Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County, Super. Ct. No. F05900892-1, Carlos A. Cabrera, Judge.
Johanna Kate Johnston, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kathleen A. McKenna and Connie Broussard Proctor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Levy, J. and Cornell, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Darnell Fateen Randle contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the vehicle stop violated the Fourth Amendment and, consequently, his convictions should be reversed. We will affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Fresno Police Officer Derik Kumagai and his partner were on patrol near Blackstone and Dakota on January 25, 2005, when they were flagged down by a citizen in a vehicle. The citizen informed the officers that a male, possibly with a handgun, was driving a white four-door car with the words “for sale” painted on the windows. In an effort to protect herself, the citizen did not provide her name.
Officers set up surveillance on the four corners of the intersection to try and locate the white car and its driver. About five to seven minutes later, Kumagai and his partner spotted a white car matching the description pull into a gas station. The registration tags on the white car were expired; the entire windshield was cracked in a spider web pattern; and the words “for sale” were painted on the front windshield. Both the paint and the crack in the windshield obstructed the driver’s view.
Kumagai testified at the suppression hearing that a traffic stop of the vehicle was made based upon the expired registration and the obstructions to the driver’s view. Randle was the driver and only occupant of the vehicle. Kumagai conducted a high-risk stop because of the possibility the driver was armed with a handgun.
Officers drew their weapons and removed Randle from the white car. A weapons search was conducted of Randle. Officers found a loaded .25-caliber Beretta handgun in Randle’s right front pocket. They also found marijuana in another pocket. Randle was placed under arrest for possession of a concealed weapon and possession of marijuana.
Kumagai issued the standard warnings to Randle, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Randle agreed to speak to officers and claimed he carried the handgun for protection; he denied having any other narcotics in his possession.
Randle was transported to jail and a more thorough search of his person was conducted. At that time officers found a large baggie containing several smaller baggies hidden in the area of Randle’s buttocks; the baggies contained cocaine base.
Randle filed a motion to suppress evidence; the motion was denied. Thereafter, Randle pled no contest to the charge of transportation for sale of cocaine base and admitted the Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (c) arming enhancement in exchange for dismissal of two other charges.
The trial court imposed a sentence of six years in prison, stayed execution, and placed Randle on probation for three years. Randle appealed and obtained a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Randle contends the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the stop was conducted based on an anonymous tip. He also contends the manner in which it was conducted amounted to a de facto arrest, and the anonymous tip was not sufficiently reliable to give rise to probable cause for the arrest.
In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court accepts the trial court’s factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but independently assesses whether the search and seizure conformed to constitutional standards of reasonableness. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182.) An appellate court accepts all facts in favor of the denial of the motion, including all reasonable inferences and deductions, if supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922.)
An officer may stop a vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion that the law has been violated. (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1082 (Wells).) Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause; an anonymous tip may give rise to a reasonable suspicion. (Id. at p. 1083.)
Kumagai testified that the stop was made based on the expired tags and the obstructions to the driver’s view caused by the paint and the cracked windshield. Kumagai also testified that the expired tags and obstructions constituted Vehicle Code violations. These facts alone warranted the traffic stop. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)
Detention of a person in a vehicle is permissible under the Fourth Amendment if there is a reasonable suspicion the individual has violated the law. (People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463 (Dolly).) A citizen’s tip can, by itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to warrant a detention, especially if the circumstances present an exigent threat to public safety. (Id. at p. 464.)
In Wells, an anonymous caller reported a blue van traveling on Highway 99 and “‘weaving all over the roadway.’” (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1081, 1083.) An officer spotted the van and effected a traffic stop to see if the driver was intoxicated, although the officer did not observe any evidence of erratic driving or intoxication prior to effecting the stop. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court in Wells concluded that the imminent risk to public safety presented by a drunk or erratic driver justified an investigatory detention based upon an anonymous tip, despite the absence of any corroborating evidence of illegal activity. (Id. at p. 1088.)
In Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th 458, an anonymous caller warned that a man in a vehicle had a loaded weapon and had used the weapon to threaten the caller; the caller identified the vehicle and the intersection where the vehicle was located. (Id. at p. 462.) The California Supreme Court determined that the imminent threat posed by a man with a gun, combined with the firsthand, contemporaneous description of the vehicle and location, which was accurate, was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion warranting an investigatory detention. (Id. at p. 471.)
The anonymous tip received by Kumagai and his partner alerted them to a potential threat to public safety, namely a man traveling in a vehicle with a loaded weapon. The anonymous tip was accurate as to the vehicle description and location and thus was sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion warranting an investigatory detention. (Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1088; Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 471.)
Having concluded that the stop and investigatory detention were not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, we turn to Randle’s claim that the manner in which the detention was effected constituted an unjustified show of force. On the contrary, when officers effect a stop and a detention because of a reasonable suspicion that a person has a loaded weapon, officers are entitled to act in a manner that protects themselves as well as the public at large.
In Dolly, after officers received an anonymous tip that the driver of a vehicle had a weapon and had threatened the caller, officers effected the investigatory stop by having the driver exit the vehicle and lie prone on the ground with his hands at his side. The opinion does not state whether the officers had their weapons drawn. (Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 462.)
It is not an unwarranted show of force for officers to draw their weapons in order to effect an investigatory detention when the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the show of force is necessary to ensure officer safety. (Washington v. Lambert (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3d 1181, 1188.) The circumstances in Randle’s case gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the show of force was necessary for officer safety.
Under these circumstances, the traffic stop, investigatory detention, and show of force were warranted. (Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 471.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.