Opinion
D075252
02-21-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HECTOR DANILO RAMIREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD278638) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Runston G. Maino, Judge. Affirmed. Heather L. Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, and Elizabeth M. Kuchar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
On December 5, 2018, Hector Danilo Ramirez was charged with and convicted of three counts of identity theft with a prior identity theft conviction from September 5, 2017. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subds. (c)(1) & (2).)
Ramirez challenges his convictions on three grounds. He asserts (1) the trial court erred by admitting the underlying facts of his prior conviction because the evidence was not sufficiently similar to the instant offenses to warrant its admission under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b) on the issue of intent; (2) the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded under section 352; and (3) the error was constitutionally prejudicial, requiring reversal of Ramirez's identity theft conviction. We reject these contentions and affirm the trial court's rulings.
Further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise specified. --------
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
The 2017 Identity Theft Crime
On June 19, 2017, Officer Todd Snyder went to a motel to look through its registry book to identify persons with outstanding arrest warrants. Officer Snyder discovered Ramirez, who had an active felony warrant for his arrest, was staying there. Officer Snyder went to the room, found Ramirez, and arrested him.
When Officer Snyder searched Ramirez incident to arrest, he discovered the California identification of Elizabeth V. (E.V.). Ramirez used E.V.'s identification without her knowledge or consent to check in to the hotel room. E.V. was not an occupant of the room, but her name was listed on the hotel registry as "other guest." Due to this incident, Ramirez was convicted of willfully obtaining personally identifying information and using it for any unlawful purpose within the meaning of Penal Code section 530.5, subdivision (a) on September 5, 2017.
B.
The 2018 Conviction
On September 15, 2018, San Diego Police Officer Cora Hadland received a dispatch call to respond to an alleyway to investigate a report that people were sleeping and/or camping at that location. When Officer Hadland arrived, Ramirez was present with two other people. Officer Hadland asked for identification, and Ramirez reached into his wallet and handed his identification to her. Ramirez appeared nervous and protective over his backpack. Officer Hadland ran Ramirez's name through the police database, which revealed he was on probation and had a valid Fourth Amendment search waiver. She then searched Ramirez's backpack and discovered personal identifying information of others which, unlike the miscellaneous contents of his backpack, was well-organized. Among the personal identifying information found was (1) a Delta-Care insurance card in the name of Adela B.; (2) a military I.D. card with Alejandra H.'s name and picture on it; and (3) a W-2 form with a name, address, and social security number belonging to Ryan H. Ramirez did not have the permission from these persons to use or possess these items.
Ramirez claimed he found the items in the trash. Ramirez explained he collected personal identifying information from the trash and kept it organized in his backpack until he sold it. When Officer Hadland asked if Ramirez had any intention of returning the items he found to their rightful owners, Ramirez said, "No." Hadland then placed him under arrest. At trial, a San Diego Police Department Detective confirmed there is a black market for personal identifying information where people sell and trade it, then use it for fraudulent purposes.
Ramirez was charged with three counts of identity theft with a prior identity theft conviction from September 5, 2017. (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subds. (c)(1) & (2).) On December 7, 2018, a jury found him guilty of all three identity theft charges. He was sentenced on January 8, 2019, and he timely appealed.
II.
DISCUSSION
During in limine motions, the court denied Ramirez's motion to exclude evidence relating to his 2017 conviction. Ramirez contends this was an abuse of discretion by the court. We disagree.
A.
Evidence Code Section 1101We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court's implicit determination that "the charged and uncharged offenses were sufficiently similar to support an inference that defendant harbored the same intent . . . in each instance." (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1149 (Carter).) "The decision to exclude evidence 'will not be disturbed except on a showing [that] the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice [citation].' " (People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 745 (Peoples).)
Section 1101, subdivision (b) allows the admission of evidence "that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove some fact (such as . . . intent . . . ) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act." When the prosecution seeks to admit uncharged criminal conduct to show the defendant's intent in committing the charged offense, "[i]n order to be admissible to prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the inference that the defendant ' "probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations.]' " (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402 (Ewoldt).) "The incidents need not have the greater degree of similarity required to show the existence of a common plan or the shared distinctive pattern required to show identity." (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15 (Demetrulias).) " '[W]hen the other crime evidence is admitted solely for its relevance to the defendant's intent, a distinctive similarity between the two crimes is often unnecessary for the other crime to be relevant.' " (People v. Delgado (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1837, 1845.)
