Opinion
G061915
07-25-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDGAR RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Lynne G. McGinnis and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 16NF1172 Richard M. King, Judge. Affirmed.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa Mandel, Lynne G. McGinnis and Adrian R. Contreras, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
BEDSWORTH, J.
Senate Bill No. 1437 was a landmark measure that redefined the parameters for the crime of murder in California. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015 (SB 1437).) When it became effective on January 1, 2019, it not only narrowed the scope of vicarious liability for murder, it also created a procedural mechanism that allows some convicted murderers to seek resentencing relief. That mechanism was originally codified in Penal Code section 1170.95 and is now set forth in Penal Code section 1172.6. The question now before us is whether a criminal defendant who was convicted after SB 1437 became effective can obtain resentencing relief under section 1172.6. Because that section was intended to provide retroactive relief to defendants who were convicted before SB 1437 changed the law on murder, we hold it does not apply to defendants who - like appellant in this case - were convicted after SB 1437 took effect. We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying appellant's petition for resentencing.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2015, appellant was involved in a confrontation that led to the shooting of two men, one of whom was fatally wounded. Appellant was not the shooter, but in March 2019 - two months after SB 1437 became law - he was tried along with codefendant David Ortega for murder, attempted premeditated murder, vicariously discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury, and acting for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Although the jury convicted Ortega as charged, it was unable to reach a verdict as to appellant, and the court declared a mistrial on his case.
In September 2019, the prosecution amended the information to include a new charge against appellant - voluntary manslaughter. As part of a plea agreement, appellant pleaded guilty to that offense in exchange for an 11-year prison term, and the remaining charges were dismissed.
On May 17, 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. After appointing appellant an attorney and soliciting briefing from the parties, the trial court held a hearing on the matter. It determined appellant failed to make a prima facie case for relief because at the time he pleaded guilty he could not have been convicted of murder based on a theory of imputed liability that was abrogated by SB 1437. Therefore, it denied his petition.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his petition because, irrespective of the fact he pleaded guilty after SB 1437 became effective, he still alleged a prima facie case for relief pursuant to section 1172.6. Therefore, the trial court should have issued an order to show cause and set an evidentiary hearing on his entitlement to relief. We disagree.
SB 1437 was designed to ensure a defendant's culpability is commensurate with his conduct. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) To that end, the bill "eliminated natural and probable consequences liability for murder as it applies to aiding and abetting, and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. [Citation.] [It] also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code, which create[d] a [resentencing] procedure for convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to retroactively seek relief." (Id. at p. 957, italics added, fn. omitted.)
As originally enacted in 2019, section 1170.95 limited resentencing to defendants who had been convicted of murder; it did not apply to defendants who had suffered convictions for attempted murder or manslaughter. However, by the time appellant filed his resentencing petition in 2022, the statute had been amended to include the latter two crimes. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.).) Now housed in section 1172.6, the statute currently provides:
"(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner's murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the following conditions apply:
"(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person's participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
"(2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.
"(3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1172.6. subd. (a).)
In determining whether a defendant's petition has made a prima facie showing as to these three conditions, the trial court is not permitted to engage in judicial factfinding. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) However, if the record of conviction shows the defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law, the trial court may summarily deny his petition without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter. (Id. at p. 971.)
Here, the trial court determined appellant failed to satisfy the second condition for resentencing because he did not plead guilty to manslaughter in lieu of a trial at which he "could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder." (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(2).) In so ruling, the court recognized that, technically speaking, appellant could have been convicted of those offenses if he had not pleaded guilty to manslaughter. However, given that he was convicted after SB 1437 became effective on January 1, 2019, he could not have been convicted of those crimes based on the old felony murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory under which liability was imputed to him by virtue of his participation in a crime. In other words, he could not have been convicted on a theory of liability that was abrogated by SB 1437. Therefore, he did not come within the scope of section 1172.6, and he was not entitled to relief under the statute.
The trial court justified its ruling under the absurd consequences doctrine of statutory construction, which permits courts to disregard the plain meaning of a statute to avoid an absurd result. (People v. Bell (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 315, 351.) Although that doctrine should be used sparingly to avoid judicial overreach (ibid.), we agree it applies in this case and dictates an unfavorable result for appellant.
We feel appellant is not the type of defendant section 1172.6 was intended to benefit. Despite the fact subdivision (a)(2) of the statute broadly alludes to defendants who "could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder," Lewis makes clear the statute is a retroactive mechanism that was designed to provide relief to defendants who were, or could have been, convicted of murder or attempted murder prior to the enactment of SB 1437. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) More particularly, the Legislature wanted to ensure that defendants who had faced the prospect of conviction under the old felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine had the opportunity to take advantage of the changes SB 1437 made to those theories of culpability. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 853 [describing section 1172.6 as a mechanism for retroactive application of the ameliorative provisions of SB 1437].)
Therefore, like the trial court, we read section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2) as applying to defendants who pleaded guilty to manslaughter in lieu of a trial at which they could have been convicted of a particular type of murder or attempted murder. That is, a murder or attempted murder that was based on a theory of imputed liability that was abrogated by section SB 1437. Because appellant was not facing the prospect of conviction under one of those theories at the time of his plea, he cannot satisfy the second condition for resentencing relief set forth in section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(2).
As respondent points out, appellant's petition also comes up short in terms of satisfying the other conditions of the statute. Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(1), resentencing relief is only available if the charges against the defendant allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of imputed liability that was abrogated by SB 1437. In this case, the original complaint and information allowed for that possibility because they were filed before SB 1437 went into effect on January 1, 2019. However, those pleadings were superseded when the information was amended in the fall of that year, following appellant's mistrial. (Muns v. Superior Court (1955) 137 Cal.App.2d 728, 732.) By that time, SB 1437 was in full effect, so appellant could not have been prosecuted under the theories that were abrogated by that law.
The timing of appellant's conviction is also a problem with respect to the resentencing requirement set forth section 1172.6, subdivision (a)(3). Under that provision, the defendant must show he could not be convicted of murder or attempted murder today "because of changes" to the law of murder that were ushered in by SB 1437. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) The quoted phrase signals the defendant must have been facing broader liability at the time of his conviction than he would have been if he had been tried following the passage of SB 1437. However, that circumstance does not exist in this case because SB 1437 was already in effect when appellant was convicted. Because appellant has already received the benefit of the changes in the law, he is not entitled to resentencing relief.
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant's petition is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. DELANEY, J.