Opinion
1-20-1276
06-30-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN RAMEY, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 86 CR 1416 02; Honorable Charles P. Burns, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment. Presiding Justice Gordon specially concurred.
ORDER
McBRIDE, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition because defendant's sentencing claim is not cognizable when he committed the offenses as an adult.
¶ 2 Defendant John Ramey appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for leave to file his pro se successive postconviction petition. He argues on appeal that as a 22-year-old, his natural life sentence is unconstitutional as applied to him under the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Based on emerging authority regarding youthful offenders and his unconstitutional sentence, defendant asserts that he satisfied the requisite cause and prejudice for filing a successive postconviction petition and the trial court erred in denying his motion.
¶ 3 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder, residential burglary, and robbery after police discovered the bound, gagged and beaten body of 65 year-old Sylvia Wilson in her apartment located at West Jackson Boulevard and South Homan Avenue in Chicago. Since defendant is not challenging his conviction, we provide a brief summary of the evidence presented at trial. Defendant admitted in a statement to the police that on January 5, 1986, his codefendant suggested that defendant and a second codefendant help to rob Wilson. While the codefendant entered Wilson's apartment, defendant waited in the lobby of her apartment building and the second codefendant waited in a car on the street. Codefendant returned to the lobby 15 minutes later and asked defendant to help carry bags from the apartment. When defendant entered Wilson's apartment, she was tied up on the bed. After reentering the apartment, codefendant hit her on the head, placed a rag into her mouth, and tied the rag in place. Defendant and the codefendant rejoined the second codefendant in the car, left the scene and split the $45 proceeds of the robbery. The evidence disclosed that Wilson died from strangulation. Multiple witnesses testified that they saw defendant in the lobby of Wilson's building the day of the offense.
¶ 4 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the murder was committed in a brutal and heinous manner. Specifically, the court discussed its findings on the record.
"Well, as I said earlier, this 65-year old lady lived alone in a one-bedroom apartment. [Defendant] knew that she lived there. He had some contact with that building, his brother did, and this lady who had been evicted from that apartment a short time before the day of the murder produced money to pay the rent that was
in arrears. They, apparently, somebody thought she had more money and [defendant and the codefendants] drove there that day. And the killing of this lady was unbelievable. She was bound and in a very strange way, the medical examiner testified. She was beaten. A couple of teeth were broken out. Now, you don't knock out teeth of an old 65-year-old lady out very easily, but that is what happened. Obviously, they beat her and they tied her up. It was in January. They left the window open, and they left her bound there. I don't know how long she was alive, but she eventually died. As the statute says, the murder was accompanied by brutal and heinous and savage behavior, and of course, at the same time, the aggravating factors of committing another felony. *** I recognize the fact that these defendants are relatively free of any background, but they had decided to take this lady's life, and they did it in a terrible way. It is just as hard for me to grasp why they would do this to her; why they thought it was necessary to take her money, you want to beat her, but to murder her. She was murdered. It is just outrageous."
¶ 5 The court then sentenced defendant to life imprisonment, a consecutive extended term of 30 years, and a concurrent term of 7 years in prison, respectively. This court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. People v. Ramey, 240 Ill.App.3d 456 (1992).
¶ 6 Defendant subsequently filed multiple collateral attacks against his conviction. See People v. Ramey, No. 1-96-3098 (1998) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23) (granting appointed appellate counsel's motion for leave to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley 481 U.S. 551 (1987) and affirming the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's 1994 postconviction petition); People v. Ramey, No. 1-99-3474 (2002) (unpublished order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23) (affirming the circuit court's judgment denying defendant's 1999 pro se petition for habeas corpus and finding that defendant's sentences were constitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, (2000)); People v. Ramey, 393 Ill.App.3d 661, 679-80 (2009) (affirming the second stage dismissal of defendant's successive postconviction petition claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but modifying defendant's 30-year sentence for residential burglary to be served concurrently with his natural life sentence); People v. Ramey, No. 1-13-3388 (2015) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)) (granting appointed appellate counsel's motion for leave to withdraw under Finley 481 U.S. 551, and affirming the circuit court's denial of defendant's 2013 petition for relief from judgment); and People v. Ramey, No. 1-16-2656 (2019) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)) (granting appointed appellate counsel's motion for leave to withdraw under Finley, 481 U.S. 551, and affirming the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition).
¶ 7 In May 2020, defendant filed the pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition at issue in this case. In his successive petition, defendant raised multiple issues, including the claim that his natural life sentence was unconstitutional as applied to him in violation of the proportionate penalties clause because the trial court failed to consider defendant's age and other information before imposing his sentence. According to defendant, he started using marijuana and PCP at age 15 which slowed his brain development. He supported this claim with his own affidavit as well as affidavits from friends and family members attesting that he used drugs as a teenager. He also attached an article discussing brain development in teenagers.
¶ 8 In October 2020, the trial court entered a written order denying defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition. The court rejected defendant's sentencing claim, finding that defendant was not a juvenile at the time of the incident and that defendant failed to include any research to support his claim.