Admission of the facts underlying Ramirez's previous conviction are relevant to the issue of intent as they demonstrate " 'that if a person acts similarly in similar situations, he probably harbors the same intent in each instance' [citations], and that such prior conduct may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the actor's most recent intent. The inference to be drawn is not that the actor is disposed to commit such acts; instead, the inference to be drawn is that, in light of the first event, the actor, at the time of the second event, must have had the intent attributed to him by the prosecution." (People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879.)
Ramirez draws a distinction between his use of the personal identification in the prior instance and his mere possession of it in the instant offense, arguing there is not a sufficient degree of similarity between the two acts to warrant admission under section 1101, subdivision (b). However, the acts need not have the greater degree of similarity required to show the existence of a common plan or the shared distinctive pattern required to show identity. (See Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 15.)
Applying these standards, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the 2017 prior act because Ramirez's 2017 conviction for identity theft and the instant offense both involve Ramirez's possession of personally identifying documents without the victims' knowledge or consent. In both instances, Ramirez took the personal identification of others, attempting to gain personally from either its use or sale. In 2017, he took someone else's identification without her knowledge and used it to check in to a motel. In 2018, he took multiple pieces of personal identifying materials from the trash with the stated intention to sell it. In both 2017 and 2018, Ramirez's actions resulted in defrauding individuals by taking identifying documents and using them to seek personal gain.
Thus, Ramirez's 2017 conviction for identity theft and the instant offense both involve sufficient similarities "to support the inference that the defendant ' "probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each instance." [Citations]' " (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 402), and the trial court was within its discretion to conclude the evidence of the 2017 identity theft conviction was relevant to show that Ramirez probably harbored the same intent to defraud in 2018.
B.
Evidence Code Section 352Ramirez also argues that admission of the 2017 identity theft-related evidence was barred by section 352, because its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value.
We apply abuse of discretion standard of review to the trial court's decision on whether evidence of uncharged crimes should be excluded under section 352. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 371.) To demonstrate such abuse, Ramirez needs to establish the trial court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd, and that it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Peoples, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 745.) The trial court is required to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect that evidence may have on the defendant's right to a fair trial (§ 352) and has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 727.)
As discussed ante, evidence regarding the 2017 prior act had probative value on the issue of intent. One of the central and contested elements in this case was intent. The trial court's conclusion that the underlying facts of the 2017 prior act were highly probative as to the issue of possession with intent to defraud another person was not arbitrary or capricious because it considered the value of the information before admitting it.
Moreover, the court specifically instructed the jury not to consider the 2017 identity theft to show that Ramirez had a bad character or was predisposed to commit crime. The trial court specified the purposes for which evidence of the 2017 prior crime was admitted, stating it was only for section 1101, subdivision (b) and impeachment purposes. The limiting instruction served to reduce any prejudice resulting from evidence of the 2017 prior act. (See Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1151 [as part of its analysis of whether evidence of prior criminal acts should have been excluded under section 352, the court observed that the jury instructions "conveyed that evidence relating to those events could not be considered to prove defendant's bad character or criminal disposition"].) We must assume, absent contrary evidence, that the jury followed the trial court's instructions. (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 689, fn. 17.)
We cannot say, as a matter of law, that this probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. (§ 352.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
C.
Harmless Error
Ramirez contends prejudicial error resulted from the admission of the facts underlying his 2017 prior crime.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence, we conclude the admission of that evidence constitutes harmless error because there was additional circumstantial evidence of Ramirez's intent to defraud in this case. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) Under Watson, we ask whether it is reasonably probable that the defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had the evidence been excluded. (Ibid.)
Admission of the 2017 prior act did not result in prejudicial error because the trial court issued verbal and written instructions, while specifying it could only be considered for the particular purpose of deciding intent. Even if the prejudicial error occurred based on admission of the previous crime, the error was harmless because the jury, correctly informed of the burden of proof and the elements of the offense, is presumed to understand and follow the court's instructions. (See People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 201.)
Moreover, if the facts underlying the prior act were excluded, it is not reasonably probable Ramirez would have obtained a more favorable outcome because Ramirez admitted to Officer Hadland that he had no intention of returning the personal identifying information. This statement of intent by itself showed Ramirez intended to defraud.
Ramirez also contends the trial court gave the jurors an improper reason to find Ramirez had the intent to defraud because it is possible he had the personal identifying information in his backpack by mistake. Yet, Officer Hadland stated that at the time of the search, the personal identifying information was well-organized and set apart from the other miscellaneous materials in Ramirez's backpack. All of this, while taking into consideration the detective's testimony regarding the black market for personal identifying information, provides an independent basis for the jury to reach the same result with or without the admission of the 2017 prior crime.
We are of the opinion it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Ramirez would have been reached had the underlying facts of the 2017 prior crime been excluded. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 at p. 837.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J. WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J. HALLER, J.