Opinion
7593 Ind. 6080/16
11-13-2018
Seymour W. James, Jr., The Legal Aid Society, New York (Harold V. Ferguson, Jr. of counsel, New York), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Becky Stern of counsel), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., The Legal Aid Society, New York (Harold V. Ferguson, Jr. of counsel, New York), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Becky Stern of counsel), for respondent.
Sweeny, J.P., Manzanet–Daniels, Gische, Gesmer, Singh, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Anthony J. Ferrara, J.), rendered August 12, 2016, convicting defendant, after a nonjury trial, of two counts of attempted forcible touching and one count of sexual abuse in the third degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 15 days, unanimously affirmed.
The verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ). There is no basis for disturbing the court's credibility determinations, in which it credited the testimony of the victim and two police officers, and found defendant not to be credible.
The court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress a statement he made when, after the officer informed defendant he was being arrested for forcible touching and sexual abuse, the officer added the remark, "You can't touch people on the train." Miranda warnings were not required because the officer's declarative comment was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response (see e.g. People v. Huffman, 61 N.Y.2d 795, 797, 473 N.Y.S.2d 945, 462 N.E.2d 122 [1984] ; People v. Wilson, 279 A.D.2d 381, 719 N.Y.S.2d 555 [1st Dept. 2001], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 869, 730 N.Y.S.2d 44, 754 N.E.2d 1127 [2001] ). Rather than engaging in formal questioning or its functional equivalent, the officer essentially informed defendant of the accusation against him (see People v. Ealey, 272 A.D.2d 269, 270, 710 N.Y.S.2d 321 [1st Dept. 2000], lv. denied 95 N.Y.2d 865, 715 N.Y.S.2d 219, 738 N.E.2d 367 [2000] ). In any event, although defendant claims that the exculpatory statement at issue contained prejudicial matter, any error in the admission of the statement was harmless, particularly in a nonjury trial.