Defendant retained a new attorney one week before the scheduled trial date, and County Court denied the request of that attorney, made three days before trial was to commence, for a brief continuance in order to prepare for trial. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a continuance made on the eve of trial ( see, People v. Michalek, 195 A.D.2d 1007, 1008, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 807; People v. Rosica, 171 A.D.2d 931, 933, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 1000; People v. Gabler, 129 A.D.2d 733). Defendant failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that "the requested adjournment [had] been necessitated by forces beyond his control and [was] not simply a dilatory tactic" ( People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264, 272). In addition, defendant did not specify how he would be prejudiced if the trial were not adjourned ( see, People v. LaValla, 272 A.D.2d 960, 961, lv denied 95 N.Y.2d 854; People v. Queeglay, 237 A.D.2d 896, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). We have reviewed the contentions of defendant in his pro se supplemental brief and conclude that they have no merit.

Defense counsel stated that he had attempted to prepare for trial by meeting with defendant during the previous weekend, but that defendant was uncooperative. In addition, defendant did not specify how he would be prejudiced if the trial were not adjourned ( see, People v. Queeglay, 237 A.D.2d 896, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for an adjournment ( see, People v. Conyers, 227 A.D.2d 793, 794, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 982).

We conclude, however, that the court did not abuse its discretion here. In view of the Public Defender's previous involvement with the case, the reassignment to the Public Defender the day before jury selection did not hamper the defense ( see, People v. Queeglay, 237 A.D.2d 896, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866; People v. Houk, 222 A.D.2d 1074, 1075; cf., People. v. Snyder, 297 N.Y. 81; People v. Douglas, 19 A.D.2d 455), nor did the fact that two assistant public defenders conducted some parts of the trial. Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contention that the evidence of forcible compulsion (Penal Law § 130.00) is insufficient to sustain his conviction of first degree rape ( see, People v. Gray, 86 N.Y.2d 10, 19; People v. Fenton, 234 A.D.2d 921, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1011).

Defendant contends that Supreme Court improperly restricted defense counsel's cross-examination of the victim, the sole eyewitness. "The scope of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court" ( People v. Snell, 234 A.D.2d 986, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1015). The court properly exercised its discretion in precluding certain questioning regarding the reliability of the identification of defendant because that questioning sought to elicit testimony that constituted hearsay ( see, People v. Hargrove, 213 A.D.2d 492, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 846) and testimony that was irrelevant ( see, People v. Martinez, 177 A.D.2d 600, 601, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 829). The court also properly exercised its discretion in curtailing further cross-examination regarding the victim's credibility ( see, People v. Wuo Queeglay, 237 A.D.2d 896, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). The court's "discretion includes limiting the scope of cross-examination concerning collateral issues designed solely to impeach the witness's credibility" ( People v. Perotti, 233 A.D.2d 936, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 945). The court properly sustained the prosecutor's objections to questions of the witness concerning the ownership of the store where the robbery occurred and the financing involved in the purchase of the store ( see, People v. Sloan, 242 A.D.2d 898, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 880; People v. Gugino [appeal No. 1], 229 A.D.2d 968, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 864). We reject the contention of defendant that the court improperly restricted the scope of the testimony of an alibi witness on redirect examination.