¶ 9 This appeal follows.
¶ 10 Defendant raises a single claim on appeal that the trial court erred in denying him leave to file his successive petition. Specifically, he argues that his sentencing claim satisfied the cause and prejudice test because the trial court imposed defendant's natural life sentence without considering defendant's youthful age in violation of the proportionate penalties clause.
¶ 11 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Post-Conviction Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (a)(1) (West 2018)) provides a tool by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution or both. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 378-79 (1998). Only one postconviction proceeding is contemplated under the Post-Conviction Act (People v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22) and a defendant seeking to file a successive postconviction petition must first obtain leave of court (People v. Tidwell, 236 Ill.2d 150, 157 (2010)). The bar against successive postconviction proceedings should not be relaxed unless (1) a defendant can establish "cause and prejudice" for the failure to raise the claim earlier or (2) he can show actual innocence under the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶¶ 22-23; People v. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 30. Under the cause and prejudice test, a defendant must establish both (1) cause for his or her failure to raise the claim earlier; and (2) prejudice stemming from his or her failure to do so. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 22 (citing People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill.2d 444, 459 (2002)). It is defendant's burden to establish a prima facie showing of both cause and prejudice in order to be granted leave before further proceedings on his claims can follow. See People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 24.
¶ 12 The sentencing of juvenile and youthful offenders has been evolving in the country over the last several years. Beginning with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the United States Supreme Court weighed in and set forth new constitutional parameters for the sentencing of juvenile offenders. See also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479-80 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 735-36 (2016). "[T]he United States Supreme Court has advised that 'children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.'" People v. Lusby 2020 IL 124046, ¶ 32 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471). "The Court outlawed capital sentences for juveniles who commit murder in Roper and capital sentences for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses in Graham. And in Miller, the Court barred mandatory life sentences for juveniles who commit murder." Id. Miller has since been held to apply retroactively. Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 735-36; see also People v. Holman, 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 38 (recognizing that Miller applied retroactively).
¶ 13 Since Miller, the Illinois Supreme Court has suggested similar sentencing challenges are viable for youthful offenders, i.e., defendants who are young, but legal adults. See People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶¶ 43-44 (finding that a 19-year-old defendant was not necessarily foreclosed from raising an as-applied challenge in the trial court and observing that the Post-Conviction Act was designed to resolve such constitutional claims); People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 48 (concluding that the 18-year-old defendant's as-applied proportionate penalties challenge was "more appropriately raised" in a postconviction proceeding rather than on direct appeal).
¶ 14 Here, defendant contends that under Miller and its progeny, his natural life sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because his brain was more akin to that of a juvenile when he committed the offenses at age 22. While defendant relies on several cases to support his Miller claim, nearly all involved proportionate penalties claims advanced by defendants who were 18 or 19 years old at the time they committed the offenses, rather than a 22-year-old. See People v. Minniefield, 2020 IL App (1st) 170541; People v. Franklin, 2020 IL App (1st) 171628; People v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171362; People v. Bland, 2020 IL App (3d) 170705; Ruiz, 2020 IL App (1st) 163145; People v. Ross, 2020 IL App (1st) 171202.
¶ 15 This court recently considered and rejected the same argument advanced by defendant. People v. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749; People v. Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112. We held that Miller and its progeny do not support a sentencing challenge for a defendant aged 21 years and over. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42; Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶ 32. In those cases, the defendants, who were 21 years old, each argued that they had a viable claim that their sentences violated the proportionate penalties clause because the trial court imposed the sentences without any consideration of their age and its attendant characteristics. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 30; Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶ 25.
¶ 16 In reaching our conclusion, we reviewed the recent line of cases considering Millers applicability to defendants who were 21 years old or older at the time of the offenses as well as recent statutory enactments by the General Assembly. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶¶ 37-41; Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶¶ 35-39. We found the decisions in People v. Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, People v. Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, and People v. Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, to be instructive. Green, 2022 IL App (1st) 200749, ¶ 42; Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶ 40.
¶ 17 In Humphrey, 2020 IL App (1st) 172837, ¶ 1, the defendant filed a successive postconviction petition, alleging that his natural life sentence for crimes committed when he was 21 violated the proportionate penalties clause. The reviewing court similarly observed that the defendant could "point to no case in which an Illinois court has recognized that a life sentence imposed on a young adult-21 or older as [the defendant] was-is unconstitutional as applied to that offender under the proportionate penalties clause." Id. ¶ 33. "The evolving science on brain development may support such claims at some time in the future, but for now individuals who are 21 years or older when they commit an offense are adults for purposes of a Miller claim." Id. The Humphrey court reasoned:
"While 21 is undoubtedly somewhat arbitrary, drawing a line there is in keeping with other aspects of criminal law and society's current general recognition that 21 is considered the beginning of adulthood. In Illinois, a person under the age of 21 when he or she commits first degree murder is now eligible for parole review after serving 20 or more years of his or her sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West Supp. 2019). The Illinois legislature has also prohibited the sale of nicotine and tobacco products to persons under 21 (720 ILCS 675/1 (West Supp. 2019)), prohibited the sale of alcohol products to persons under 21 (235 ILCS 5/6-16 (West 2016)), and made possession of a firearm by those under the age of 21 an aggravating factor for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2016))." Id. ¶ 34.
