People v. Rahming

19 Citing cases

  1. People v. Padgett

    932 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1997)   Cited 27 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the subsequent discovery of a possible warrant did not overcome the other factors favoring suppression

    An individual's attempt to avoid coming into contact with a police officer does not, without more, justify an investigative detention of the individual. People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Colo. 1990). The officers informed Padgett that he could not leave until an arrest warrants check was run on him: "And I told them that I would have them on their way if they didn't have any warrants."

  2. People v. Revoal

    269 P.3d 1238 (Colo. 2012)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that a warrantless search is presumptively “unreasonable unless it is justified by one of the few, specifically established exceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment”

    ¶ 16 We have often stated that, standing alone, a history of past criminal activity in a locality does not justify suspension of the constitutional rights of everyone, or anyone, who may subsequently be in that locality. See, e.g., People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Colo.1990). In this case, the recent robberies in the area cannot alone justify the stop.

  3. People v. Greer

    860 P.2d 528 (Colo. 1993)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that an investigatory stop cannot be based solely on the reputation of past criminal activity in an area

    The facts known to the officer, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, must create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity which justifies an intrusion into the defendant's personal privacy at the time of the stop. People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Colo. 1990). The officer's unarticulated hunch that a criminal act has occurred, however, is not sufficient to support an investigatory stop.

  4. People v. McKnight

    446 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2019)   Cited 27 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Recognizing Colorado's longstanding application of this Fourth Amendment framework under article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution

    And we have consistently rejected the notion that "a history of past criminal activity in an area is itself sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being, has been, or will be committed." Outlaw v. People , 17 P.3d 150, 157 (Colo. 2001) (citing People v. Greer , 860 P.2d 528, 531 (Colo. 1993) ; People v. Rahming , 795 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Colo. 1990) ). If "a history of past criminal activity in an area" wasn't enough on its own to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, then it also wouldn't be enough on its own to satisfy the more stringent standard of probable cause.

  5. People v. Funez–Paiagua

    276 P.3d 576 (Colo. 2012)   Cited 12 times

    We noted that an attempt to avoid coming into contact with a police officer does not, without more, justify an investigative detention of the individual. Id. at ¶ 18;see People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Colo.1990). The majority acknowledges the similarities of this case to Revoal.

  6. People v. Arias

    159 P.3d 134 (Colo. 2007)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that a motor vehicle stop was unjustified because the officer who erroneously thought that an air freshener hanging from a rearview mirror, regardless of whether it “obstructed” the “driver's vision through any required glass equipment,” was a violation of Colorado law had not testified to any facts to support an objective finding that the air freshener obstructed driver's view

    In making this determination, the police must have more than an "unparticularized suspicion or hunch" that the suspect is engaged in criminal activity. People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Colo. 1990) ( quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct 1868). This inquiry is objective and must be viewed in light of "the facts and circumstances known to the officer immediately prior to the stop."

  7. Outlaw v. People

    17 P.3d 150 (Colo. 2001)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that defendant walking away after noticing patrol car fails to provide reasonable suspicion

    We have rejected the proposition that a history of past criminal activity in an area is itself sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being, has been, or will be committed. See People v. Greer, 860 P.2d 528, 531 (Colo. 1993); People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1343 (Colo. 1990). The fact that Outlaw and his companions were standing in a neighborhood frequented by crime is not in itself a basis for concluding that Outlaw was engaged in criminal conduct.

  8. People v. Smith

    13 P.3d 300 (Colo. 2000)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that when a second car pulled up and stopped behind a police officer presently engaged in the traffic stop of a stolen car, the officer reasonably stopped and searched the second car to secure his own safety

    In making this determination, police officers must have more than an "unparticularized suspicion or hunch" that criminal activity is afoot. See People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Colo. 1990) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27). The inquiry is objective, considering the facts and circumstances known to the officer immediately prior to the stop.

  9. People v. Canton

    951 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1998)   Cited 14 times

    In this case, because the individuals scattered when he approached, Officer Szentmartoni could reasonably believe that they were afraid of being observed (as if they were engaged in illegal activity). Furthermore, although a history of criminal activity in a locality does not justify suspension of the constitutional rights of anyone who may subsequently be at that locality, see People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Colo. 1990), the fact that an area is reputed to be the site of drug trafficking can provide support for an officer's decision to stop an individual. See Greer, 860 P.2d at 531; Ratcliff, 778 P.2d at 1379.

  10. People v. Morales

    935 P.2d 936 (Colo. 1997)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that defendant was not seized when asked questions about his identity and where he was going, but that he was seized when he said he was leaving and police continued to question him about possible criminal conduct

    We do not imply that those individuals are somehow suspicious merely because of how they dress. See People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Colo. 1990) (holding in case where individuals were dressed as gang members that facts in addition to appearance would be necessary to justify detention). In analyzing the question of when a combination of otherwise innocent circumstances may lead to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the United States Supreme Court has found that a person looking backward over his shoulder, concealing the fact that he was traveling with someone, and carrying no luggage was not enough to raise legitimate suspicions.