Opinion
B334947
09-26-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN JOSE RAMOS, Defendant and Appellant.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. TA148872-03 Danette Gomez, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
One evening around midnight in March 2019, Julio R. was driving his car with several passengers when he noticed a red truck, a silver car, and a black car were following him. When Julio tried to park his car in front of his house, he saw the black car, driven by Juan Jose Ramos (a gang member with the moniker "Blue"), was behind him. The red truck, driven by codefendant Jesus Jesse Martinez, and the silver car, driven by Richard Muro (a shot-caller in the gang), were parked near the house. Codefendant Brenda Quiroz got out of the red truck and fired four or five shots into Julio's car. Julio suffered a gunshot wound in the arm and a possible broken bone. A passenger in Julio's car suffered injuries to her neck, wrists, and knee when Julio's car subsequently collided with Muro's car.
The People charged Ramos with two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, one count of maliciously and willfully discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. The People alleged various firearm, gang, and other enhancements.
On June 22, 2020 Ramos pleaded no contest to attempted murder and (an amended count of) assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Ramos to 20 years in prison.
On August 15, 2022 Ramos filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. He alleged, among other things, that he accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted murder and that he could not now be convicted of attempted murder because of legislative changes to sections 188 and 189. The superior court appointed counsel to represent Ramos.
Statutory references are to this code.
The superior court denied the petition for resentencing. The court ruled Ramos "is not eligible for resentencing as the law had already changed prior to this offense and plea. The petitioner fails to make a prima facie showing that he is eligible for resentencing because there is no indication that he was prosecuted under any theory that imputed malice to petitioner based on the natural and probable consequences or felony murder theory. Therefore, section 1172.6 is inapplicable to petitioner's case. [¶] Therefore, the Court finds the petitioner is ineligible as a matter of law based on all of the above." Ramos timely appealed.
The superior court had the wrong chronology. The law had changed prior to June 22, 2020, when Ramos pleaded no contest to attempted murder. Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2-4) substantially modified the law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 986; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843) and significantly narrowing the felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448-449; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957).
Ramos, however, was not convicted of murder. He was convicted of attempted murder, and it was not until January 1, 2022, when Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551) became effective (and over six months after Ramos pleaded no contest to attempted murder), that the Legislature expanded section 1172.6 "to apply also to persons convicted of attempted murder or manslaughter." (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3.) When the trial court sentenced Ramos in June 2020, the amendments to section 1172.6 authorizing resentencing for defendants like Ramos convicted of attempted murder had not yet been enacted. Therefore, as the People concede, the superior court erred in denying Ramos's petition on the ground the Legislature changed the law before Ramos was convicted of attempted murder.
The superior court's second reason for denying Ramos's request for an order to show cause, that the record did not indicate the People prosecuted Ramos on a theory of imputed malice, fares no better. The People charged Ramos with (among other crimes) two counts of attempted murder, without specifying any particular theory. "Because the crime of attempted murder was generically charged, the complaint allowed the prosecution to proceed on a theory of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citations. The] Supreme Court has held that 'only a single statutory offense of murder exists.' [Citation.] '[I]t has long been the law in this state that an accusatory pleading charging murder need not specify degree or the manner in which the murder was committed.' [Citation.] Nor does an accusatory pleading need to 'specify the theory of murder on which the prosecution relies at trial.' [Citation.] 'Specifically, neither felony murder nor murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine need be separately pleaded.'" (People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 337-338; see People v. Davenport (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 476, 484 ["The generic manner for charging murder . . . does 'not limit the People to prosecuting [the defendant] on any particular theories.'"]; People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233 ["despite the fact that the indictment charged [the defendant] with murder committed with malice aforethought, it allowed the prosecution to proceed on any theory of murder"]; see also People v. Didyavong (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 85, 96, fn. 4 ["A murder charged generically does not limit the prosecution to any particular theories of liability"], review granted June 28, 2023, B279622; review dism. Oct. 18, 2023, S280047.)
Nor did Ramos's no contest plea to attempted murder "answer the question of whether intent could have been imputed to him under the natural and probable consequences doctrine." (People v. Estrada, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 338.) Ramos did not admit or plead to any type of malice, any particular theory of attempted murder, or anything other than a "generic charge of attempted murder without the 'willful, deliberate, and premeditated' allegation." (Ibid.) Ramos's trial attorney did stipulate to a factual basis for the plea "based on the police reports, transcripts of the hearings, probation report and any other discovery provided this case," but the facts described in at least one of these documents (the probation report) provided ample basis for a jury to convict Ramos of attempted murder on a theory of imputed malice: Though Ramos was involved in the incident, he was not the shooter or even the driver of the car the shooter got out of.
The order is reversed. The superior court is directed to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
WE CONCUR: FEUER, J., STONE, J.