Moreover, Classified Ins.’s dictum is at odds with the established rule permitting forfeiture of an appeal bond. Although section 1305 governs such a forfeiture, it is well recognized a forfeiture is appropriate where a defendant fails to surrender himself following an appeal even though the defendant has received no court order stating the time or place of his surrender.” (Sacramento, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 122.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Rushing, P.J., Elia, J.