¶ 18 In Rivera, 2020 IL App (1st) 171430, ¶ 1, the defendant filed a successive postconviction petition seeking Miller protections for youthful offenders because he received a sentence of 55 years for first degree murder and armed robbery committed when he was 23. In reviewing the defendant's proportionate penalties claim, the Rivera court found that any arguments that could be made based on the statutes and cases relating to defendants under the age of 21 were not applicable. Id. ¶ 26. The reviewing court concluded that if an extension of Miller protections should be made for defendants over the age of 21, then it should be made by our legislature or our supreme court. Id. ¶ 27. "The supreme court and the legislature are in a better position to draw clear, predictable and uniform lines for our state." Id.; see also People v. Kruger, 2021 IL App (4th) 190687, ¶ 32 (agreeing with the Humphrey court's limitation of Miller-based claims to defendants 18 to 20 years old and any further extension should be made by either the legislature or the supreme court).
¶ 19 Similarly, in Suggs, 2020 IL App (2d) 170632, ¶¶ 30-44, the reviewing court affirmed the summary dismissal at the first stage of an initial postconviction petition where the defendant, who was 23 years old at the time of his offense, raised eighth amendment and proportionate penalties challenges to his de facto life sentence. The Suggs court noted that although "society has drawn lines at ages 18 and 21 for various purposes," the defendant failed to "point to any line, societal, legal, or penological, that is older than 21 years." Id. ¶ 35. The reviewing court concluded while it may seem "but a short step" to apply the Miller factors to an 18-year-old offender, "it is a much greater leap to extend [them] to a 21-year-old, and an even greater leap to apply [them] to a 23-year-old," such as the defendant in that case. Id.
¶ 20 Additionally, this court in Green reviewed the recent statutes enacted by the General Assembly regarding youthful offenders limiting relief to defendants under 21 years of age.
"In addition to addressing the growing case law regarding youthful offenders, the legislature firmly established the line between a young adult offender entitled to sentencing protection and adult offenders. Section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code
of Corrections created a parole review for offenders under the age of 21 at the time of the offense. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020). Under this statute, a person convicted of first degree murder is eligible for parole after serving only 20 years, if he or she was under 21 years old at the time of the offense and was sentenced after the law took effect. Id. § 5-4.5-115(b). Additionally, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 defines a '"' [m]inor'"' as "a person under the age of 21 years subject to this Act" (705 ILCS 405/1-3(10) (West 2018)), while an '[a]dult'" means a person 21 years of age or older' (id. § 1-3(2)). Thus, under this statutory scheme, defendant was an adult at age 21. It is also worth noting that under the current sentencing requirements, the murder of a police officer mandates the imposition of a mandatory sentence of natural life without the possibility of parole for a defendant over the age of 18. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1 (a)(1)(c)(iii) (West 2020); id. § 5-4.5-115(b)." Green, 2022 IL (1st) 200749, ¶ 41.
¶ 21 This court in Green found Humphrey, Rivera, and Suggs to be controlling. Id. ¶ 42. Based on these cases and the relevant statutes, we concluded that "the line of adulthood has been drawn at age 21." Id. We reached the same conclusion in Hemphill and found that the 21 -year-old defendant "was an adult for purposes of a Miller claim." Hemphill, 2022 IL App (1st) 201112, ¶ 40.
¶ 22 We continue to adhere to this reasoning in the present case and hold that Miller is inapplicable because defendant was a 22-year-old adult at the time of the offenses. Since defendant's sentencing claim is not cognizable under Miller, he cannot establish the requisite cause and prejudice and the trial court properly denied defendant leave to file his successive postconviction petition.
¶ 23 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 24 Affirmed.
¶ 25 PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON, specially concurring:
¶ 26 I agree that the trial court committed no error in the case at bar and I would affirm; however, I do not agree with the analysis of the majority that there is a bright line rule that individuals who are 21 years or older when they commit an offense must be treated as adults for purposes of a Miller claim and as a result I must write separately, as there may be exceptions. A bright line rule of age has to be decided by our legislature or by our Supreme Court, not by a panel of the Illinois Appellate Court. The area of offenses over the age of 21 years old is still an area of the law in the development stage.
¶ 27 There may be situations where young adults can be treated as juveniles, as our Supreme Court has indicated in Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 45. In the successive petition filed by the defendant, he failed to claim how the drugs he consumed / or how his brain development caused him to be in the same situation as that of a juvenile. There is nothing in the successive petition to support any of the petition's claims his brain was more like a juvenile than an adult, as the trial court concluded. The defendant participated in a brutal and heinous crime that took the life of a 65-year-old female for $45.00, and there was no evidence at sentencing that this 21-year-old had any potential for rehabilitation.