Opinion
C088968
06-08-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HEATHER LYNN RAGLEN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CR034748)
A jury found defendant Heather Lynn Raglen guilty of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon (a hammer). The jury found that the attempted murder was not committed willfully and with premeditation but found true great bodily injury enhancements on both counts. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider defendant's intoxication in imposing the upper term of nine years for the attempted murder, and insufficient evidence supports the great bodily injury enhancements. We disagree with both contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant lived with the victim, her 73-year-old mother. One morning defendant told the victim that one of the cows was having calving problems. As the victim began walking outside toward one of her barns, defendant told her that she was going in the wrong direction and that she should instead go toward a smaller equipment barn on the property.
When the victim got closer to the equipment barn, defendant struck her in the head with a claw hammer from behind. A short struggle over the hammer ensued, until the victim noticed that defendant had a "scary stare," as if she "looked right through" the victim. Frightened, the victim started yelling for help. Defendant, in a "strange voice," told the victim, "Don't yell, nobody's going to hear you." The victim then fled to a neighbor's house, where the neighbor called the Lassen County Sheriff's Department.
When deputies arrived, they found defendant had "red, watery eyes," "slurred speech," smelled of alcohol, and appeared to be "extremely intoxicated." She said she did not remember what had happened. Deputies arrested defendant and took her to the county jail, where her blood-alcohol content was found to be .38 percent.
The victim was taken to the hospital, where she was treated for several "half moon shaped" lacerations on her head, consistent with blows from a hammer. She also had bruising around her left eye. Doctors took an X-ray of her hand, which was swollen, but determined that it was only bruised and that she would not need stitches for her head wounds.
A jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder but found that it was not done willfully and with deliberation and premeditation. The jury also found defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon and found true a great bodily injury enhancement as to each count.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant argued that her extreme intoxication at the time of the attack should be a mitigating factor because it reduced her culpability for the crime. The trial court rejected the argument, saying that the jury had already factored defendant's intoxication into its decision by finding that the attempted murder was not willful, deliberate, or premeditated.
The trial court also noted a number of aggravating factors. In particular, defendant lured the victim into an isolated location and ambushed her with a weapon, which indicated cruelty or callousness, as well as planning. The victim was particularly vulnerable because she was elderly and in the care of defendant, and defendant was in a position of trust because the victim had previously cared for defendant, who had had problems with alcohol for some time. The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of nine years, plus a five-year enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury.
DISCUSSION
I
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Imposing The Upper Term
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider her intoxication at the time of the attack as a mitigating factor in her sentence. In particular, she claims that it was improper for the court to give little weight to her intoxication as a mitigating factor merely because the jury had already considered it in deciding whether the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated. We disagree.
The People contend that defendant forfeited her right to raise her intoxication on appeal because she did not object at the sentencing hearing. But any such objection would have been futile. Before the sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed a sentencing brief, arguing that defendant was "extremely intoxicated," and was thus significantly less culpable for the attack. Counsel made a similar argument at the sentencing hearing, saying that defendant "was so intoxicated at the time that she doesn't remember the incident." These arguments were specifically rejected by the trial court at the hearing and defense counsel need not offer further futile objection to avoid forfeiture. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587 ["[c]ounsel is not required to proffer futile objections"].)
A trial court's sentencing decision is subject to review for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) An upper term sentence may be based upon "any aggravating circumstance that the court deems significant . . . [and] 'reasonably related to the decision being made.' " (Id. at p. 848, quoting Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.408(a).) " 'The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.' " (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.) A "trial court may 'minimize or even entirely disregard mitigating factors without stating its reasons.' " (People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1258.) And even a "single valid factor in aggravation is sufficient to justify the imposition of the upper term." (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1758.).
The fact that the court did not give great weight to defendant's alcoholism as a mitigating factor does not mean that it failed to exercise its discretion or "refused to take this factor into consideration." It simply means that the court considered the mitigating impact of that factor and rejected it. Similarly, the court had the discretion to consider the intoxication in the context of the particular crimes for which defendant was being sentenced, and thus could consider whether it had already played a role in defendant's trial. Finally, defendant's intoxication was discussed in the sentencing hearing and balanced against defendant's many aggravating factors, any one of which would have justified the imposition of the upper term. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing decision.
II
Sufficient Evidence Supported The Jury's Finding Of Great Bodily Injury
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the injuries the victim sustained in the attack are too transitory to count as "great bodily injury." In support of this argument, she cites several cases in which very severe injuries constituted great bodily injury and argues that these cases establish a principle that lacerations alone are not substantial enough to be great bodily injury. We disagree.
To assess the sufficiency of the evidence, we "review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) "Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' " (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
Under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (f), great bodily injury simply means "a significant or substantial physical injury." "To be significant the injury need not be so grave as to cause the victim permanent, prolonged or protracted bodily damage." (People v. Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 227.) Indeed, "some physical pain or damage, such as lacerations, bruises, or abrasions is sufficient for a finding of 'great bodily injury.' " (People v. Washington (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1047.)
The victim, a 73-year-old woman, suffered lacerations on her scalp and bruising around her eye and hand after defendant hit her in the head with a hammer. The lacerations were over an inch long, and there was blood dripping off of her forehead and onto the front of her shirt. She required X-rays and bandages, and doctors wrapped her head in gauze. Given the victim's age and the fact that she received multiple head wounds, a reasonable trier of fact could find that she sustained great bodily injury. Sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Butz, J. /s/_________
Mauro, J.